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ABSTRACT

A LONGITUDINAL EXAMINATION OF HOW HOSPITAL PROVISION OF HOME
HEALTH SERVICES CHANGED AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
BALANCED BUDGET ACT OF 1997: DOES OWNERSHIP MATTER?
By Tiang-Hong Chou, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009
Dissertation Director: Kenneth R. White, Ph.D., FACHE.
Professor, Department of Health Administration

By using a natural experiment approach and longitudinal national hospital data,
this study sheds light on the objective functions of hospitals with different ownership
forms by comparing their relative reductions in HH provision after the implementation of
the BBA. The empirical findings reveal that for-profit hospitals behave differently as
compared to public and private nonprofit hospitals, due to their different operational
objectives. While the response of for-profit hospitals is consistent with the
profit-maximizer model, both public and private nonprofit ownership types behave
consistently in accordance with the model of two-good producers whose objective is to
maximize market outputs for meeting the health care needs of the community, given the

break-even requirement. This finding provides support for the tax exemption the United
States government has granted private nonprofit hospitals.
Although the response patterns of the nonprofit ownership types are in general
similar, this study found that, contrary to expectation, religious hospitals were more
likely than secular nonprofit hospitals to have reduced HH provision after the BBA.
Further studies are needed to explore the difference in operational behaviors between
these two ownership types.
Built on previous related studies and applying a more comprehensive set of
independent and control variables with improved data sources, this study is able to
examine the effects of certain organizational and market factors on hospital offering of
HH care pre-BBA and the change in the provision of HH care in the six years following
the implementation of the BBA. Hospital proportion of Medicare patients, hospital size,
total profit margin, case mix index, elderly density in the market are found to be positive
determinants of a hospital‘s likelihood of offering HH care. However, these
organizational and market factors, in general, play a non-significant role in influencing
hospitals‘ changes in HH care provision after the implementation of the BBA. In the
study, explanations and implications of these finding are discussed. Finally, potential
limitations to this study and opportunities for future research are addressed.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Study Problem
The primary goal of this study is to shed light on how the objective functions of
hospitals with different ownership types differ by comparing their responses to changes
in payment policies following enactment of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. This Act
created a natural experiment by imposing differential financial incentives on hospitals
with different ownership types. Of particular interest is the change in hospital provision
of one particular post-acute care service: home health care.
During the period 1980 to 1997, the number of hospital-based post-acute care (PAC)
services in the United States increased dramatically. Two major reasons for the increase
were: (1) to meet the needs of the growing elderly population, and (2) to respond to the
1983 implementation of prospective reimbursement in the form of Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs) in the hospital sector for patients covered by Medicare. DRGs created
major pressure on hospitals to shorten hospital stays and contain costs (Morrisey, Sloan,
and Valvona, 1988; Shortell, Gillies, and Devers, 1995; Kane, Kane, and Ladd, 1998:35).
Hospital provision of PAC services—such as home health (HH) or nursing home
(NH) care—is viewed by many researchers and managers as an effective integration
strategy for hospitals (Hughes and Renehan, 2005; Robinson, 1994; Dansky, Milliron,
and Gamm, 1996). By integrating with PAC facilities and providing PAC services on its
1
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own a hospital would not only ensure the smooth transfer of patients to PAC facilities and
reduce lengths of stay and related costs (Chiu, 1995), but it would also bring in revenues
from sources other than acute care. This strategy was especially successful as PAC
services were not included in the prospective payment either by public payers (Medicare
and Medicaid) or private payers (private LTC insurance companies or out-of-pocket
payers). Consequently, the percentage of hospitals having a NH unit rose from 9 percent
in 1972 to 21 percent in 1990 (Robinson, 1996). The number of total Medicare-certified
HH agencies (HHAs) increased from 2,924 to 10,444 between 1980 and 1997 (NAHCH,
2008). The ratio of the number of Medicare-certified hospital-based HHAs to the number
of total Medicare-certified HHAs grew from 12.3 percent in 1980 to 30.1 percent in 2000
(NAHCH, 2008).
However, this hospital diversification/integration strategy was seriously challenged
by the enactment of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). This Act resulted in a
reduction in Medicare payments for hospital-based PAC services, particularly HH care.
Most researchers and managers agree that the BBA dramatically changed the
environment in which HHAs operate (Horwitz, 2005a; Fennell and Campbell, 2007).
While profitable or potentially profitable prior to passage of the BBA, most HH services
have become unprofitable since the implementation of the BBA. Studies have reported
that many hospitals started dropping HHAs after the BBA (Paone and Mullen, 2005,
Horwitz, 2005a). The number of hospital-based Medicare-certified HHAs declined from
2,698 to 2,151 between 1997 and 2000, and by 2007, there was a further decline to 1,503
(NAHCH, 2008).
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The changes instituted by the BBA provide an opportunity for researchers to
examine hospital-based HH services by ownership type under different reimbursement
conditions. The aim of this study is to examine whether the implementation of the BBA
resulted in changes in the provision of HH services among hospitals of different
ownership types.
Background
Home Health Care
Although HH care has only accounted for less than 3 percent of total personal
health care expenditures in the U.S. (Poisal et al., 2007), HH care serves the greatest
number of people among the continuum of LTC services. In 2000, U.S. HH programs
discharged about 7.2 million people. The number of patients receiving HH care at a given
point of time is estimated to be 1.4 million (Feldman, Nadash, and Gursen, 2005).
The U.S. HH care industry grew rapidly in the past decades largely due to the
growing number of the elderly, public funding and policy, popular demand, and
technological advances that promote complicated care at home (Hughes and Renehan,
2005). Both the absolute capacity and relative importance of HH grew significantly.
Between 1970 and 1997, HH expenditures increased from $0.2 billion to $34.5 billion,
and the share of total health expenditures accounted for by HH rose from 0.3 percent to
3.2 percent (Levit, Smith, Cowan, Lazenby, and Martin, 2002). According to the National
Association of Home Care and Hospice (NAHCH), the number of Medicare certified
HHAs increased from 1,753 in 1967 to a peak of 10,444 in 1997, dropped to 6,861 in
2001, and gradually rose again to 9,284 in 2007 (NAHCH, 2008).
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The vast majority of HH consumers are people age 65 or over, accounting for
approximately 86 percent of total HH care recipients (NAHCH, 2008). As the population
continues to age, the need for HH care is projected to grow (Hughes and Renehan, 2005).
In addition, some scholars have suggested that HH care is preferred over institutional care
because home care is not only less costly but also more comfortable and accommodating,
and more able to foster the greatest possible independence from the perspective of the
care recipients (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2009).
Hospital Provision of Home Health Services
Social expectations have been rising that U.S. hospitals and healthcare systems
would become more integrated, seamless, patient-centered, efficient, and cost-effective
organizations (Shortell et al., 1995; Institute of Medicine, 2001, Evashwick, 2005;
Griffith and White, 2007). Although general short-term community hospitals serve people
of all ages and with all types of diagnoses and conditions, a significant fraction of
patients they treat are older adults and people with chronic conditions. People age 65 or
over account for about 12 percent of the U.S. population, but they represent about 46
percent of inpatient admissions. It is common that elderly patients often need PAC
following their discharges from the hospital (Paone and Mullen, 2005).
As mentioned earlier, hospital provision of HH services has been viewed by many
researchers and managers as an effective integration or diversification strategy for
hospitals to adapt for survival under prospective payment reimbursement based on DRGs.
For hospitals, to own or provide in-house HH services afforded control over the process
for discharging patients to PAC, thus reducing the uncertainty of managing patients‘
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length of stay. The number of hospital-based Medicare-certified HHAs increased
dramatically from 359 in 1980 to 2,698 in 1997. During the same period, the ratio of the
number of hospital-based Medicare-certified HHAs to the number of total
Medicare-certified HHAs grew from 12.3 percent to 25.8 percent (NAHCH, 2008).
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 was enacted to control the growth of
Medicare spending and to offer Medicare beneficiaries additional choice for care through
private health plans (MedPAC, 2000). The BBA affected Medicare reimbursement
payments for hospital inpatient and outpatient services as well as PAC services such as
HH and NH care. For hospital inpatient services, the Act froze base payment in fiscal
year 1998 and reduced updates in subsequent years. The BBA also enacted a new policy
intended to limit early transfer of patients from hospitals inpatient to PAC settings. The
BBA lowered the adjustment for indirect medical education to teaching hospitals, reduced
the adjustment received by hospitals that treat a disproportional share of low-income
patients, and lowered capital payment rates for hospitals (MedPAC, 2000).
With respect to hospital outpatient services, the BBA created a new prospective
payment system (PPS) that pays predetermined amounts for services that are similar
clinically and in their use of resources (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2009c). The hospital outpatient PPS went into effect on August 1, 2000.
The Act transformed Medicare PAC reimbursement payment from a retrospective
cost-based system to a system of fixed daily rates (Feldman, Nadash, and Gursen, 2002).
The new policy mandated that NHs receive a case-mix-adjusted, all-inclusive per diem
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rate for each Medicare resident starting on July 1 of 1998. A classification system was
designed to assign each Medicare resident into one of the 44 different resource utilization
groups (RUGs) on which NHs are reimbursed. The per diem rates cover all services
including medications, laboratory tests, supplies, and rehabilitation therapies (Angelelli,
Gifford, Intrator, Gozalo, Laliberte, and Mor, 2002). In other words, while DRGs are
used for the reimbursement of hospital inpatient care, RUGs are used to pay for care
provided by NHs for Medicare beneficiaries. Therefore, RUGs have had a financial
impact on NHs similar to the effect DRGs have had on hospitals since the mid-1980s. In
addition, prior to the BBA, hospital-based NHs received higher payment rates from
Medicare than did their freestanding counterparts. The differential payment scheme was
gradually eliminated in a three-year period (Angelelli et al., 2002). That is, for hospitals
providing NH care, NH PPS (RUGs) was phased in beginning July 1, 1998, and became
fully implemented in July 1, 2001.
Similarly, the BBA significantly changed Medicare payment to HH programs. The
BBA also mandated that a PPS should be developed for the reimbursement of HH
services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries. However, while the new system was being
developed, an Interim Payment System (IPS) was put in place to control the growing
expenses of HH care. The IPS was phased in beginning October 1997 for Medicare HH
reimbursement with the start of each agency‘s cost reporting period. The system became
fully implemented one year later. Under the IPS, HHA reimbursement was constrained by
both an aggregate per-visit cost limitation and by aggregate per-beneficiary cost limits
(McCall, Petersons, Moore, and Korb, 2003).
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The HH PPS was not established until the fourth quarter of 2000. Effective October
1, 2000, the HH PPS replaced the IPS for all HH agencies. While the IPS did not take
into account the clinical condition of a beneficiary, the new HH PPS adjusted for health
conditions and care needs of the beneficiary. Similar to the mechanism used in the NH
and hospital inpatient/outpatient PPSs, the HH PPS also adjusted for geographic
differences in wages for HHAs across the country. The adjustment for clinical
characteristics and service needs of the beneficiary is referred to as case-mix adjustment.
The HH PPS provides HHAs with payments for each 60-day episode of care for each
beneficiary. If a beneficiary is still eligible for care after the end of the first episode, a
second episode can begin; there are no limits to the number of episodes a beneficiary who
remains eligible for the HH benefit can receive. In addition to the case-mix adjustment, a
special outlier provision exists to ensure appropriate payment for beneficiaries who have
the most expensive care needs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2009b).
These adjustments, which were not present in the IPS, were made to ensure that all
beneficiaries, even the sickest, have access to HH services for which they are eligible. In
short, HH reimbursement is a little more generous under HH PPS than under the IPS.
Because of the issues that were illuminated by the excessive payment reductions
resulting from the BBA, the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget
Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999 was passed by Congress to lessen the financial impacts
brought about by the BBA on healthcare providers including hospitals, NHs, and HHAs.
In general, BBRA softened payment reductions, extended periods for implementing
payment-cutting policies, or placed a moratorium on service caps with the intention that
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these cost control policies would not cause harm to beneficiaries‘ access to high-quality
health care. It was estimated that the amount of payment increase resulting from the
BBRA totaled $6.8 billion, $2.7 billion, and $1.3 billion for the hospital, NH, and HH
sectors, respectively (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999).
The timeline of the implementation of the related HH payment policies mandated
by the BBA discussed above is shown in Figure 1. In this study, years 1997 through 2003
are selected to form the study period since the reimbursement policies of interest
occurred and took effect during this period. At the end of 2003, the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003 was enacted that created a policy environment different from
the study period for operations of hospitals and HHAs. Thus, the years between 1997 and
2003 are used for the comparison of hospital provision of HH services.

DRGs
implemented

83

96

HH IPS fully
implemented
HH IPS phased in

97

Q4
98

Q4
99

HH PPS

00

Q4
01

02

03

04 Year

Balanced Budget
Act of 1997
Balanced Budget Refinement
Act (BBRA) of 1999

Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003

IPS=interim payment system;
PPS=prospective payment system

Figure 1. The Timeline of the Implementation of the BBA Policies Related to Home
Health
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HH Agencies in the Post-BBA Era
Medicare has been the major payer for HH services, accounting about 30 percent of
total HH revenues, followed by Medicaid which contributed about 20 percent of total HH
revenues in 2000 (Hughes and Renehan, 2005). Thus, the expectation of HHAs for
continued and increasing Medicare reimbursement was seriously eroded by the BBA that
transformed a cost-based, fee-for-service payment system to the restricted schemes for
Medicare HH payment. After the implementation of the BBA, HHAs had to bear the
financial risk of taking care of Medicare patients with certain probabilities that the care
provided to a Medicare patient would cost more than the reimbursement rates for that
patient. HHA statistics show that roughly one-third of all Medicare-certified HHAs
closed in the three years following the implementation of the BBA. The number of all
Medicare-certified HHAs declined from 10,444 in 1997 to 7,152 in 2003, a reduction of
31.5 percent (NAHCH, 2008).
Issues Raised by the BBA Concerning Hospital Provision of Post-Acute Care
As described earlier, the strategy used by hospitals to diversify into or integrate with
PAC services was seriously challenged by the enactment of the BBA. After the BBA, a
decline of hospital-based HHAs was reported. The reduction in the number of
hospital-based HH programs raises critical questions concerning the continuum and
access of care and the availability of PAC beds after acute-care hospitalization (MedPAC,
2000; Angelelli et al., 2002; McCall, Petersons, Moores, and Korb, 2003; Bodenheimer
and Grumbach, 2009). The growing demand for HH, coupled with fewer
hospital-sponsored HHAs, raises the potential issue of access of hospital patients to
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needed HH services. Therefore, it is important to examine which organizational and
market factors would be related to hospitals‘ decisions to reduce their LTC provision in
facing tightened reimbursements.
If hospitals of different ownership forms react to the changing reimbursement
environment differently based on their mission and goals and this translates into their
respective objective functions, this raises the question, ―Does ownership matter as
hospitals reevaluate their HH programs post-BBA?‖ If yes, ―which ownership types are
more or less likely to stop provision of HH services following implementation of BBA?‖
In addition, decisions on service provision are important strategic issues for health
care organizations (Porter and Teisberg, 2006). Health care organizations (HCOs) should
consider multiple factors in deciding to provide or drop a particular service. A
comprehensive examination of the provision and change of HH services by hospitals
needs to take these factors into account.
Purpose of Study and Research Questions
The specific aim of this study is to shed light on the objective function of hospitals
by examining how they change their provision of HH services in response to a change in
financial incentives, and to explore the relevant factors that influence hospital provision
of HH services. Specifically, this study is intended to answer the following two questions:
1) What were the relative changes in hospital provision of HH care among public,
religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals after the implementation of
the BBA?

11
2) What are the organizational and market factors that are associated with hospital
provision of HH care before and after the BBA?
In this study, public hospitals refer to those hospitals owned and operated by
government including state, county, and city governments. For-profit hospitals are private,
investor-owned hospitals controlled on a for-profit and tax-eligible basis by an individual,
partnership, or a profit-making corporation. Nonprofit hospitals are defined as
nongovernment hospitals controlled by tax-exempt organizations, including religious
organizations, community hospitals, cooperative hospitals, hospitals operated by fraternal
societies, and so on (American Hospital Association, 2009a).
One unique aspect of this study is the further division of nonprofit hospitals into
religious and secular hospitals which, in theory, may have different motivations and
operation behaviors. Religious hospitals, such as Catholic hospitals, play an important
role in the U.S. health care system for the capacity and volume of care they provide as
well as the type of populations they serve. For instance, religious hospitals account for
approximately 14 percent of total hospital beds in the U.S. (calculated from the 2007
American Hospital Association survey file). Religious hospitals are also expected to offer
more services to vulnerable populations such as the poor and the uninsured in their
communities due to their charitable purposes. Given the uniqueness of religious hospitals
and the limited literature exploring the potential differences between religious hospitals
and other ownership types, it is worth separating religious from secular nonprofit
hospitals in health service research.
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Significance of the Current Study
Ownership type may influence the objective function of the institution and hence its
response to change in the health care market. The implementation of the BBA provides an
opportunity for researchers to examine how for-profit, religious nonprofit, secular
nonprofit, and public hospitals operating hospital-based HHAs responded to a new
national policy. Differential responses might suggest different underlying motives,
objectives, or operating utility models for hospitals with different ownership structures.
As discussed above, the BBA changed the financial condition in which HH services
operate. While HH services were generally profitable prior to the BBA, they became
relatively unprofitable after the BBA. Therefore, the relative change of hospital provision
of HH services among hospitals with different ownership structures would help identify
the role financial incentives play in the decision to offer such services.
The answers to these questions have several important implications. First, the
general public should be interested in knowing whether health care providers such as
hospitals of all kinds are indeed operating on a for-profit basis. This issue is particularly
relevant in a time of health care reform. For example, when commenting on the 2009 U.S.
health reform proposed by President Obama and Congress, Dr. Marcia Angell argues that
―We are the only advanced country in the world that has chosen to leave health care to the
tender mercies of a panoply of for-profit businesses, whose purpose is to maximize
income and not to provide health. And that's exactly what they do‖ (Public Broadcasting
Service, 2009). This study should be able to shed light on this comment by revealing the
objectives of U.S. hospitals.
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From the perspective of policymakers, it is important to know whether there were
undesirable changes in the capacity of hospital-based HHAs after the implementation of
the BBA. A significant reduction in the number of hospital-based HHAs can lead to a
serious problem of PAC accessibility for needed patients. Policy makers may also be
interested in knowing how other factors influence provision of HH services and how
these other factors may interact with the BBA in determining hospital provision of HH
services. As the population ages, the importance of HH services will continue to rise.
Thus, the change in the capacity of HH services resulting from a particular policy like the
BBA should be a major interest to policy makers. In addition, this study provides an
examination of the issue of interest for an extended period of time. Most of the previous
studies on the change in services brought about by the BBA focused on the period
from1997 to 2000. Very few published studies have explored the issue beyond 2000. A
study considering a longer period of time gives policy makers more information
regarding the profound and dynamic impact of the BBA.
For hospital managers, this study offers empirical evidence showing how hospitals
in their ownership sector responded to the BBA in provision of HH care compared to
other ownership types. It also analyzes hospital decisions about HH services post-BBA,
as well as identifies other key factors associated with those decisions.
In addition, this study is a first attempt to adopt a multi-theoretical framework for
exploring how hospital provision of HH services changed post-BBA. As will be
discussed later, this study integrates theoretical perspectives from economics, resource
dependence theory, transaction cost economics, institutional theory, and population
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ecology. Hence, a multi-theoretical model for identifying the potential behavioral
difference among hospitals with various ownerships including the religious and secular
nonprofits was developed and tested. The conceptual model contributes to the possibility
of revealing a comprehensive set of strategic considerations and market factors
influencing hospitals‘ decisions to provide HH services before and after the
implementation of the BBA.
Overview of Conceptual Framework
Based on the assumption that hospitals should consider multiple factors in addition
to financial incentives in deciding whether or not to offer or discontinue certain services,
and in responding to changes in the environment, this study adopts a conceptual
framework based on a number of major constructs drawn from economic models and
several organization theories. Specifically, economic models of nonprofit organizations
proposed by Weisbrod (1988) as well as resource dependence, institutional, population
ecology perspectives and transaction cost economics are applied to form the conceptual
framework and to guide the development of study hypotheses.
Weisbrod‘s models focus on the underlining objectives and resulting behaviors of
nonprofit organizations. He suggests that nonprofit organizations may be ―for-profits in
disguise‖ whose objectives and behaviors are not different from their for-profit
counterparts. Weisbrod also posits that a nonprofit institution can be a ―two-good
producer‖ which offers mission and revenue goods at the same time. The last model
Weisbrod proposes is ―inefficient profit maximizers‖ in which nonprofits have the same
objectives while they differ in behaviors from for-profit organizations. These models
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provide a relevant framework for studying the objective function of hospitals with
different ownership forms. This study argues that the two-good model, inefficient profit
maximizer model, and a mission-good-only model fit religious, secular, and public
hospitals, respectively. These models thus are used to predict the behaviors of hospitals of
certain ownership types in changing HH care provision after the BBA.
Hospitals‘ changes in HH provision in response to the implementation of the BBA
can be viewed as a typical example of organizations‘ reactions to changes in the
environment. Resource dependence, institutional and population ecology theories and
transaction cost economics are organization theories commonly applied to the
examination and prediction of the interaction between the organization and its
environment. Each theory provides a unique set of constructs referring to specific
hospital considerations closely associated with hospitals‘ likelihood of changing HH
provision in response to the major reimbursement reduction for HH services brought
about by the BBA. These considerations can be understood as filters that carry over or
filter out the need for or desire of hospitals to change HH provision post-BBA. The
objectives of hospitals predicted by the ownership models can be viewed as a prism that
differentiates the responses of hospitals with different ownership forms to the
implementation of the BBA. A simplified conceptual model based on the discussion is
shown in Figure 2.
Scope and Approach
In this study, the population includes all U.S. non-federal, acute-care general hospitals
that operate in the 50 states and District of Columbia. The sample used for analysis is
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Figure 2. A Conceptual Model of Hospitals‘ Changes in HH Provision Post-BBA

composed of hospitals reporting to the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual
Surveys of hospitals between 1997 and 2003. The unit of analysis is an individual
hospital in a particular year in the study period.
This analysis applies a study design comparable to a natural experiment where the
implementation of the BBA serves as an intervention, and public hospitals serve as the
control group, and other ownership types of hospitals are study groups. With this design,
the changes in HH provision among the ownership types are compared. The econometric
approach applied for data analysis is difference-in-difference estimation with a data form
of independently pooled cross-sections. This analytical approach has been used by
researchers to conduct policy evaluations.
The study data are formed by merging relevant datasets with needed information in
the years of study. The datasets employed include AHA annual survey files, Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) hospital cost report files, CMS case-mix index
files, and Area Resource Files (ARF). These datasets are created and maintained by
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public or professional institutions to facilitate health services research and have been
widely used. However, data management and cleaning efforts are needed before the
merged data can be analyzed because there are missing values as well as outliers in the
original datasets.
This study reports descriptive statistics and correlations of major study variables.
Bivariate and multivariate analyses of the relationships of interest are presented. The
predicted probability of offering HH services for hospitals with four different hospital
ownership types is then plotted overtime. Finally, results of hypothesis testing and
implications of the findings are discussed.
Conclusion and Outline of Remaining Chapters
This chapter introduces the study conducted in this dissertation. The background of
hospital provision of HH care, the nature of the BBA, and the possible impact of the BBA
on the provision of HH are described. Research aims and questions are proposed in
exploring the objective functions of hospitals with different ownership types and the
factors associated with their changes in HH provision post-BBA. Also, the rationale and
importance of conducting this study are explained. Finally, the theoretical framework,
focus and methods adopted are briefly summarized.
Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the literature on how objective functions of
organizations can be measured. The literature on relationships between hospital
ownership and service provision, hospital changes in PAC service provision (in particular,
HH care) after the BBA, and determinants of hospital provision of PAC services are also
reviewed in the second chapter. In Chapter 3, the description of the multi-theoretical
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framework is presented, as well as a brief description of each theoretical perspective.
Hypotheses are proposed based on theoretical constructs and existing empirical evidence.
In Chapter 4, the research design, description and sources of data are presented. This
chapter provides variables and measurements used in the study, as well as the
econometric analysis plan. Results in narrative and tabular form are presented in Chapter
5. The last chapter provides the conclusion of hypothesis testing and policy implications
of this study. Finally, potential limitations and future suggestions are discussed.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews previous empirical studies aimed to explore objective
functions of hospitals and the relationship between the implementation of the BBA and
hospital provision of HH care. The first section discusses the measures used by previous
studies to study the objective function of the healthcare organization (HCO). Discovering
objective functions of hospitals is the primary interest of this study. Thus, the selection
and application of a valid measure that can reflect the objectives of hospitals are critical
to this study. The second section briefly summarizes the findings concerning the effect of
hospital ownership on service provision. This dissertation hypothesizes that hospitals of
different ownership types have different objectives, as reflected by providing different
types of services. The third section synthesizes the existing evidence showing the change
in utilization, outcomes, and hospital provision of certain PAC services after the
implementation of the BBA. The fourth section specifically discusses some primary
findings concerning the initial changes in utilization and hospital provision of HH care
post-BBA. The last section reviews the factors found by researchers to be associated with
hospital provision of PAC services. Some of these factors provide insights in formulating
some of the study measures and can be reevaluated by the results of this study. The
empirical findings reviewed in this chapter provide an important foundation on which
this study can be built and extended.
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Measurement of the Objective Function of Health Care Organizations (HCOs)
In this study, a HCO‘s objective function is defined as the organization‘s goal in
terms of profit orientations. The objective function of a for-profit HCO is to maximize its
profit. On the other hand, a nonprofit HCO‘s objective function should reflect its
considerations other than profit. However, this statement of objective function about
nonprofits is often arguable. Health economists have proposed many different models to
explain the behaviors and underlying objectives of nonprofit HCOs (Newhouse, 1970;
Pauly and Redisch, 1973; Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 1988).
The continuation of the argument about the objective function of nonprofit HCOs
among different theoretical models may be in part because HCOs‘ objectives in general
cannot be directly observed. Thus, researchers have applied a number of approaches to
measure HCOs‘ observable behaviors that may reflect their objective functions. For
example, Lindrooth and Weisbrod (2007) use the patient average length of stay (LOS) as
an indicator of the extent to which a hospice is intended to maximize profit under a
Medicare flat fixed payment scheme. The Medicare hospice reimbursement method
creates an incentive encouraging maximization of patient LOS. Thus, hospices operating
on a for-profit basis should have a strong incentive to selectively admit patients with
longer expected LOS, and admit patients sooner after a hospital discharge. The study
found that for-profit hospices are significantly more likely than religious nonprofit
hospices to admit patients with longer, more profitable, expected LOS. In terms of the
timing of admission, no significant difference between the two ownership types was
found.
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An HCO‘s objective function may be viewed as a parallel to the utility function of
an individual. In this regard, the approach used by Lindrooth and Weisbrod (2007) is
similar to that applied by Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995) who used the length of time
(in weeks) that an injured worker receives workers‘ compensation to study the response
of workers to the change in financial incentives brought about by new worker
compensation laws. Meyer and colleagues (1995) studied the change of injured workers‘
compensation and injury duration after the implementation of new workers‘
compensation policies in the states of Michigan and Kentucky. The policies increased
maximum weekly benefits of workers‘ compensation, creating an incentive for
high-earning individuals to lengthen their injury duration and benefit amount. After
controlled for worker age, marital status, gender, industry, and severity of the injury,
results show that the increase in injury duration is greater for high-earning workers than
for low-earning workers by 16.2 percent and 20.3 percent in Kentucky and Michigan,
respectively. The difference in compensation duration increase in Kentucky is significant
at the 0.05 level.
In a recent stream of studies, Weisbrod and colleagues applied managerial rewards
or compensation structures in revealing the objective functions of hospitals of different
ownership types (Roomkin and Weisbrod, 1999; Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003; Erus and
Weisbrod, 2003). For example, Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) employed the data collected
in 1992 to compare the compensation schemes of CEOs among governmental, religious
nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals. They found not only significant
differences in these aspects between for-profit hospitals and other nonprofit hospitals
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(including governmental hospitals), but also clear contrasts among religious, secular, and
governmental nonprofit ownership forms.
Compared to for-profit hospitals, nonprofit and public hospitals as a whole paid
significantly more base salary (except for public hospitals that paid insignificantly fewer
base salary) and less bonus, had lower ratio of bonus to base salary, lower probability of
offering bonus incentives and rewarding financial performance, and higher probability of
rewarding quality of care for their CEO compensation. Compared to secular nonprofits,
religious nonprofits paid significantly more base salary, had lower probability of offering
bonus incentives but higher probability of rewarding care quality. Religious hospitals
paid significantly more salary, and had higher probability of offering bonus incentives as
well as rewarding care quality, as compared with their governmental counterparts. Finally,
compared to public hospitals, secular nonprofit hospitals paid significantly more base
salary and bonus, had higher bonus to base salary ratio, and higher probability of offering
bonus incentives. The authors concluded that there are indeed differences in objective
functions and/or constraints among the institutional forms, reflecting by their contrasting
CEO compensation schemes. The paper thus calls for a more general model that
differentiates the objective functions of nonprofit hospitals in the three ownership forms.
Some researchers have also employed quality indicators of HCOs as a reflection of
accomplishing objectives of organizations (Grabowski, 2001; Chou, 2002; Spector,
Selden, and Cohen, 1998; Harrington, Zimmerman, Karon, Robinson, and Beutel, 2000).
This approach is based on the assumption that health care providers such as hospitals or
nursing homes are able to take advantage of asymmetric information by only meeting the
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minimum requirement of quality of care in order to minimize operating costs and
maximize profits. Therefore, a HCO with a nonprofit objective may differentiate itself
from other profit-maximizing counterparts by providing higher quality of care to the
patients/clients it serves. For example, Chou (2002) applied the data from 1984, 1989,
and 1994 National Long-Term Care Survey to investigate the hypothesized difference in
care quality between for-profit and nonprofit nursing homes. Results of the analysis show
that the difference became clear when the situation of asymmetric information is present.
For those cases without a spouse and child visit within 1 month after admission,
nonprofit NHs had significantly fewer cases in death, dehydration, and urinary tract
infection, as compared with for-profit homes. In addition, for the residents who are
cognitively unaware, nonprofit NHs had significantly fewer cases in dehydration and
urinary tract infection. Interestingly, these two ownership forms did not differ
significantly in these quality indicators when there were not the asymmetric situations
specified above, except that nonprofit status is associated with fewer deaths for
cognitively unaware and aware residents alike.
In addition, Hansmann, Kessler, and McClellan (2002) examined whether the rates
of exit from the hospital industry differed across the various forms of hospital ownership
in response to the decrease in demand for acute care. They found that over the 1985-1994
period, for-profit urban hospitals are the most responsive to reduction in demand through
exiting from the industry, followed by their non-federal public and religious nonprofit
counterparts, while secular nonprofits are significantly the least responsive of the four
ownership types.
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Finally, researchers commonly view the provision of certain types of services as a
commitment to particular populations (LeBlanc and Hurley, 1995; White, Begun, and
Tian, 2006), strategic goals (Porter and Teisberg, 2006), and operational objectives
(Horwitz, 2005a; Clement, White, and Valdmanis, 2002) of HCOs. Horwitz and Nichols
(2007: 1) support this approach by arguing that ―investigating service offerings is
particularly useful because, in a highly regulated industry in which managers are
constrained in their attempts to maximize profits (e.g., it is difficult and sometimes illegal
to turn away low-paying patients), managers have some freedom to open or close a
service as a way to increase profits.‖
The application of the change in provision of services as an indicator of hospitals‘
objective functions should be advantageous to other approaches presented above for
several reasons. First, LOS and quality of care are sometimes beyond the control of
hospitals. These indicators may reflect patient conditions more than hospitals‘ objectives.
Second, HCOs‘ managerial compensation schemes, particularly the compensation for
nonprofit hospital CEOs, have been closely scrutinized by governmental agencies and the
society in recent years. Therefore, managerial compensation may no longer be a valid
measure of the objective function of nonprofit hospitals. Finally, hospital rates of exit
from the industry in response to the decline of acute care demand may depend directly on
performance rather than operating objectives. Also, hospital closure is a much serious
and complicated corporate decision than the adjustment of a service mix. The former is
faced with more constraints and usually takes much longer to decide. Thus hospital
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closure may not be an indicator of hospitals‘ objectives as sensitive as the change in
service provision.
Following the argument discussed above, this analysis employs the change in the
provision of HH services to measure hospitals‘ objectives. Specifically, the probability of
dropping HH services provision is compared across different ownership forms of
hospitals before and after the implementation of the BBA. Since different ownership
types within the nonprofit sector are seldom compared, this study extends the knowledge
gained from the existing studies by examining the change in provision of HH care among
hospitals with different incentives, including public, religious, non-religious (secular)
nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals post-BBA.
Hospital Ownership and Service Provision
Ownership Effects on Types of Service Provision
Researchers have found empirical evidence that ownership type affects hospital
provision of certain services (White and Begun, 1998/99; Horwitz, 2005a). In a study
exploring urban hospital adoption of AIDS/HIV-related services, LeBlanc and Hurley
(1995) found a strong ownership effect. Public urban hospitals were 3 times, 4.1 times,
and 5.7 times more likely to fully invest in HIV/AIDS-related services than private
not-for-profit, for-profit, and church-owned urban hospitals, respectively.
Additionally, White and Begun(1998/99); White, Cochran, and Patel (2002); and
White, Begun, and Tian (2006) found that, after controlling for relevant market,
organizational, and demand factors, Catholic hospitals were more likely than for-profit
hospitals to offer services that represent a commitment to social justice (e.g., indigent
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care), compassionate care (e.g., patient support groups, social workers, nursing homes,
and pastoral care), end-of-life care (e.g., hospice, pain management, and palliative care),
or societally stigmatized services (e.g., HIV/AIDS) for vulnerable populations.

Also,

Catholic hospitals were more likely to provide end-of-life and compassionate care
services than other not-for-profit hospitals, and more likely than public hospitals to
provide end-of-life and stigmatized services.
Horwitz (2005a) compared hospital provision of profitable and unprofitable
services among different ownership types from 1988 to 2000. During the study period,
after controlling for other factors, public urban acute-care hospitals were consistently and
significantly more likely than their for-profit counterparts to provide psychiatric
emergency services which are widely recognized as an unprofitable service. On the other
hand, for-profit urban acute-care hospitals were consistently and significantly more likely
than their public counterparts to provide open-heart surgery which has been classified as
a highly profitable service. Nonprofit urban acute-care hospitals consistently fell between
their public and for-profit counterparts in the probability of providing the two mentioned
services across the period of study.
Ownership Effects on Hospital Response to Payment Policy Change
At least two studies have shown that hospitals with different ownership forms
respond differently to health care payment policy change in providing uncompensated
care. Davidoff, LoSasso, Bazzoli, and Zuckerman (2000) found that Medicaid and
Medicare payment generosity increased uncompensated care provision in nonprofit and
public hospitals. Expanded Medicaid eligibility reduced provision of uncompensated care
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by public and for-profit hospitals, but did not affect the provision of uncompensated care
by nonprofit hospitals. Medicaid HMO penetration was found to be associated with a
decrease in uncompensated care provision by nonprofit hospitals, but not with public or
for-profit hospitals. Additionally, Bazzoli, Lindrooth, Kang, and Hasnain-Wynia (2006)
found that the decline in Medicaid payments that resulted from the BBA reduced
uncompensated care provision in safety-net hospitals which were largely comprised of
public and religious hospitals.
The BBA and PAC
Implementation of the BBA and Change in Hospital Provision of PAC
A number of studies have explored the change in hospital provision of PAC such as
HH and NH care after the implementation of the BBA. The Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) (2002) reported to Congress that 20 percent of hospital-based
NHs exited the market by 2000, due to the implementation of the BBA. Similarly, a
decline in the number of hospital-based HHAs after the BBA was also reported. Between
1997 and 2000, the number of hospital-based Medicare-certified HHAs decreased from
2,698 to 2,151 (a 20 percent decrease) (NAHCH, 2008).
One study done by Angelelli, Fennell, Hyatt, and McKenney (2003) researched
rural hospital provision of and change in provision of PAC after the BBA between 1997
and 2000. The results of this study suggest that the percentage of rural hospitals having a
hospital-based or freestanding NH generally remained the same. The percentage
providing HH care declined slightly from 67 percent to 61 percent. From 1997 to 2000,
rural hospitals in general became more aggressive in ensuring the continuum of health
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care (from acute care to PAC). In general, hospitals in rural areas are faced with more
difficulties in transferring discharged patients because there are relatively fewer PAC
resources nearby (Angelelli et al., 2003). The aged population may also be more
prevalent in rural areas. This phenomenon points out that regional characteristics, such as
the percentage of elderly in the population and the location (rural/urban) of hospitals
could be important factors that influence hospitals‘ decisions/strategies concerning the
provision of PAC services.
Impacts of the BBA on PAC Utilization and Outcomes
McCall, Korb, Petersons, and Moore (2003) employed Medicare beneficiary data
in the first six months of fiscal year (FY) 1997 and the first six months of FY 1999 to
study the change in the use of post-hospital care services after the BBA. Specifically, the
study includes Medicare data in five DRGs, including stroke (DRG 014), Chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (DRG 088), heart failure (DRG 127), hip fracture (DRG
210), and Diabetes (DRG 294). The study also examined whether the number of adverse
outcomes had risen, as measured by hospital readmissions, emergency room visits, and
death. Their findings suggest that utilization of rehabilitation and LTC hospitals increased
after the BBA, while expenditures of post-hospital care for the beneficiaries in the five
DRGs dropped an average of $454 per discharge. In addition, only five quality categories
with significantly worse adverse outcome out of possible 90 indicators were observed.
Another study done by Kilgore, Grabowski, Morrisey, Ritchie, Yun, and Locher (2009)
showed similar results, which found that Medicare hospice utilization rates and costs
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increased post-BBA. Also, there was no discernable difference in mortality rate in
Medicare cancer patients before and after the BBA.
The BBA and Home Health Care Utilization and Provision
Impacts of the BBA on Home Health Industry
A number of empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the initial impact
of the BBA on HH utilization. By using a 1 percent sample of Medicare fee-for-service
beneficiaries, McCall, Komisar, and Petersons, and Moore (2001) compared HH
utilization and expenditures among three time periods: (1) FY 1997 (October
1996-September 1997), the 12 months prior to the beginning of the IPS; (2) FY 1998, the
12 months during the IPS was phased in; and (3) FY1999, the 12 months after the IPS
was fully implemented. Results show that use of Medicare HH services dropped
dramatically post-BBA. From FY 1997 to FY 1999, total Medicare reimbursements for
HH visits decreased by more than 50 percent. Also, payments per enrollee declined by
half over this period. HH payments per user were found to decline by 37 percent annually.
HH users per 1,000 beneficiaries and the number of visits per user dropped 21 percent
and 41 percent, respectively.
McCall and colleagues continued to conduct a multivariate analysis applying
regression techniques to examine the same issue (McCall, Petersons, Moore, and Korb,
2003). By controlling for relevant factors such as beneficiary demographic characteristics,
prior medical care utilization, community characteristics, supply of HH resources,
substitutes for HH care, and state historical Medicare/Medicaid health care and HH use,
the authors analyzed the incidence of HH use in the Medicare beneficiaries and the

30
utilization of HH among the Medicare HH users. Results show a 22 percent decline in the
incidence of using HH services post-BBA. Stronger reductions were found in the
incidence of use for beneficiaries age 85 and older, those in states with high historical
Medicare HH use, and those with dual (Medicare and Medicaid) eligibility. The study
also showed a 39 percent drop in the number of visits per user. More intensive reductions
in the number of services were found in high historical Medicare use states as well as for
those age 85 and older, nonwhites, females, those using for-profit agencies, and those
treated for certain diagnoses including diabetes, skin ulcers, heart failure, and
cerebrovascular diseases. Less intensive reductions were associated with hospital-based
agencies.
Likewise, Kilgore and colleagues (2009) found that HH utilization rates and costs
among Medicare cancer patients dropped substantially after the BBA, partly because the
BBA shifted some of the cancer patients to hospice. However, significant reduction in
total Medicare costs after the BBA was also noted.
Implementation of the BBA and Change in Home Health Care Provision among
Hospitals of Different Ownership Types
Horwitz (2005a) has done research intended to reveal the objectives of hospitals
with public, nonprofit, and for-profit ownerships. More specifically, the study tested
whether hospital ownership types specialize in services based on profitability. The study
based largely on the data of non-federal, urban, acute-care, general hospitals in the AHA
files from 1988 to 2000. In the study, the author examined 34 services which were
categorized into three groups based on general probability: (1) profitable services, (2)
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unprofitable services, and (3) services with variable profits during the study period. The
classifications of the service profitability were a result of efforts including reviews of
peer-reviewed medical and social science literature, MedPAC and Prospective payment
Assessment Commission reports to Congress, trade publications, business magazines,
and newspaper reports. The author also conducted interviews with hospital
administrators and doctors to get the qualitative evaluation of relative service profitability.
The various sources yielded relatively similar results (Horwitz, 2005b). Of particular
interest here is the result regarding the change in hospital provision of HH between the
pre- and post-BBA eras. The result shows that, for all the three hospital types, the
probability of offering HH services increased when the service was profitable
(1988-1997) and started to decrease when the services became unprofitable (1998-2000).
However, growth of HH care when it was profitable and decline of HH care when it was
unprofitable were particularly dramatic among for-profits. Controlling for hospital and
market characteristics, the probability of a for-profit hospital‘s providing HH services
tripled from 17.5 percent to 60.9 percent between 1988 and 1997. During the same
period, the probability increased slightly from 40.9 percent to 51.7 percent for nonprofit
and from 38.1 percent to 51.9 percent for public hospitals. From 1997 to 2000, as HH
care became relatively unprofitable due to the implementation of the BBA, the
probability of offering HH care fell a striking 37.5 percent among for-profit, but only 7.7
percent among non-profit and 1.5 percent among public hospitals.
Horwitz and Nichols (2007) continued this stream of study by applying more
sophisticated approaches to explore a related but different question: Are service provision
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by hospitals of different ownership types influenced by market ownership mix?
Longitudinal data from 1988 to 2005 were employed by the authors with the aim to
empirically examine the conflicting theoretical perspectives about the behavior of
nonprofit hospitals. Also, the authors used a number approaches to define hospital
markets, including Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and geographic radius. Results
show that nonprofit hospitals were systematically less likely to offer unprofitable
services in markets with high for-profit dominance than in other markets. The evidence is
particularly clear on HH provision. When HH services were most profitable, from 1993
through 1997, nonprofit hospitals were more likely to offer them in high than in low
for-profit penetration markets. However, when HH services turned less profitable,
nonprofit hospitals reduced their likelihood of offering HH more dramatically in high
than in low for-profit penetration markets.
This dissertation is directly related to the two studies previously mentioned,
particularly the Horwitz (2005a) study. This study can be viewed as a replication and
extension of the mentioned study specific to HH provision by hospitals with different
ownership forms. First, this study examines the issue beyond 2000 through 2003 which is
not covered in the Horwitz study. Second, this study further classifies private nonprofit
hospitals into religious and secular groups which have theoretically and empirically
demonstrated to be different in objectives and behaviors (Ballou and Weisbrod, 2005;
Hansmann, Kessler, and McClellan, 2002). Third, the Horwitz (2005a) study may suffer
from several issues. As the author indicated, missing values and observations from
non-responses in the AHA are a major concern. Although the issue resulting from
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missing values had been considered and addressed through reasonable efforts, sample
selection biases could occur given the fact that a significant portion of hospitals did not
report service provision in the AHA survey. This study addresses the issue by employing
a more valid data source, as will be described in Chapter 4. Also, there may be issues of
omitted variables in the Horwitz study, as mentioned by the author. The study only
controlled for hospital size, teaching status, geographic location, gender, race, household
income, and age of the residents in the market. There should be other institution-specific
factors such as patient case-mix, professional and financial capabilities that determine the
provision of HH care. In addition, other relevant market factors such as the HH resource
in the local market should also be taken into account. This study thus strengthens the
finding by including more relevant organizational and market factors proposed by a
number of organization theories which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Other Determinants of Hospital Provision of PAC
In addition to the research mentioned earlier in this chapter, several studies have
been conducted to examine factors associated with hospital provision of or
diversification to PAC (Wheeler, Burkhardt, Alexander, and Magnus, 1999), nursing
home services (Chiu, 1995; Lucente, 2006), and home health services (Xu, 2000).
Subacute Care
The study conducted by Wheeler and colleagues (1999) applied cross-sectional,
time series data from 1985 through 1991 and a Heckman two stage model to examine the
factors associated with hospital provision of subacute care (SAC) as well as the size of
the care measured by the number of total subacute beds in the hospital. Results show that
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the number of subacute care beds in private, acute-care general community hospitals was
significantly and positively associated with nonprofit status, system affiliation, hospital
size, nursing staff to bed ratio, total expenses to bed ratio, competition, per-capita income
in the county, growth in hospital size, and having swing beds. Also, in the face of higher
financial risks, for-profit hospitals tended to have more SAC beds compared to nonprofit
hospitals.
The authors found that the size of hospital SAC was significantly and negatively
associated with financial risk, the number of physicians to beds ratio, occupancy rate,
being in a rural area, and outpatient revenue proportion. Additionally, in the situation of
higher cash flow, for-profit hospitals tended to have fewer subacute care beds relative to
their nonprofit counterparts. Finally, Wheeler and colleagues did not find a significant
association between the size of SAC and cash flow as well as proportion of population
age 65 or over in the county.
Nursing Home Services
Chiu (1995) and Xu (2000) applied conceptual models drawn from transaction cost
economics and the same analytical models to examine the linkage between hospitals and
nursing home and home health services, respectively. Applying the same conceptual and
analytical models, Lucente (2006) also investigated whether the considerations of
providing NH care differed before and after the implementation of the BBA.
Using a sample composed of all non-federal, acute-care general hospitals in the
1990 AHA survey file, Chiu (1995) found that hospitals located in areas with high
hospital occupancy or had a higher proportion of total discharges contributed by

35
Medicare patients were more likely to have a hospital-based NH. However, larger
hospitals were slightly but significantly less likely to provide its own NH care, compared
to smaller hospitals. Other factors included in his analytical model are not significant
determinants of hospital provision of NH care. These factors include NH beds to elderly
population ratio, the number of geriatric services, availability of HH care and swing beds,
affiliation with HMO/PPO, state CON stringency, system membership, rural locality,
ownership, the interaction terms between Medicare discharges and hospital size, and
between poor people proportion and the number of beds to elderly population ratio.
Lucente (2006) examined determinants of hospital integration of NH care before
(FY 1994/1995) and after the BBA (FY 2000/2001). Basically the author found similar
determinants in these two time periods. Significant and positive predictors of hospital
integration of NH care in both periods include the ratio of SNF beds to elderly population,
hospital occupancy rate, geriatric service provision, a rural location, Medicare discharge
proportion, hospital case mix index, and hospital size. On the other hand, significant and
negative predictors in both periods contain average length of stay in the market, nursing
staff to beds ratio, state CON, and teaching status. However, the provision of NH care
was significantly and negatively associated with the proportion of elderly in poverty and
system membership only in the post-BBA period. The most dramatic change is observed:
while for-profit hospitals were more likely than nonprofits to integrate with NHs before
the BBA, they became less likely than their nonprofit counterparts to provide in house
NH care after the BBA.
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Home Health Care
Finally, Xu (2000) employed the non-federal, acute-care general hospitals included
in the AHA survey files of 1993, 1996, and 1997 to explore the determinants of hospital
arrangement of offering HH care. The results from a model contrasting a hierarchy
(providing hospital-based HH care) with a market (depending on external freestanding
HHAs) arrangement suggest that hospital size, Medicare discharge proportion, provision
of geriatric services, provision of rehabilitation services, provision of NH care, rural
locality, system member, being in west states, and nonprofit ownership (vs. public
ownership) are significantly and positively associated with hospital provision of HH care.
On the other hand, teaching status and for-profit ownership (vs. public) are significantly
and negatively associated with hospital adoption of an in-house HHA. Non-significant
determinants include HMO/PPO contract, HMO penetration, hospital occupancy rate,
for-profit HHA proportion in a county, SNF beds relative to elderly population, HH
supply relative to elderly population, hospital‘s experience in offering social support
services, and imbalanced demand over supply of HH services in the market.
The major empirical findings of the studies specific to hospital provision of PAC
services discussed in this chapter are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1. Summary of Determinants of Hospital Provision of PAC Services
Construct
Determinant
Hospital Ownership types
Ownership

NFP (vs. FP)

Effect
Positive

Negative

Public (vs. FP)

Non-significant
Positive
Negative

NFP (vs. public)

Non-significant
Positive

Catholic

Negative
Positive

Type of Service (Reference)
HH (Xu, 2000)；HH:1988-94;
1998-2000 (Horwitz, 2005a);
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999); NH,
post-BBA (Lucente, 2006)
HH:1994-97 (Horwitz, 2005a) ;
NH, pre-BBA (Lucente, 2006)
NH (Chiu, 1995)
HH (Xu, 2000); HH:1988-94;
1998-2000 (Horwitz, 2005a)
HH:1988-94; 1998-2000
(Horwitz, 2005a)
NH (Chiu, 1995)
HH (Xu, 2000); HH:1988-1997
(Horwitz, 2005a)
HH:1998-2000 (Horwitz, 2005a)
EOL: compared to public, FP, and
other NFP (White et al., 2002)

Interaction of ownership and financial factors/market
BBA

For-profit
market

NFP x BBA (vs.
public)
FP x BBA (vs.
public)
NFP*high FP market
(vs. low FP market)

Negative

NH, HH (Horwitz, 2005a)

Negative

NH, HH (Horwitz, 2005a)

Positive

NH, HH: 1993-1997 (Horwitz &
Nichols, 2007)
NH, HH: 1997-2000; HOS
(Horwitz & Nichols, 2007)
NH, HH: 1993-1997 (Horwitz &
Nichols, 2007)
NH, HH: 1997-2000 (Horwitz &
Nichols, 2007)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)

Negative
FP x high FP market
(vs. low FP market)

Positive
Negative

Cash flow
Financial risk

FP x Cash flow
FP x Financial risk

Negative
Positive

Other hospital characteristics
Resource
munificence;
transaction
frequency
Access to
financial
capital

Size

Positive

System affiliation

Negative
Positive
Negative

HH (Xu, 2000); SAC (Wheeler et
al, 1999); EOL (White et al.,
2002) ; NH (Lucente, 2006)
NH (Chiu, 1995)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999); HH
(Xu, 2000)
NH, post-BBA (Lucente, 2006)
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Table 1 (continued)
Construct
Determinant

Effect
Non-significant

Financial
performance

Access to
other resource

Transaction
uncertainty
Asset/transacti
on specificity

Transaction
frequency

Type of Service (Reference)

Non-significant
Positive

NH (Chiu, 1995); NH, pre-BBA
(Lucente, 2006)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
NH (Lucente, 2006)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
NH (Lucente, 2006)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
HH (Xu, 2000)
HH (Xu, 2000); NH (Lucente,
2006)
NH (Chiu, 1995)
HH (Xu, 2000)

Non-significant

HH (Xu, 2000)

Positive
Non-significant
Positive

HH (Xu, 2000)
NH (Chiu, 1995)
HH (Xu, 2000); NH (Chiu, 1995);
NH (Lucente, 2006)

Non-significant

NH (Chiu, 1995)

Non-significant

NH (Chiu, 1995); HH (Xu, 2000)

Rural area

Positive

Competition
Per capita income
%Elderly in poverty

Negative
Non-significant
Positive
Positive
Negative
Non-significant
Non-significant

HH (Xu, 2000); NH (Lucente,
2006)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
NH (Chiu, 1995)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
NH, post-BBA (Lucente, 2006)
NH, pre-BBA (Lucente, 2006)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999); HH
(Xu, 2000)

Cash flow
Financial risk
FP x Cash flow
FP x risk
#Physician/#bed
#RN+LPN/#beds
Expenses/#beds
Occupancy rate

#Type of geriatric
services
# Type of
rehabilitation
services
# Type of
social/support
services
Provision of NH
Provision of HH
% Medicare
discharge/patient
days
% Medicare
discharge x hospital
size
HMO/PPO contract

Non-significant
Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Non-significant
Positive

Market factors
Market
demand,
transaction
uncertainty

Elderly %
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Table 1 (continued)
Construct
Determinant

Transaction
frequency
Transaction
uncertainty

Control
variables

Effect

Type of Service (Reference)

Imbalanced demand
over supply of HH
services
HMO penetration

Non-significant

HH (Xu, 2000)

Non-significant

HH (Xu, 2000)

Area hospital
occupancy rate
# NH beds/elderly
population
% poor person x (#
NH beds/elderly
population)
#RN/LPNs employed
by HHAs/elderly
population
# For-profit
HHAs/total HHAs in
market
Hospital average
LOS
Teaching hospital

Positive

NH (Chiu, 1995)

Positive
Non-significant
Non-significant

NH (Lucente, 2006)
NH (Chiu, 1995); HH (Xu, 2000)
NH (Chiu, 1995)

Non-significant

HH (Xu, 2000)

Non-significant

HH (Xu, 2000)

Negative

NH (Lucente, 2006)

Positive
Negative

Growth rate (in beds)
Availability of swing
beds
Outpatient
revenue/total revenue
State CON
stringency
Located in west
states

Positive
Positive
Non-significant
Negative

EOL (White et al., 2002)
HH (Xu, 2000); NH (Lucente,
2006)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)
NH (Chiu, 1995)
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999)

Negative
Non-significant
Positive

NH (Lucente, 2006)
NH (Chiu, 1995)
HH (Xu, 2000)

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Since the 1980s, health care environment has been in turmoil and full of rapid
changes and uncertainties. In order to survive in the dynamic environment, HCOs such as
hospitals must be able to respond to these changes appropriately. Various economic and
organizational theories have provided useful tools in understanding the motivation for
certain decisions HCOs make in response to the change in the environment.
This chapter proposes a conceptual model using multiple theories to study the
change in HH care provision by hospitals with different ownership structures in response
to the implementation of the BBA. The depiction of the conceptual model is followed in
turn by a brief description of each theoretical perspective. Major constructs derived from
each theory will then be discussed and applied to propose relationship between the
constructs and the issue of interest and to develop the study hypotheses.
Integrated Theoretical Perspectives
Multiple theoretical perspectives are applied to examine hospital decisions
regarding provision of HH services. Each theoretical viewpoint provides distinctive
explanations to various motives of organizations to provide HH care or not. Multiple
theoretical approaches have been commonly used in health services research (e.g.,
D‘Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997; Zinn, Weech, and
Brannon, 1998; Walston, Kimberly, and Burns, 2001; Roggenkamp, White, and Bazzoli,
40
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2005). The rationale for combining multiple theoretical perspectives in studying the
question is that, as many researchers have suggested, no single theoretical perspective
currently existing can fully explain health care organizational responses to and their
performances under certain environmental forces or contingencies (Stiles, Mick, and
Wise, 2001; Luke and Walston, 2003). Hence, a multiple-theoretical approach may give
researchers a more comprehensive picture of the issue of interest.
Various views in terms of using multiple theoretical approaches in health services
studies are observed. Some researchers suggest an ―either-or‖ proposition while others
argue for an ―X and Y‖ thinking (Shortell, 1997). The former proposition views different
theoretical perspectives as competing arguments while the latter views them as
complementary frameworks which are adopted in this study.
The Conceptual Model
Organizational scholars recognize that organizations have diverse goals.
Organizational goals may serve cognitive, motivational, symbolic, or justification
purposes (Scott and Davis, 2007). In some cases, these goals may be competing within
an organization. For example, Daft (2001) distinguishes official goals (e.g., mission
statements) from operative goals. Official goals provide legitimacy (symbolic functions).
Operative goals provide decision guidelines and criteria of performance (cognitive
functions), employee development (motivational functions) (Daft, 2001), and explain and
defend organizational decisions and behaviors (justification functions) (Weick, 1969).
Additionally, Shortell, Zukoski, Alexander, Bazzoli, Conrad, and Hasnain-Wynia (2002)
suggested that most organizations have multiple motives for engaging in certain types of
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activities. They point out that these motives may be of an instrumental nature, a
legitimacy nature, and/or an altruistic nature.
There are numerous motives or goals associated with hospital provision of PAC
services. Wheeler et al. (1999) suggested that the objective functions of hospitals in
diversifying into sub-acute care include minimizing financial risk, maximizing financial
returns or profits, and providing socially valuable services. Giardina, Fottler, Shewchuk,
and Hill (1990) indicated that the benefits hospitals may gain from LTC diversification
(their discussion was based on the pre-BBA context) include: (1) offsetting revenue loss
from declining/more stringent acute care payments, (2) taking advantage of the
profitability and growth of the LTC market, (3) meeting the incentive to discharge
patients as quickly as possible, (4) increasing revenue from charges for ancillary services
such as rehabilitation, (5) achieving economies of scale, (6) establishment of a referral
network, and (7) improving their public image.

Giardina and colleagues thus concluded

that entering the LTC market would help hospitals meet both their financial goals and
their stated missions such as meeting health care needs of their communities.
Following the arguments and approaches used in previous research, this study
integrates a number of major concepts from health economics, resource dependence,
transaction cost economics, institutional theories, and population ecology to explore the
issue of interest and to develop hypotheses. This study basically assumes that hospitals‘
decisions regarding the provision of HH services are based on multiple organizational
considerations and related market factors posited by these theories.
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The conceptual model illustrated in Figure 3 basically suggests that hospitals‘
decision to offer HH services and their responses to policy changes regarding HH
services (such as the BBA) are not determined by only one particular factor. Instead,
hospitals‘ decisions in providing HH services are based on a number of concerns or
contexts.
Filters
Resource
Dependence

Transaction
cost

Implementation
of the BBA

Institutional
influence

Prism
Objective
function

Change in
HH service
provision

Org inertia

Figure 3. The Conceptual Model

This multi-theoretical model provides a comprehensive set of organizational
considerations or contexts related to hospitals‘ decisions concerning whether they should
change the provision of HH services in response to the payment reduction brought about
by the BBA. Each organizational consideration or market context pointed out by the
theoretical perspectives can be viewed as a filter or prism which differentiates, filters out,
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or carry over certain considerations in hospitals‘ decision to offer HH care after the BBA,
contributing to the different behaviors or decisions hospitals take or make concerning the
provision of HH care post-BBA. Specifically, this study considers the objectives of
hospitals with different ownership forms to be a prism that differentiates the responses of
hospitals in the change in HH care provision to the implementation of the BBA. In
addition, the constructs proposed by the organization theories act as filters that bring
about or remove certain considerations for hospitals in response to the change in the
reimbursement environment.
In the following sections, each of the theoretical concepts or arguments relevant to
hospitals‘ decisions on the provision and change in provision of HH services is discussed.
The major points of the discussion are summarized in Table 2. Hypotheses to be tested
are proposed after each of the theoretical discussions.
Economic Perspectives
The basic assumptions of economic theories lie in scarcity of resources and rational
decision making (Folland, Goodman, and Stano, 2004). Decision makers (i.e., consumers
and producers) are rational in terms of ―making choices that best further one‘s own ends
given one‘s resource constraints‖ (Folland et al., 2004). This implies that a rational actor
always behaves based on his/her self interest and calculation of consequences. In
economic analysis, the goal of consumers is to maximize their own utility while the
objective of producers/firms is profit maximization.

Table 2. Theoretical Premises and Implications for Hospital Decision Regarding the Provision of HH Services
Basis of
Comparison
Basic premise

Economics

Resource Dependence

Transaction Cost

Organization decisions
are established to
maximizing
self-interest/utility

Organization decisions
are shaped by internal
resource availability and
external actors who
control critical resources

Organization
decisions are
established to
minimizing
transaction cost

Efficiency
Organizations exercise
active choice

Maintaining autonomy
Obtaining resource for
survival
Organizations exercise
active choice

Minimizing
transaction cost
Efficiency
Organizations
exercise active
choice

Intentional

Intentional

Intentional

Unintentional
Environmentally
induced

Pre-BBA: Inpatient
payment was reduced
by DRGs, hospitals
need to create new
sources of revenues in
order to be profitable
Post-BBA: HH
payment was cut by
BBA and become
unprofitable

Medicare patients/
revenues are critical
resources to hospitals
DRGs created hospitals‘
need to connect acute
care and HH care to
ensure the care for
Medicare patients,
resulting in the increase
in hospital dependence
on PAC

As hospitals‘ need to
transfer patients to
limited number of
HH settings
increases, transfer
uncertainty and
complexity rises,
bringing up overall
transaction cost.

As population
ages, provision
of HH care is
considered
more necessary
and legitimate
As more hospitals
offer/drop HH,
isomorphic
pressure
increases.

Organizational Utility/profit
maximization
goal
Role of
managers in
decision
making
Type of
organizational
change
Environment

Institutional

Population
Ecology

Organization
decisions are
shaped by
institutional
environments/
pressures
Pursuing
legitimacy for
survival
Organizations do
not exercise
active choice

Organization
structure and
change are shaped
by internal inertia
and evolving
environments
Adaptive survival

Organizations do
not exercise active
choice
Individual adaptive
ability is limited
Unintentional
Environmentally
induced
DRGs/BBA
required hospitals
to bear financial
risk of patient care,
creating an
environment that
threatens the
survival of hospital
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Table 2 (continued)
Basis of
Economics
Comparison
Hospital view Achieving mission
HH provision Maximizing profit
as a mean for Optimizing efficiency

Resource Dependence

Transaction Cost

Institutional

Maintaining
autonomy/reducing
dependence on other PAC
facilities in discharging
Medicare patients

Reducing transaction
costs in discharging
Medicare patients to
HH facilities

Conforming to
social pressure
for offering HH
and gaining
legitimacy to
operate
Meeting the
requirement
from
authoritative
organizations
Meeting social
expectation
Conforming to
other hospitals
offering HH
Conforming to
peer hospitals not
offering HH

Adapting to the
reduced payment
environment

Coercive pressure
Normative
pressure
Mimetic pressure

Organizational
inertia
Environmental
adaptation and
selection

Rationale for
offering HH
care

HH services are
profitable
Generating additional
revenues
Meeting bottom line
Fulfilling mission
Enhancing competitive
advantage

Controlling patient source Managing
and managing patient
transaction
need
uncertainty and
Reducing dependence on
complexity
other HH facilities
Reducing transaction
Managing threats from
costs
government policy such Ensuring efficient
as DRGs
operation

Rationale for
not offering
HH care

HH services are
unprofitable and
financially risky
Lack of slack resource

Lack of financial and
personnel capabilities

Key predictor
of HH care
provision

Ownership form
Competition
Profitability of service
Economies of scope

Resource dependence
Resource uncertainty
Resource availability
Organization constraints

Transferring patients
to HH facilities in
the market involves
minimal transaction
costs
Transaction
uncertainty,
frequency, and
complexity

Population
Ecology

Being pushed to
offer HH
otherwise will be
selected out by the
environment and
policy
Inertia to change
(post-BBA)

Inertia to change
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Therefore, from the perspective of economics, economic actors have free choices
among goods or inputs in maximizing their utilities or profits but under certain
constraints. The human nature of rationality and self interest and the market opportunities
(i.e., choice of goods or inputs) and constraints (induced by income, prices, and market
demands) contribute to the efficient allocation of limited resources in a society through
perfect competition.
Among the market factors discussed above, economists view price as the most
critical signal to economic behavior. The change of price is referred to an ―invisible hand‖
in guiding all market and economic activities. A perfectly competitive market will reach
its equilibrium in terms of demand and supply through the price dynamic (Folland et al.,
2004). The use or allocation of resources is thought to be the most efficient at the point of
equilibrium where the market supply meets the market demand.
According to economics, producers such as firms and hospitals will reduce the
output of a good/service when the price of the good/service drops, holding other things
equal. The producer will then redirect the resources or inputs saved from the production
reduction of the good/service to the production of other goods deemed profitable. By
doing this the producer expects to efficiently allocate his/her limited resources and
attempts to make up the revenue reduction due to the decreased price and production of
the original good, thus maintaining or increasing his/her profit.
These economic perspectives provide a sound explanation for the growth of
hospital-based PAC services after the implementation of DRGs in 1983. For hospitals,
the implementation of DRGs represented a dramatic change of economic environment
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(healthcare market) where they operate. It signifies the reduction of reimbursement and
prices for the acute care services hospitals provide. Thus hospitals started to limit their
acute care services (e.g., reducing lengths of stay) while at the same time expand or
diversify into other profitable services such as NH and HH services. On the other hand,
as long as other important factors are not major concerns, one may expect that
profit-maximizing hospitals would reduce their PAC provision after the payment
reduction of PAC services resulting from the BBA.
Behaviors of Hospitals with Different Ownerships
From the perspective of economics, for-profit hospitals should behave exactly like
profit-maximizing firms (Wheeler and Clement, 1990). They should do whatever it takes
to make profit and distribute the profit to owners or shareholders. However, traditional
economic perspectives may tell only part of the story of the overall hospital behavior.
One of the unique aspects of the U.S. hospital sector is its mixed ownership types
(Stevens, 1999). For-profit, public/government-operated, and private nonprofit hospitals
operate simultaneously in the health care market. Theoretically and by definition,
nonprofit hospitals should have objectives different from those held by their for-profit
counterparts.
Health economists have long been interested in the objective functions and
behaviors of HCOs of different ownership forms. Weisbrod (1988) proposed three
conceptual models for describing the objective functions and behaviors of nonprofit
HCOs, which may or may not differ systematically across ownership forms in
responding to the change in price/financial incentives. The first model suggests that
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nonprofit HCOs are ―for-profits in disguise.‖ That is, nonprofits are in fact acting to
maximize profit and behaving like for-profits. From this view, the argument concerning
for-profit HCOs discussed above can be applied to all hospitals including for-profit and
nonprofit hospitals. Certain empirical evidence supports this argument by showing that
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals have similar cost or revenue behaviors (Sloan, 2000).
The second model holds that nonprofits are pursuing/producing two kinds of goods,
i.e., mission goods (or M-goods) and revenue goods (or R-goods) at the same time.
Providing R-goods generates revenues necessary for nonprofit HCOs to fulfill their
missions by providing as many M-goods as possible, subject to a budget constraint. In
other words, nonprofits have to at least break even in order to be sustainable in the long
run. In this regard, nonprofits will take a balanced position of producing M- and R-goods.
Nonprofit HCOs might remain in the production of M-goods even though these goods
are not profitable, as long as there are sufficient R-goods. On the other hand, nonprofits
may not be as sensitive as for-profits in responding to reduced financial incentives in the
production of M-goods.
The third model proposed by Weisbrod holds that nonprofits are inefficient profit
maximizers. Because of the non-distribution constraint held on nonprofit organizations,
there is a lack of incentive for managers in nonprofit HCOs to operate efficiently
although their underlying intentions are profit-oriented. Based on this argument,
nonprofits will behave differently from for-profits in reacting to changing financial
incentives or prices of services, not because they are mission-driven, but because they are
inefficient in making the change.
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These conceptual models of nonprofit HCOs are particularly relevant to nonprofits
except for public HCOs. Public hospitals, with a mission to ensure equal access to
needed care, play a critical role in the healthcare safety net, providing care to the
uninsured and to minority populations. Among the three hospital ownership types (public,
for-profit, and nonprofit), public hospitals may be least vulnerable to changes in the
economic/financial environment because public hospitals are products of government
policy or intention. The sustainability of a public hospital depends more on political
decisions than financial considerations. A public hospital can survive even operating at a
financial loss and is backed up by public budgets when it meets public/policy purpose
(Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, and Himmelstein, 2002).
In addition, the goals and services of public HCOs are regulated directly by law or
established by sponsoring governmental agencies, thereby being much less flexible in
operation compared to their private nonprofits. Thus, a more appropriate model for
describing the objective and behavior of public HCOs may be a M-goods-only (i.e.,
mission-focused) model, in which the objective of public hospitals is to meet social needs
only, regardless of the profitability of the services provided.
Finally, the U.S. private nonprofit hospitals can be further classified into two
sub-categories, religious (or faith-based) and secular nonprofit hospitals. The former may
fit more closely into the two-good model while the latter may fit more closely into the
inefficient profit maximizer model proposed by Weisbrod. These propositions will be
further discussed in the hypothesis section.
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Figure 4 illustrates the conceptual model for describing the objectives and relative
positions of hospitals of the four ownership types in the continuum of profit
maximization versus mission orientation. Based on the model, each ownership type will
be discussed relative to other types and hypotheses developed for empirical testing.
More likely to reduce HH post-BBA

Mission
fulfillment

Public
Hospitals

Religious
Hospitals

Secular
nonprofit
Hospitals

For-profit
Hospitals

Mission
good

Profit
maximization

Revenue good
M-good only
Model

Two-good
Model

Inefficient
Profit
Maximizer

Profit
Maximizer

Rely on social/political resources

Rely on revenue resource

Less sensitive to financial incentive

Sensitive to financial incentive

Figure 4. A Conceptual Model of the Objective Function of Four Major Ownership
Forms of Hospitals
For-Profit versus Public Hospitals
It is quite straightforward to predict for-profit hospitals‘ response to the BBA. Due
to their focus on profit-maximization, other things being equal, for-profit hospitals would
aggressively increase provision of HH services when HH business is profitable, and
would leave the business when it becomes unprofitable (Harrington et al., 2002).
In discussing organizational change, population ecology theory (PET) posits that
organizations, rather than making active or strategic changes, are relatively inertial
structures which are difficult to change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Hannan and Carroll,
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1995). There are two types of structural inertia: internal inertia and external inertia. The
former includes organization internal policy, vested interests, and sunk costs. The latter
includes public policies and legitimization of organization activities. Applying this
perspective to the change in hospital provision of HH services post-BBA, one could
expect that public hospitals may have greater inertia to change provision of HH services
when compared to for-profit hospitals because public hospitals are directly constrained
by public policies.
These arguments are consistent with the findings in Horwitz (2005a) who reported
the change in hospital provision of HH services as HH care turned unprofitable due to the
BBA. After controlling for related factors, Horwitz found that the probability of offering
home health care fell a striking 37.5 percent among for-profit, 7.7 percent among
non-profit, and only 1.5 percent among public hospitals. Based on the discussion above,
the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 1a: For-profit hospitals were more likely than public hospitals to
reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
Private Nonprofit Hospitals versus For-profit Hospitals
Private nonprofit hospitals differ from for-profit hospitals in that their goal is not to
maximize profits. Instead, nonprofit hospitals usually have unique missions such as
charity, religious/evangelical purposes, meeting community health needs, and
teaching/research. Also, unlike a for-profit hospital, nonprofit hospitals are subject to the
nondistribution constraint (Spector, Selden, and Cohen, 1998; Chou, 2002; Lindrooth and
Weisbrod, 2007). In other words, they cannot distribute their profits (Folland, Goodman,
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and Stano, 2004). Thus, they must use profits in ways other than distributing them to
shareholders. For example, a nonprofit hospital may use profits to provide or support
services which are not profitable but are important to the fulfillment of its mission
(Wheeler and Clement, 1990). Further, nonprofit hospitals enjoy tax-exempt status from
the IRS in exchange for the provision of a certain amount of community benefit.
Therefore, nonprofit hospitals should have more slack resources and higher social or
legal obligations than for-profit hospitals have to provide unprofitable care like HH
services post-BBA. This is also consistent with the PET argument regarding greater
external inertia faced by nonprofit hospitals than by for-profit hospitals. That is,
nonprofits are directed by the external requirements for providing community benefits
and constrained by internal requirements for offering mission services. Hence, nonprofit
hospitals are in a less flexible position to change their HH provision after the
implementation of the BBA compared to for-profit hospitals. Thus,
Hypothesis 1b: For-profit hospitals were more likely than nonprofit hospitals
to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
Private Nonprofit Hospitals versus Public Hospitals
However, all private hospitals must meet the break-even bottom line to stay in
business. Hence, nonprofit hospitals must be concerned with profits even if profits
provide little utility to the hospital (Hirth, 1999). If nonprofit hospitals are not as efficient
as their for-profit counterparts, or they are equally efficient but cannot break-even under
certain market environments, nonprofit hospitals will not have more slack resources than
for-profit hospitals to offer unprofitable services. In this case, one may expect that
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nonprofit and for-profit hospitals would respond similarly regarding their provision of
HH services after the BBA. That is, although private nonprofit hospitals may not as
sensitive as for-profit hospitals, they would be more sensitive than their public
counterparts to the change of the Medicare payment environment. Thus,
Hypothesis 1c: Private nonprofit hospitals were more likely than public
hospitals to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
Religious versus Secular Nonprofit Hospitals
Most of the religious hospitals were originally founded to provide charity care for
the vulnerable populations in their communities and, as such, have carried forward their
missions of social justice. Religious hospitals are the private, nonprofit providers that are
most similar to public hospitals in purpose. Religious hospitals are directly governed by
their affiliating denominations as public hospitals are guided by governments. Both
governments and religious denominations usually have established particular non-profit
goals and guiding rules for their affiliated hospitals to meet certain social needs.
In addition, as public hospitals receive funds from governmental agencies, many
religious hospitals receive direct financial support from their sponsoring denominations.
In this sense, both public and religious private hospitals could behave similarly following
a policy change that reduces economic incentives to provide a particular service.
However, like other private nonprofits, religious hospitals are easily subject to a
break-even requirement given the fact that financial resources supported by their
denominations are usually limited. They rely in large part on their revenues or profits
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through providing revenue goods (R-goods). Therefore, religious hospitals fit perfectly
with the two-good model suggested by Weisbrod.
With respect to secular private nonprofit hospitals, they may behave in accordance
with the model of an inefficient profit maximizer. Secular private nonprofits usually
operate independently without regulatory governance in addition to general public
policies or regulations. Moreover, many secular nonprofit hospitals may not have regular
financial resources besides revenues from operations and service provision. In other
words, they are faced with higher self-sustaining pressure compared to their religious and
public counterparts. As market competition intensifies and the payment environment
tightens, secular hospitals may need to be as profit-oriented as their for-profit
counterparts. However, secular hospitals may not be able to be as efficient as for-profit
hospitals due to the non-distribution constraint discussed earlier.
From the perspective of population ecology theory, religious hospitals may have
greater internal inertia with church-introduced policies and support which are absent in
secular nonprofit hospitals. Therefore, religious hospitals could be more reluctant to
change their provision of HH services post-BBA. Thus,
Hypothesis 1d: Secular nonprofit hospitals were more likely than religious
nonprofit hospitals to reduce HH services after the implementation of the
BBA.
Resource Dependence Theory
Resource dependence theory (RDT) holds that every organization is resource
dependent to certain extent. In other words, no organization is entirely self-sufficient, nor
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any organization can control all of the resources necessary for survival. Hence, the
exchange of resources with other organizations is inevitable and critical to organizational
survival. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) indicated, ―Resource dependence perspective
looks at how an organization interacts with others and its environment to obtain critical
and often uncertain resources through exchange.‖
Resources in the environment are always limited or sometimes scarce. If the
resource critical to a particular organization is controlled by other organizations,
uncertainty and dependence are induced, thus making the focal organization vulnerable.
In this case, the survival of the organization is dependent on certain organizations that
dominate or control the key resource. As resource dependence theorists argue, this
interdependence between organizations is a fundamental determinant and predictor of
organizational behavior and performance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
The resource dependence perspective assumes that organizations and managers to
certain degree can actively and strategically arrange their environment to reduce
unwanted reliance and enhance the likelihood of survival (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976).
According to RDT, organizations‘ dependence on other organizations does not
necessarily result in risks for the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Nevertheless,
an organization may face difficulties to obtain the resources necessary for its operation
and survival when resources become scarce and/or the organizations that control key
resources become undependable, unpredictable or more demanding.
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Hospital Dependence on Post-Acute Care
Medicare patients and revenues are critical resources for hospitals‘ survival. DRGs
encouraged hospitals‘ to arrange acute care-PAC connections to ensure the care of
Medicare patients after hospital discharge and to avoid readmission, resulting in
hospitals' dependence on PAC services (Kane, Kane, and Ladd, 1998). In this situation,
according to RDT, hospitals have two major strategic options, namely buffering and
bridging strategies. Buffering strategies are employed by organizations to protect their
technical core (Thomson, 1967; Oliver, 1991). One of the key buffering approaches
would be growth by integrating PAC services into a hospital‘s service provision list. By
providing its own PAC services, a hospital is able to control in large part the process of
care and transfer of patients between acute care and post-acute care settings.
On the other hand, bridging strategies entail the development and management of a
dyadic relationship between a focal organization and other organizations. For example,
instead of providing HH services itself, hospitals can have long-term contracts with
outside HHAs for patient transfer and the coordination of care.
As noted earlier, the BBA has tightened the reimbursement rates of Medicare for
HH care. However, different hospitals have different proportions of Medicare patients,
and as a result have received distinct degrees of reduction in reimbursement payment
from the BBA. As discussed above, a hospital‘s reliance on PAC for discharging elderly
patients has been an essential driver for hospitals to adopt a HH agency. Medicare
beneficiaries are the major users of HH care and a significant portion of them are likely
to require HH care after an inpatient discharge. A relatively higher proportion of
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Medicare patient days would impose greater pressure on a hospital‘s discharge- planning
activities as well as hospital reliance on PAC. Thus, the greater the Medicare inpatient
day proportion in a hospital, the greater the need or reliance of the hospital on HH
services. The following hypotheses are posited:
Hypothesis 2a: Hospitals with higher proportions of Medicare inpatient days
were more likely than those with lower Medicare inpatient day proportions to
provide HH services.
Hypothesis 2b: Hospitals with higher proportions of Medicare inpatient days
were less likely than those with lower Medicare inpatient day proportion to
reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
Hospital Financial and Professional Capability to Provide HH Care
Nevertheless, providing HH services entails financial and professional/personnel
capabilities which may not be present in every hospital. Hospitals without such
capabilities may need to rely on bridging strategies in order to coordinate necessary HH
care. The resources particularly important for HH care provision include capital and
nursing resources. One factor that may directly influence hospital offering of HH care is
the financial status of hospitals. Hospitals with better financial status (e.g., higher profit
margins) may have more resources to provide services in addition to acute care services
which are the core business of general hospitals. Also, HH services are provided largely
by nursing professionals without whom a hospital may experience difficulties in offering
or maintaining HH services. Nursing capability in a hospital can be reflected through the
nursing density (e.g., the fraction of total FTEs accounted for by nursing staff) in the
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hospital. Hospitals with higher nursing density should have more nursing capability than
do those with lower nursing density. Therefore, one could expect that a hospital with a
lower financial margin and lower nursing density may be less likely to have
hospital-based HH services and more likely to discontinue HH programs after the BBA.
Hence:
Hypothesis 3a: Hospitals with less financial ability were less likely than those
having more financial ability to provide HH services.
Hypothesis 3b: Hospitals with less financial ability were more likely than those
having more financial ability to reduce HH services after the implementation
of the BBA.
Hypothesis 4a: Hospitals with higher nursing density were more likely than
those with lower nursing density to provide HH services.
Hypothesis 4b: Hospitals with higher nursing density were less likely than
those with lower nursing density to reduce HH services after the
implementation of the BBA.
A conceptual display of the relationships proposed in hypotheses 2 through 4 is
illustrated in Figure 5.
Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) draws on concepts from economics and
contract law to form a theoretical model explaining how organizations provide the most
efficient exchange in response to market failure (Williamson, 1975; 1985). While
neoclassical economics basically posits that the market is the most efficient governance
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Figure 5. The Conceptual Illustration of the Relationships in Hypotheses 2-4

structure for guiding exchanges through the price mechanism, contracts, and competition,
TCE argues that in some circumstances organizations will do a better job at the exchange
relationship.
TCE emphasizes the transaction and suggests that the characteristics and scopes of
transactions determine the desirable transacting form and organizational boundary. The
theory points out that transaction forms include ―spot market‖, ―hybrid arrangement‖,
and vertical integration. In a spot market, exchange buyers purchase goods or services
directly from suppliers in the market without the establishment of any prior relationships.
A hybrid arrangement for exchange refers to developing a mid- or long-term relationship
through a contract or joint venture arrangement with suppliers to guide exchanges. In the
final transaction form, vertical integration, buyers ultimately gains permanent control
over the supplier, i.e., to internalize the transaction. Vertical integration is also
characterized as ―hierarchy.‖ TCE suggests that the design and the boundary of an
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organization are the result of the organization‘s continuing process of ―make or buy‖
decisions.
TCE views organizations as boundedly rational and opportunistic. Not any
negotiation and contract are perfect, and organizations cannot anticipate all the
circumstances of every contract, due to their bounded rationality. This issue could be
largely reduced, however, if organizations were always truthful and willing to fulfill
fairly the agreement signed even the contract is not perfect. Yet organizations can be
opportunistic, that is, seeking their self-interest with guile, risks can thus arise from
contracts. In these cases, transaction costs will inevitably occur as organizations try to
seek necessary information, monitor and enforce contracts, ensure exchanges, and
resolve conflicts or the failure of contracts. These factors can contribute to the failure of
the market. If transaction costs related to a certain transaction are too high, organizations
tend to internalize the transaction, that is, to make the services or goods within the
organization instead of buying them from the market.
In addition to the human characteristics mentioned above, Williamson (1985)
argues that a high level of transaction uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency will
contribute to the exchange process preferring organization to market. Under these
conditions, hierarchical arrangements, in spite of higher fixed costs in general, will result
in overall lower transaction costs than markets. It is because disagreements involved with
transactions can be enforced and opportunism can be reduced through ―managerial fiat‖
(Williamson, 1975).
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Transaction cost economics is particularly useful in describing the fundamental
basis and behavior of organizations in the case of market failure. Since health care
systems or the hospital sector deviate significantly from the perfectly competitive market
assumed by classic economics and indeed operate in the environment characterized as
market failure, TCE is insightful in studying health care organizations (Stiles, Mick, and
Wise, 2001). In addition, the delivery of health care can be viewed as the composition of
transactions among providers, patients, payers, and suppliers. Transaction cost economics
is a relevant theoretical lens in studying transactions among parties. In this light, hospital
provision of PAC services can be considered as a hospital‘s intent and action to better
organize its transactions related to the provision of care. TCE has been commonly
applied by health services researchers to study the linkage between hospitals and
provision of NH care (Chiu, 1995; Lucente, 2006), HH care (Xu, 2000), and LTC
(Angelelli et al., 2003).
As discussed earlier, the implementation of DRGs induced the need of hospitals to
coordinate the continuum of care from acute to post-acute care services. Coordination
involves administrative costs that are not directly related to the production of health care
services. Hence, the concept of transaction costs in TCE offers a useful framework in
understanding the issue regarding coordination costs in hospitals.
In theory, hospitals can simply refer patients needing PAC to HHAs in the market
(i.e., buying from the market), they can also establish some types of contracts or joint
venture with these HHAs to coordinate the care process (i.e., hybrid arrangement), or
they can set up and provide their own HH services (i.e., make the service through
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hierarchical arrangement). According to TCE, hospitals with higher transaction
uncertainty, frequency or quantity, and transaction complexity entail higher transaction
costs related to the coordination between acute and post-acute continuum of care, thus
being more likely to provide HH services themselves (Williamson, 1985; Stiles and Mick,
1997).
Transaction Uncertainty
According to TCE, as transaction uncertainty increases, organizations tend to
―make‖ the product or service they need instead of ―buy‖ it from a market place
(Williamson, 1975; Scott and Davis, 2007). Therefore, hospitals facing greater PAC
transfer uncertainty should provide their own HH services rather than depending on the
services provided by other HHAs. If a hospital is located in a healthcare market with few
HHAs relative to the size of the elderly population, the hospital may be faced with higher
transaction uncertainty. In other words, in a hospital market where HH capacities are
limited and many Medicare patients discharged by hospitals need HH services, it may be
hard for hospitals to develop long-term and stable relations with HHAs. In this situation,
provision of a hospital‘s own HH services may be preferred because it not only makes
hospitals able to ensure Medicare patient resources but also reduces hospitals‘
dependence on other HHAs and maintains hospitals‘ autonomy. Both TCE and RDT are
drawn upon to predict that:
Hypothesis 5a: Hospitals in markets with fewer HH services relative to
PAC-needing patients were more likely than those in markets with less limited
facilities to provide HH services.
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Hypothesis 5b: Hospitals in markets with fewer HH services relative to
PAC-needing patients were less likely than those in markets with more
services to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
Transaction Frequency
With respect to transaction frequency, a larger hospital or a hospital with a higher
proportion of Medicare patients may need to interact with PAC facilities on a more
frequent basis and thus experience higher transaction costs. As Chiu (1995) pointed out, a
hospital with a greater number of Medicare patient days is likely to have more
transactions with PAC facilities such as nursing homes and home health agencies. Larger
hospitals in general have higher numbers of Medicare patient days. Also, larger hospitals
generally have a greater proportion of Medicare patients and provide more services. Xu
(2000) empirically revealed that hospital size is associated positively with hospital
provision of HH care. It can thus be expected that larger hospitals would be more likely
than their smaller counterparts to provide their own HH services and would be less likely
to reduce HH care when HH turns unprofitable. Thus:
Hypothesis 6a: Larger hospitals were more likely than smaller hospitals to
provide HH services.
Hypothesis 6b: Larger hospitals were less likely than smaller hospitals to
reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
Transaction Complexity
Finally, hospitals having patients with more complex medical conditions may face
greater transaction complexity when it comes to coordinating the care their patients need
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following release from acute care wards. For hospitals, discharging a patient with more
complex medical conditions to a HHA tend to involve more coordination between the
hospital and the HHA, thus driving up transaction complexity as well as transaction costs.
In health services research, a case-mix index (CMI) is often used to measure the average
medical complexity of the patients for an individual hospital. A CMI may also be related
to average length of stays, contributing to the pressure on a hospital to discharge patients
in a timely basis, thus influencing the pressure on hospitals to integrate HH care.
Hospitals with higher CMIs tend to have longer average length of stays, thereby having
to work harder to make patient discharge as smooth as possible in order to make beds
available for new patients. Also, a hospital with a higher CMI may be more likely to
provide HH services because these more medically complex patients are likely to need
post-acute care following discharge. The greater transaction complexity could drive up
the need of hospitals to provide and maintain their own HH services, thus:
Hypothesis 7a: Hospitals with higher CMIs were more likely than those with
lower CMIs to provide HH services.
Hypothesis 7b: Hospitals with higher CMIs were less likely than those with
lower CMIs to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
A conceptual display of the relationships proposed in hypotheses 5 through 7 is
illustrated in Figure 6.
Institutional Theory
Institutional theory emphasizes that organizations not only are influenced by
competitive and efficiency-based forces, but also are shaped by widely-held beliefs and
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Figure 6. The Conceptual Illustration of the Relationships in Hypotheses 5-7
rule systems in their professions and societies – both in how they structure themselves
and how they perform their works (Scott and Davis, 2007).
The basic premises of institutional theory explain why organizations within sectors
adopt similar structures, practices, and procedures. According to institutional theorists,
organizations do so to increase their legitimacy (Meyer and Scott, 1983). Institutional
theory views organizations as adaptive organisms reacting to the characteristics and
commitments of participants and to pressures or influences from the external
environment (Selznick, 1948). However, organizations do so not because of
active/strategic choices, but by unintentionally conforming to environmental pressures. A
certain set of factors largely composed of cultural-cognitive (e.g., common beliefs and
values), normative (e.g., professional standards and certification), and regulative
elements (e.g., rules, law, and sanctions) are thought to form the institutional
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environment, providing meaning to organizational life and creating pressures for
organizations to perform in conforming to these accepted values, standards, and rules.
Institutional perspectives emphasize that organizations face environments
characterized by norms, rules, and requirements that the organizations must conform to
in order to receive legitimacy and social support (Scott and Davis, 2007). The pressures
of institutional environments often have the effect of directing organizations‘ attention
away from task performance and efficiency/effectiveness. That is, organizations may be
attempting to seeking rational or economic goals (e.g., maximizing efficiency,
effectiveness, and profits, minimizing costs, or fulfilling mission) while in fact they are
conforming to the institutional constraints (Luke and Walston, 2003).
Coercive Pressures
From the perspective of institutional theory, an organization‘s behavior is
influenced by certain institutional forces including coercive pressures, normative
pressures, and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). First, coercive pressures
are usually expressed through the forms such as requirements or regulations from
governments or sponsoring institutions. As mentioned previously, both governments and
sponsoring churches may consider provision of necessary HH services as one of their
major missions or duties, thus imposing more requirements or policies on their affiliated
hospitals to offer HH services. In this regard, one may observe public and religious
hospitals to be less responsive than their secular and for-profit counterparts to reduce HH
care due to the implementation of the BBA. This discussion is in accordance with the
hypotheses 1a to 1d proposed earlier.
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Normative Pressures
Another source of institutional forces is normative pressure resulting from social or
professional norms. Hospital provision of HH care can be considered an action hospitals
take to conform to environmental requirements when they are located in an area with a
substantial elderly population. In an area having higher elderly density or higher growth
rates of the elderly population, social norms for hospitals to provide better continuum of
care should be greater. Hence, one would expect that hospitals in areas with higher
elderly density or higher growth rates of the elderly population would have a higher
probability of offering their own HH services and a lower probability of cutting these
services after the BBA. Also, a higher density of elderly people or a growth rate in the
elderly population in a market creates greater dependence of hospitals on Medicare
patients, HH agencies, as well as a higher frequency and volume of elderly patients
needing transfers to HH care settings. Thus:
Hypothesis8a: Hospitals located in areas with higher proportions of elderly
population were more likely than those in areas with lower elderly proportions
to provide HH services.
Hypothesis 8b: Hospitals located in areas with higher proportions of elderly
population were less likely than those in lower elderly proportion areas to
reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
Hypothesis 9a: Hospitals located in areas with higher elderly population
growth rates were more likely than those in areas with lower rates to provide
HH care.
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Hypothesis 9b: Hospitals located in areas with higher growth rates of elderly
population were less likely than those in areas with slower rates to reduce HH
services after the implementation of the BBA.
Mimetic Pressures
Mimetic isomorphism is the third institutional mechanism influencing
organizations to adopt similar practices. Researchers have demonstrated spillover effects
brought about by for-profit HCOs on nonprofit HCOs (Horwitz and Nichols, 2007), and
vice versa (Grabowski and Hirth, 2003). If a for-profit hospital is located in a market
occupied by public and nonprofit hospitals, it may be faced with greater mimetic pressure
brought about by its non-profit neighboring counterparts. On the other hand, it is
plausible that a nonprofit hospital located in a for-profit dominant market may exhibit
behaviors similar to its for-profit neighbors, thus:
Hypothesis 10a: Nonprofit hospitals located in markets with higher
proportions of for-profit hospitals were more likely than those in markets with
lower proportions to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA.
Hypothesis 10b: For-profit hospitals located in markets with higher
proportions of nonprofit hospitals were less likely than those in markets with
lower such proportions to reduce HH services after the implementation of the
BBA.
A conceptual display of the relationships proposed in hypotheses 8 through 10 is
illustrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. The Conceptual Illustration of the Relationships in Hypotheses 8-10.

The hypotheses stated above are summarized in Table 3 with the major factors
hypothesized to be associated with hospital provision and change in provision of HH care
before and after the BBA. Expected directions of the relationships of interest are also
shown in the table.
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Table 3. Summary of the Study Hypotheses and the Expected Results
Hypotheses

EconomicsOwnership
H1a
H1b
H1c
H1d
Resource
Dependence
H2a~H2b

Determinants of hospital
(change in) provision of HH
care

Expected Sign
Likelihood
of offering
HH

FP vs. Public
FP vs. NFP
NFP vs. Public
Secular vs. Religious NFP

Likelihood of
continuing HH
post BBA

(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)

Level of hospital dependence
on post-acute care% Medicare inpatient days
Hospital financial capabilityHospital profit margin
Professional capabilityNursing density

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

UncertaintyLimited HHAs
Frequency-Hospital size
Complexity-Hospital CMI

(+)

(+)

(+)
(+)

(+)
(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

H10a

Normative pressureElderly population %
Normative pressureElderly population growth
rate
Mimetic pressure-FP market

H10b

Mimetic pressure-NFP market

H3a~H3b
H4a~H4b
Transaction Cost
H5a~H5b
H6~H6b
H7a~H7b
Institutional Theory
H8a~H8b
H9a~H9b

(+) means positive association; (-) means negative association

NFP hospitals
(-)
For-profit
hospitals (+)

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the methodologies used to examine how hospital provision of
HH services changed after the implementation of the BBA. This chapter first discusses
the research design, followed by a discussion of study sample, data sources, and variable
measurement. Some issues encountered in the process of data management and the
methods used to address these issues are also described. Finally, the
econometric/statistical approach used to analyze the data is presented.
Research Design
This study can be viewed as a natural experiment in which the BBA is the
intervention. Of particular interest is whether or not the reduction of hospital-based HH
services after the BBA differs for religious, secular nonprofit, or for-profit hospitals as
compared with public hospitals which serve as the control group in the analytical model.
A natural experiment approach is very relevant for policy evaluation (Meyer, 1995).
More specifically, this study applies a time series non-equivalent control group
design which is a quasi-experiment design in nature (Polit and Beck, 2004: 185-186). In
this study, however, there is only one data-collecting point (i.e., 1997) in the pre-BBA
period while there are six data-collecting points (years 1998 through 2003) in the
post-BBA period. The conceptual illustration of this research design is depicted in Figure
8.
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Figure 8. A Conceptual Diagram of the Research Design

As shown in Figure 8, the intervention of the natural experiment is the
implementation of the BBA. Although the new reimbursement policies are universally
applied to all HH agencies, hospital managers in different ownership forms should
respond to the BBA differently due to their different operational objectives. For example,
in the face of the BBA, for-profit hospitals may feel under greater pressure to reduce HH
provision in order to avoid the loss of profit. In contrast, public and nonprofit hospitals
may not perceive a need to reduce HH provision since financial incentive is only part of
their objective equations. In this situation, four treatment groups with different expected
responses to the intervention are naturally formed. Hence, the responses of any two
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groups can be compared with one serving as the study group and the other as the control
group.
The core interest of this study is whether the changes in HH provision from the
pre-BBA to the post-BBA years among the hospitals with different ownership types are
different. As in a true experimental context, this question can be answered by comparing
the changes in HH provision between any two hospital groups. However, this study did
not control the assignment of hospitals into the treatment groups. That is, there is no
random assignment in this natural experiment, thus the four treatment groups are not
equivalent. Direct comparison among the groups can cause biases. Therefore, statistical
controls for relevant organizational and market factors affecting hospitals are necessary.
Internal Validity
There are several benefits as well as potential issues associated with the study
design applied. One major benefit of a natural experiment approach is that the issue of
endogeneity (reverse causality between dependent and independent variables) can be
largely avoided. This is because the intervention (i.e., the implementation of the BBA)
was not determined by whether a particular hospital provided HH care or not. It is the
BBA that affects hospitals‘ decisions to continue or to stop offering HH care, among
other things. Scholars have suggested that natural experiments can provide strong
evidence regarding the effect of an intervention on outcomes of interest if the comparison
is thoughtfully designed to achieve equivalence between treatment and control groups
(Polit and Beck, 2004:191).
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In addition, this study design should be able to control for the threats to internal
validity including testing, instrumentation, and regression to the mean. These threats are
commonly present in longitudinal research. First, the threat of testing occurs when
hospitals changed their HH provision because of the report of the data regarding HH
provision in the baseline year (i.e., 1997). This is not likely to happen because this study
uses a retrospective approach. No real experiment was actually conducted at the time of
data reporting and collection, thus there is no artificial influence of researchers on
hospitals‘ reporting of the data used. Also, the collection of the data used in this analysis
was on a routine basis without any purpose specific to the study of HH provision.
Second, the issue of instrumentation arises when there are unwanted changes in
characteristics of the measuring instrument or in the measurement procedure (Singleton,
Straits, Straits, and McAllister, 1988: 203). This is unlikely to occur in this study, either.
As will be discussed in the data section, the collection instruments and procedures of the
data applied had been relatively consistent and stable across time. No significant change
in these aspects during the study period is observed. Also, the data for a particular
variable across years are drawn consistently from one particular data source or a mix of
two data sources to ensure the consistency of data across time.
Third, the threat of regression to the mean usually increases when cases are
selected for study based on their extreme performance in the baseline period and thus the
results of the following measurements tend to regress to the mean, resulting in a bias. For
this situation to be applicable here, hospitals would have to have been selected into the
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analysis because they offered or did not offer HH care. This is obviously not the case
here since all hospitals with data available are included in the analysis.
However, by applying the time series nonequivalent control group pretest-posttest
design, this study may be faced with the threats to internal validity including history,
selection, maturation, and attrition. These threats arise largely because nonequivalent
groups are employed. There may be significant differences in development trends (e.g.,
growth in hospital size, tendency of financial performance, etc.), hospital closure,
likelihood of being included in the analysis, and the external policy or regulatory
environments among different hospital ownership groups. Most of the selection and
maturation issues may be addressed through controlling for relevant organizational and
market factors in the analytical model. However, if certain characteristics mentioned
above are unable to be controlled for and are important to the hospital decisions to offer
or not to offer HH care, biases will occur.
There are several notable sources of threats to internal validity for which it may not
be possible to effectively control. First, there might be history threats present in this study.
Since the BBA may not be the only policy that affects HH reimbursement payments in
the study period, other policies might also have similar effects which could potentially
impact the relationship of interest. Nevertheless, the BBA is widely recognized to be the
single, most influential federal health care policy enacted in the study period that directly
impacted HH reimbursement payments. Thus, the reduction of payments and profitability
for HHAs in this period should be largely attributable to the BBA. Other researchers
have applied the same assumption to the evaluation of the impact of the BBA (McCall,
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Petersons, Moore, and Korb, 2003). In addition to the BBA representing the major
federal health care reimbursement policy, states might have enacted their own
reimbursement policies as well in the study period. An analytical model including state
dummies is conducted in order to control for the effects of state policies. However, this
approach controls for only differences among states throughout the study period but not
state changes in related policies across time period. Ideally this issue can be addressed
through including all the interaction terms between the state and year dummy variables.
Yet this can result in a very tedious model in which 300 additional interactions terms
need to be included. Although the effects could be a potential limitation to this study,
they should be minor since it is unlikely that a large number of states enacted major
policies significantly changing HH reimbursement schemes in this time period.
Selection threats are the second concern to the internal validity of this study.
Although a number of organizational and market factors supposed to be associated with
hospital provision of HH care are controlled for in the analysis, selection biases can
occur if the hospitals not included in the sample are significantly different from those in
the sample in characteristics important to this study. Fortunately, this issue should be
minor since the AHA survey has high coverage and response rates. As will be described
later, this study includes all the hospitals which are in the study population category and
reported to the AHA surveys in the study period. Thus, the representativeness of the
sample should be satisfactory. Nevertheless, some observations in the data have missing
values or outliers in a number of independent variables. Sample selection biases can be
present if the observations with missing values or outliers in the key variables are omitted.
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This issue is addressed through the application of data imputation techniques and the
inclusion of dummy variables indicating observations with missing values or outliers for
each major variable with a significant number of missing values or outliers.
Third, there might be attrition or mortality threats resulting from the reduction in
the number of sample hospitals over time due to closure or non-response. If the hospital
closure or non-response is associated systematically with ownership types and the
likelihood to continue or discontinue HH provision, the results could be biased.
Fortunately, the degree to which this is an issue can be examined and is addressed by
including a dummy variable indicating those observations from hospitals reporting to
AHA in some early years but not seen in later years.
External Validity
There might be anticipatory or expectancy effects of hospitals in response to the
BBA which is a threat to external validity. For instance, some hospitals offering HH
services might discontinue HH care as the Act was being proposed and discussed before
1997. Also, some hospitals might have decided not to adopt a HH agency due to the
anticipated reduction in HH reimbursement payment before the Act was implemented.
These effects can result in an under estimation of the overall effect of the BBA on the
reduction in hospital-based HH provision. Unfortunately, these effects are hard to
empirically evaluate. However, these anticipated effects may not significantly impact the
relationship of interest since the total number of hospital-provided HH agencies kept
growing in 1995, 1996, and 1997, and started declining only in 1998. Therefore, this
study should be able to reveal the relationship of interest to a satisfactory degree.
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Construct Validity
Threats to construct validity in this study may be minor since a natural experiment
occurs in a natural setting without artificial intervention and manipulation of the study
process. Thus, most of the threats to construct validity such as demand traits,
experimenter expectancy, novelty effects, compensatory rivalry/equalization effects, and
instrument issues may not exist. However, efforts are still needed to obtain adequate
operationalization of the construct, clearly-defined measures that reflect all properties of
construct, and representativeness of variables.
Econometric Approach and Model Specification
Following the work of Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995) who applied a natural
experiment to examine the changes in workers‘ injury duration after changes in workers‘
compensation policies, this analysis applies the approach of independently pooled
cross-sections across time. Specifically, a difference-in-difference analysis is employed
to test the hypotheses. In this study, the unit of observation is an individual hospital in a
particular year. A logit model is used to estimate the following equation:
hhprovi, year=F[β0 + β1profiti, year + β2religiousi, year + β3seculari, year + B4Y98-03 + B5(profiti,
year x Y98-03) + B6(religiousi, year x Y98-03) + B7(seculari, year x Y98-03)+ B8Xi,
year +B9(Xi, year x Y98-03) + β10 (profiti, year x nfp_marketi, year)+ β11 [(religiousi,
year + seculari, year) x fp_marketi, year ] + B12 [(religiousi, year + seculari, year) x
fp_marketi, year x Y98-03] + B13(profiti, year x nfp_marketi, year x Y98-03) + B14Zi,
year + εi, year
Where:
Logit model F(x) = 1/(1+e-x) = probability of offering hospital-based HH care
hhprovi, year represents whether a hospital provided its own HH care in a particular year.
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profiti, year, religiousi, year , and seculari, year represent the ownership types, i.e., for-profit,
religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit, of hospitals, while public hospitals serve
as the reference category.
Y98-03 is a set of dummy variables representing the years 1998 to 2003 (post-BBA), while
the year 1997 is the base group (pre-BBA).
Xi, year is a vector of independent variables indicating relevant organizational and market
factors in addition to the ownership variables.
nfp_marketi, year and fp_marketi, year indicate the degree to which a hospital market is
dominated by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, respectively, in a particular year.
Zi, year is a vector of control variables.
εi, year is the error term of the model.
These variables will be discussed in detail in the section ―Variables and Measures.‖
The coefficients of most interest to this project are coefficient vectors B 5~ B9 and B12~
B13. For example, hypothesis 1 states that, other things being equal, for-profit hospitals as
a whole are more likely than their public counterparts to reduce the provision of HH
services after the implementation of the BBA. If this hypothesis is supported, all of the
coefficients (i.e., B5) of the interaction terms of the for-profit hospital dummy (using
public hospitals as a base group) and year dummies (yr98~yr03, using yr97 as a base
group) should be negative, meaning that for-profit hospitals had a greater reduction in
HH provision after the BBA compared to public hospitals. It should be noted that this
study applies difference-in-difference estimation with independently pooled
cross-sections across time rather than a panel approach. Hence, the result should not be
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interpreted as the difference in the likelihood of dropping hospital-based HH care after
the BBA between a typical individual hospital of a particular ownership form and a
typical hospital in the base group. Instead, the result should be understood as the
difference in the likelihood of reducing HH services after the BBA between the whole
group of the hospitals in a particular ownership form and the whole base group. The
expected signs and relationships of the coefficients in the analytical model are
summarized in Table 4.

Table 4. The Expected Coefficients for the Testing of the Hypotheses
Hypotheses

Expected Coefficient

H1a

Determinants of hospital (change in)
provision of NH and HH care
FP vs. Public

H1b

NFP vs. FP

H1c

NFP vs. Public

|B6| and |B7| < |B5|;
B6, B7 <0
Β6 and B7<0

H1d

Secular vs. Religious NFP

|B6| < |B7|

H2a~H9a

Other organizational and market factors
derived from organization theories

B8>0

H2b~H9b

B5<0

B9>0

H10a

Mimetic pressure-NFP in FP market

B12<0

H10b

Mimetic pressure-FP in NFP market

B13>0

The model specified above is able to explore the relationship between the
implementation of the BBA and the relative change in HH care provision among
hospitals of different ownership types over time. Including the year dummy variables and
the interaction terms with year dummy variables makes the model relatively flexible and
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capable of detecting any potential time pattern concerning the change in HH provision
without assuming a particular pattern of change over time.
Since the dependent variable is a simple binary variable, a logit or probit model for
examining HH provision is relevant for analyzing the data. The statistical analysis
applies the logit model since it is widely applied in health research. The result of logistic
regression can be interpreted through odds ratios which are familiar to health science
researchers and can be easily constructed using the coefficients of the independent
variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2004).
There may be heteroskedasticity in the model because the probability of offering
HH care in a hospital is unlikely to be independent across time (Horwitz, 2005a). For
example, if a hospital provided HH services in 1997, the hospital should be more likely
than those not provided to offer HH care in the following years. Therefore, the issue of
potential heteroskedasticity is addressed through a cluster-robust-VCE
(variance-covariance matrix of the estimators) estimator where the observations from a
particular hospital are treated as a cluster (Baum, 2006: 138). By applying the
cluster-robust-VCE estimator, the estimates of the coefficients are not affected but the
standard errors can be corrected.
Study Population and Sample
The population of this study includes all U.S. non-federal short-term, acute-care
general hospitals operated in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The sample used
for this study is composed of the short-term, acute-care general hospitals included in the
AHA annual survey data sets of 1997 through 2003. Because federal
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government-sponsored hospitals such as VA hospitals, military hospitals, and hospitals in
the Indian reservations are intended to meet the health care needs of very specific
population groups, these federal hospitals are excluded from this study. However,
non-federal public hospitals such as state, county, and city hospitals serve the general
public. As such, they are included in the study sample as are all private hospitals. In this
study, short-term, acute-care general hospitals include those non-federal hospitals that
provide ―general medical and surgical services‖ in the AHA survey.
Figure 9 graphically illustrates the relationship between the population and the
sample to be studied using the data in 1997 as an example. According to AHA, over
6,500 hospitals are surveyed annually, including AHA registered hospitals as well as
non-registered hospitals which are identified with help from state and local associations,
Medicare and Medicaid centers, national organizations and governmental bodies (AHA,
2009b). The response rate of the survey is also high, around 85 percent (AHA, 2006).
The representativeness of the sample to the population should be acceptable.
Figure 9 only shows the sample in one year, the number of hospitals included in the
AHA survey and in the sample of each year is listed in Table 5. It can be seen from the
table that the sample size in each year slightly declined over the study periods.
Data Source
Data are drawn from a variety of sources for this study. The source of data for
hospital characteristics largely comes from the American Hospital Association (AHA)
Annual Survey of Hospitals datasets of 1997 through 2003. Financial indicators and the
case mix index for hospitals are from hospital cost report datasets and case mix index
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All U.S. hospitals in
year 1997

Sample
All U.S. non-federal general
acute-care hospitals operated
in 50 states and D.C. and
reported to AHA surveys in
1997

Hospitals that did
not report to AHA
surveys in 1997

Population
All U.S. non-federal general
acute-care hospitals operating
in 50 states and D.C. in 1997

Figure 9. The Population and Sample of a Particular Year (e.g., 1997) in the Study Period

Table 5. Numbers of Hospitals in the Data Source and in the Sample by Year
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total

Number of hospitals in
the AHA data file
6,299
6,247
6,116
6,044
6,003
6013
6,008
42,730

Number of hospitals
in the sample
4,810
4,772
4,703
4,661
46,27
4,600
4,608
32,781

Number of hospitals
in HCRIS data file
6,056
6,053
6,019
5,894
5,823
5,721
4,803
40,396

files released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Market data at
the county level are derived from the Area Resource File (ARF) datasets of 2006 and
2001 (including related data in the study years). The information regarding state
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Certificate of Need (CON) regulations is obtained from the website of the National
Conference of State Legislatures.
The AHA annual surveys provide probably the most comprehensive data for the
U.S. hospitals. The survey started in 1946, made a significant expansion of the datum
elements collected in 1980, and has been largely stable in content since then (AHA,
2009b). The survey data file provides information concerning hospital structure, facilities
and services, utilization, staffing, financial status, location, and community benefit. The
AHA data file currently contains more than 1,000 data items. However, most of the
financial data reported by participating hospitals are not shown in the publicly released
files. The strengths of the AHA survey data include its stable, regular, consistent
administration of the survey, and the comprehensive scope as well as high coverage and
response rates. These benefits make them a relatively trustworthy data source for
hospital-related research.
However, the AHA data file has certain weaknesses. The survey is entirely based
on self reports from voluntarily participating hospitals, making it hard to ensure data
quality. Although the response rate is generally high and AHA staff has made an effort to
validate the data, missing values and outliers in many variables still can be found in the
dataset. There may be also inconsistency in the report of data of a particular hospital
across time if the hospital staff responsible for reporting data changes. Thus, a careful
check and thoughtful management of the data are needed in using the AHA data files.
The CMS‘s hospital cost report files (also known as Healthcare Cost Report
Information System, HCRIS, datasets) are publicly available data sources providing
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comprehensive sets of financial information of Medicare-certified hospitals. All
Medicare-certified hospitals are required by the CMS to submit annual cost reports. The
HCRIS datasets have very detailed pieces of hospital financial data, including the
revenues and costs of hospital-based health care facilities such as skilled nursing
facilities, HHAs, hospice, and renal facilities, etc. The CMS has made a reasonable effort
to ensure that the data provided are up-to-date, accurate, complete, and comprehensive at
the time of disclosure (CMS, 2009a). One potential issue with the HCRIS data is that the
reporting period of each hospital in the annual file is not identical, making it sometimes
hard to compare a particular financial indicator across hospitals.
The CMS also provides hospital case-mix index (CMI) annual files through its
website. A hospital‘s CMI is computed and provided by CMS every year based on the
DRGs undergone in the hospital. According to the CMS (2005), a hospital's CMI
represents the average diagnosis-related group (DRG) relative weight for that hospital. It
is calculated by summing the DRG weights for all Medicare discharges and dividing by
the number of discharges.
The Area Resource File is currently created and maintained by the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. The ARF is a collection of data from more than 50 sources, including the
American Medical Association, AHA, US Census Bureau, CMS, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics, and so on. It is a database containing
more than 6,000 variables for each of the nation's counties. The basic county-specific
Area Resource File (ARF) is the nucleus of the overall ARF System. The ARF contains
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information on health facilities, health professions, measures of resource scarcity, health
status, economic activity, health training programs, and socioeconomic and
environmental characteristics (HRSA, 2009). These data have been widely used by
health researchers, planners, and practitioners to study the nation's health care delivery
system and factors that may impact health status and health care in the U.S. Thus, that
this study defines a hospital‘s market to be the county where the hospital is located. This
definition of market-related measures has been commonly applied by other health
services researchers (Alexander and Morrisey, 1989; Chiu, 1995).
Finally, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) website provides
information on state CON regulations used in this study (NCSL, 2009). On the NCSL
website, states with CON programs, dates of programs, as well as state CON information
contacts and websites are listed. There is also information on states with CON programs
by different types of facility such as HHAs, acute care hospitals, long-term care, and so
on. The information on whether a particular state had a HH agency CON program in the
study period is used in this study as a control variable.
Data Management
Data Integration
Several steps are taken to integrate the separate data files into a final sample with
all the data needed for this analysis. The process used to combine these data sources is
illustrated in Figure 10. First, yearly files with the necessary data from each of the AHA,
ARF, CMI, and HCRIS files are created, separately. Unused variables in the AHA files of
1997 to 2003 are removed from each of the seven original AHA files. Data in the ARF
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CMI 1997
HCRIS Combined files:
Worksheets A, G2, G3

Medicare
provider No.

ARF 1997

ARF
2001

County
code

AHA 1997

Medicare
provider No.

HCRIS 1997

Data 1997

ARF
2006

Merge files

Data 1998

Combined Data
1997~2003

Data 2003

State code

Final Data
Set

Retrieve data
Create files

State HH CON

Figure 10. Data Sources and the Process of Data Integration

yearly files are retrieved from the 2001 and 2006 ARF files. The two files include most
of the data needed in the 7-year period except for the information regarding three items:
(1) number of population age 65 and over in the county for year 2000, (2) per capita
income in the county for year 2000, (3) number of HH agencies in the county for years
1998 and 1997. The missing variables in the first and second items are created by using
the mean of the values in 1999 and 2001 for each item. The missing variables in the third
item are created by using proportional interpolation between the values of 1999 and 1994.
The rationale behind these solutions is that the statistics in each item are quite consistent
with a certain trend pattern across the years. Then seven yearly ARF files with data used
in the analysis are created.
All the necessary data associated with hospital financial reports for the study time
period can be found in three HCRIS worksheet files, including worksheets A, G2, and G3.
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Each of the worksheet files contains hospital cost report periods covering 1996 through
2003. Yearly data needed are retrieved from each worksheet file. The selection of the
yearly data is based on the criterion that the report period covers the first day (i.e., 1 st of
January) of the year. For example, the data for year 1997 are selected if the data are in a
report period that covers January 1, 1997. The use of this criterion is based on the fact
that most hospitals have a fiscal year from October 1 to September 30 of the following
year. The fiscal year of 1997 usually covers the January 1, 1997. Thus, the criterion used
is in general be in accordance with the fiscal year period used in other data sources. The
hospitals respectively retrieved from the three HCRIS worksheet files for a particular
year are the same. The yearly data of the three files are then merged to form a yearly
HCRIS data file. The number of hospitals in each yearly HCRIS data file is listed in
Table 5.
The second step is to merge these separate yearly files to form a combined yearly
data file. The AHA yearly file serves as the master file in the merging process. For
example, 1997 ARF, CMI, and HCRIS files are merged with the 1997 AHA file. To
merge the HCRIS and CMI files with the AHA file, Medicare provider ID number is used
as the merge variable. In merging the ARF and AHA files, the merge variable is the
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) state and county code. The result is the
creation of a 1997 data file.
After the seven yearly data files are created, the third step is to join these yearly
files to form a combined data file with all data for the seven years. The last step in the
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process is to merge the combined data file with state HH CON file in order to create a
final dataset for the analysis.
However, after examining the data in the final dataset, almost 1,000 observations
with a blank in the Medicare provider ID are identified. Since the Medicare provider ID
is a key variable used in the merging process, this blank may cause unexpected errors in
the process. Therefore, an effort was made to match Medicare provider ID numbers to
those hospitals with missing values in the yearly AHA datasets. This work was done
through tracking the Medicare provider ID for each hospitals included in the sample
through another hospital ID, the AHA hospital ID, which is a unique number for each
hospital in the AHA dataset. This step resulted in a dramatic reduction of the number of
hospitals in the sample with a blank in Medicare provider ID to 52. The number of
observations in the sample with a blank in Medicare provider ID was decreased from
more than 800 to 139. Since some hospitals indeed do not have a Medicare provider ID
(communication with Kimberly Garber, AHA staff, 8/31/2009), probably because they
are not Medicare-certified hospitals, these hospitals and observations are removed from
this study. Thus, the final sample size becomes 32,642.
Data Cleaning
As expected, many observations with missing values and/or outliers are observed
as shown in Table 6. The following steps were taken to deal with these issues:
Step 1: One observation has a total FTE equal to zero and another one has a zero RN
FTE, which are unlikely to be correct. These two outliers were replaced by the
mean of the values of the same hospital in other years (i.e., the hospital mean).
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Table 6. The Numbers of Observations with Missing Values and/or Outliers
Variable

CMI
County population
Elderly population
Elderly population
growth rate
Number of HHAs
Unemployment rate
Per capita income
Medicare inpatient days
Hospital net income
Hospital patient revenue
Hospital other revenue

# of obs with # of obs # of obs with missing
missing values with
values after filling in
in original data outliers
the hospital mean
1,587
486
171
168
171
168
171
168
171
171
171
1
3,384
3,519
3,919

114

168
168
280
0
659
695
759

RN FTE
Hospital total FTE

0
0

1
35

0
0

Medicare %
Nursing FTE %
Hospital total profit
margin

0
0
773

7
5
776

0
0
773

Missing
dummy
variable
cmi_d
pop_d

income_d
Used to
calculate
hospital
total profit
margin
Used to
calculate
nursing
FTE %

margin_d

Step 2: One observation has a missing value in Medicare inpatient days. The hospital
mean was imputed for the missing value.
Step 3: 1,587 observations have a missing value in CMI. Since the CMI of a hospital
does not vary dramatically across years, the hospital means were first calculated
and imputed, reducing the number of observations with a missing value to 486. A
dummy variable was created to indicate those observations that still have a
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missing value. Then the mean of the variable calculated from the total sample (i.e.,
the sample mean) was imputed for these observations. The dummy variable
(cmi_d) is included in the analytical model to control for potential bias caused by
the imputation.
Step 4: 171 observations were founded to have missing values in the items from the ARF
files, such as county population, elderly population, number of HH agencies in
the county, and so forth. Based on the fact that these statistics in general do not
fluctuate significantly in the study period, the hospital means were used to impute
for each item, decreasing the number of observations with a missing value to 168.
A dummy variable, pop_d, was created to indicate those observations that still
have a missing value. Then the overall sample mean of each item was calculated
and imputed for these observations.
Step 5: More than 3,000 observations have missing values for hospital net income,
patient revenue, and other revenue. The imputation of the hospital means results
in a reduction of the number of observations with missing values in hospital net
income, patient revenue, and other revenue to 659, 695, and 759, respectively.
Step 6: A ratio variable, hospital total profit margin, was created by dividing net income
by the sum of patient revenue and other revenue. This calculation resulted in 773
missing values. In addition, three values are greater than one which is
unreasonable. Recoding these outliers as missing resulted in 776 observations
with a missing value in this variable. The hospital means were first calculated and
imputed, reducing the number of observations with a missing value to 763. A
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dummy variable, margin_d, was created to indicate those observations that still
have a missing value. Then the sample mean was calculated and imputed for these
observations.
Step 7: Seven observations have a Medicare inpatient day percentage over 100 percent
which should be incorrect. Thus, these outliers were replaced by the hospital
means.
Step 8: Five observations have a nursing FTE ratio greater than one which is abnormal.
These outliers were replaced first by the hospital mean, then by the sample
mean.
Step 9: For the per-capita income variable, 171 observations have a missing value and
168 observations have a value equal to zero which is unreasonable. After filling
with hospital means, there still are 280 observations with either a missing value or
a zero. Thus, these outliers and missing values were replaced by the entire sample
mean and a dummy variable, income_d, is created to indicate these observations.
The methods applied to manage the missing variables, missing values and outliers
are summarized in Table 7.

Variables and Measures
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable, HH provision, is whether a hospital provided HH care of
its own in each of the years 1997 through 2003. Two pieces of information from the
HCRIS and AHA files are used to create this variable. First, the variable is coded as ―1‖
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Table 7. Methods Used to Address Missing Variables, Missing Values, and Outliers
Variable

Problem

County population 65+ in
2000
County per capita income in
year 2000
# of HH agencies in county in
1998 and 1997

Missing variable

Medicare inpatient days

Missing value

Hospital FTE
Hospital RN FTE
CMI

Outlier
Outlier
Missing value

County unemployment rate
County population
County elderly population
County elderly population
growth rate
Number of HH agencies in
county
County per capita income

Missing value
Missing value
Missing value
Missing value

Hospital net income
Hospital patient revenue
Hospital other revenue
Medicare/total inpatient days
Nursing FTE/Total FTE

Missing value
Missing value
Missing value
Outlier
Outlier

Hospital total profit margin

Missing value and
outlier

Action taken
Created by using the mean of the values in
1999 and 2001

Missing variable
Missing variable

Missing value
Missing value and
outlier

Created by using the proportional
interpolation of the values in 1999 and
1994
Imputed by using the mean of the values
of the same hospital in other years
Replaced by the hospital mean of the
values in other years
Imputed by using the mean of the values
of the same hospital in other years. A
dummy variable is created to indicate
those observations still having a missing
value; then the sample mean is imputed
for those observations.
Imputed by using the mean of the values
of the same hospital in other years. A
dummy variable is created to indicate
those observations still having a missing
value; then the sample mean is imputed
for those observations.
Imputed by using hospital means. A
dummy variable is created to indicate
those observations still having a missing
or a zero value; then the sample mean is
imputed for those observations.
Imputed by using the mean of the values
of the same hospital in other years
Replaced by the hospital mean
Replaced first by the hospital means, then
by the sample mean
Imputed or replaced first by hospital
means. A dummy variable is created to
indicate those observations still having a
missing value; then the sample mean is
imputed for those observations.
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if a hospital had a nonzero HH revenue data as reported in the HCRIS file in a particular
year. However, many hospitals are missing HH revenue. Most of these hospitals might
not provide HH care, but some might simply fail to report their HH revenue. Also, in the
data merging process, there are 3,179 observations belonging to hospitals included in the
AHA files but not in the HCRIS file. In consequence, these observations do not have
information regarding their HH revenue not because they did not provide HH care, but
simply because there are no associated data in the HCRIS file. As such, the information
regarding HH provision in the AHA file is used as supplementary information.
Specifically, for those observations not identified with a HH revenue, if the
corresponding hospital reported to the AHA that it provided or owned HH services, the
variable is also coded as ―1‖. Otherwise, the variable is coded as ―0‖.
According to the AHA annual hospital survey, HH care is defined as services
providing nursing, therapy, and health-related homemaker or social services in the
patient‘s home. The AHA survey asks hospitals to report whether HH services are
provided through one or some of the following arrangements: (1) my hospital or its
subsidiary; (2) my health system (in my local community); (3) my network (in my local
community); and (4) a formal contractual arrangement or joint venture with another
provider that is not in my system or network (in my local community). In measuring the
objective function of the hospital, the first arrangement category should be the most
relevant since in this arrangement the financial responsibility of the HH services is
directly borne by the hospital.
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The rationale behind the use of the HCRIS as the major source and the AHA as
the supplementary source of the information for the dependent variable is that, in general,
the HCRIS information is more reliable than that in the AHA file. As mentioned earlier,
the HCRIS data come from hospital cost reporting which is required by CMS, while the
AHA data are based on voluntary reports from hospitals. Altogether, the AHA and
HCRIS data are inconsistent for around 14 percent (3,623/25,500) of the sample, after
excluding those observations belonging to hospitals present only in the AHA but not the
HCRIS files or those having a missing value in HH provision in the AHA files.
Independent Variables
There are a number of independent variables of particular interest to this study.
The first set of independent variables includes ownership indicators identifying public
(Public), religious not-for-profit (Religious), secular private not-for-profit (Secular), and
for-profit (For-profit) hospitals, respectively. In the analytical models the omitted public
ownership type serves as the reference group. The second group of independent variables
contains year dummies (year‘98~year‘03) used to capture the responses of hospitals as
regards HH provision after the implementation of the BBA. Each year dummy is coded
as ―1‖ if an observation is from a particular year of interest. For example, yr00 is coded
as ―1‖ if an observation is from the year 2000 and as ―0‖ otherwise. As mentioned earlier,
most of the BBA reimbursement policies were phased in or were implemented in 1998 or
later. Although HH IPS began being phased in the third quarter of 1997, it was not fully
implemented until October 1998. Hence, year 1997 was about 1 year before the
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implementation of HH reimbursement policies mandated by the BBA and is used as a
baseline year for comparison.
The third set of independent variables comprises interaction terms between the
ownership dummies and the year dummies. The inclusion of these interaction terms in
the model is to reveal the change in the likelihood of an ownership form to offer
hospital-based HH care following the implementation of the BBA relative to public
hospitals.
The fourth group of independent variables is composed of organizational factors
drawn from related organizational theories, which are considered to be associated with
hospital provision of HH services. The measures of these organizational factors are
discussed below.
The variable Medicare represents the percentage of total patient days in a hospital
contributed by Medicare patients. This factor measures the dependence of the hospital on
PAC such as HH care. Medicare discharges are most likely to demand HH services and a
certain proportion of Medicare patients will need HH care following the discharge. Thus,
a higher proportion of Medicare patients indicates a greater dependence on PAC. Here, a
proportion of Medicare inpatient days rather than a number of Medicare inpatient days is
employed, because the number of Medicare inpatient days also reflects hospital size.
Larger hospitals usually have more resources (such as discharge planners) to deal with
the transfer need, reducing their reliance on PAC. A proportional measure takes this
aspect into account and isolates it from the effect of hospital size. In addition, inpatient
days instead of discharges are used since inpatient days indicate the extent to which
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patients need care which is important in considering potential needs for PAC. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the coefficient to this variable is expected to be positive.
The total profit margin ratio (Margin) of hospitals in the corresponding years
measures hospitals‘ financial ability to provide HH services. Here a hospital‘s total profit
margin is calculated by dividing total net income by total revenue (i.e., both from
operating as well as non-operating revenues) of the hospital in a particular period. A total
profit margin ratio rather than operating margin ratio is employed to represent the overall
financial resources the hospital has to offer, or to continue to offer, HH care in a
financially pressing time period. Total profit margin may be more relevant for all
hospitals since nonprofit hospitals may receive contributions or donations for providing
unprofitable services. A total profit margin ratio takes this part of non-operating revenues
into account. As discussed in the previous chapter, the coefficient to this variable is
expected to be positive.
Third, hospital nursing capacity is measured by nursing density (Nursing) which
is the ratio of the number of nursing FTEs (including RN and LPN) to the total FTEs in a
hospital and its subsidiary in a particular year. Ideally the FTE figures in the hospital unit
rather than the total facility including the hospital‘s subsidiary should be used. However,
the hospital unit figures needed for calculating the FTEs are either unavailable or
incomplete in the AHA file. Hence, the FTE figures for the total facility are applied.
Endogeneity may be present since a hospital with a HHA tends to have greater nursing
FTEs compared to another hospital without a HHA. Yet the issue is somewhat reduced
through dividing the nursing FTEs by the total FTEs of the total facility. Here, higher
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nursing density indicates greater nursing capacity and expertise to provide HH services
which rely largely on the nursing and related professions. The coefficient to this variable
is also expected to be positive.
In addition, Hospital size measured by the number of beds set up and staffed in a
hospital is applied to indicate the transaction frequency. Also, hospital size is associated
positively with hospital provision of services. In general, larger hospitals are more likely
than smaller hospitals to provide diverse services in house. Therefore, the coefficient to
this variable is expected to be positive.
Furthermore, the variable, case-mix index (CMI), measuring the medical
complexity of the overall patient condition in a hospital is used to represent the
transaction complexity the hospital is faced with when transferring patients to HH care. A
hospital‘s CMI is computed and provided by CMS based on the DRG cases treated in the
hospital that year. It should be noted that the CMI may only partially account for a
hospital‘s general complexity of its patient condition. The degree to which the CMI can
represent the construct depends on the share of Medicare patients in the hospital‘s total
patients. Yet it has been widely utilized as a relative measure among U.S. hospitals of
medical utilization and complexity of patients treated. As described in Chapter 3, the
coefficient to this variable is expected to be positive.
The fifth group of independent variables is composed of market factors drawn
from related organizational theories, which are considered to be important for hospitals
in providing HH services. The measures of these market factors are discussed below.
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The variable (HHA/elderly) is employed to capture the transaction uncertainty of
a hospital in transferring patients to HH agencies. The variable is the inverse of the ratio
of the number of elderly people to the number of HHA in the county. Chiu (1995) used
the ratio of the number of the elderly to the number of total nursing home beds in the
county to measure transaction uncertainty in the linkage between hospitals and NHs.
Here, a greater ratio of the number of elderly people to the number of HHA in the county
could lead to a higher overall HH utilization rate in the local market, thus increasing the
challenge for a hospital to discharge or transfer a patient to a HH setting. However, some
counties had no HHA in one or some of the years in the study period. In this case, the
ratio can be infinity, resulting in a missing value. To avoid this possibility, an inverse of
the ratio is employed. Yet, the result regarding this variable should be interpreted in the
opposite way in order to get the relationship between HH provision and transaction
uncertainty. For example, a positive coefficient to this variable mean as transaction
uncertainty increases, hospitals will be more likely to reduce HH care provision.
According to the discussion presented in Chapter 3, the coefficient to this variable is
expected to be negative.
The variables used to measure normative pressures on hospitals concerning
provision of HH services are the percentage of elderly population in a county in a
particular year (Elderly) and the growth rate of the elderly population in a county during
the study period (Growth). The former is the ratio of the number of the people age 65 or
over to the total population in the county. The elderly population growth rate in a year is
defined as the ratio of the increase in the elderly population in the past year to the elderly
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population in the previous year (in percentage). For example, the growth rate in year
2000 is calculated by [(change in county elderly population from years 1999 to 2000)/
county elderly population in 1999]*100. A greater proportion and growth rate of elderly
in the county may imply a stronger social perception and expectation that HH care is
needed. In a community with a stronger social expectation of such kind, existing health
providers such as general community hospitals may be faced with more social pressure in
order to provide HH care. Thus, the coefficients to these two variables are expected to be
positive.
The last two independent variables are for-profit market (FP market) and
not-for-profit market (NFP market). The former is defined as the percentage of the
number of total general hospital beds accounted for by for-profit general hospitals in the
county; the latter is the percentage of the number of total general hospital beds accounted
for by nonprofit and public general hospitals in the county. The two measures indicate the
degree to which a market is dominated by for-profit or nonprofit hospitals. These
variables are used to reveal the potential influence of a dominant ownership type on the
hospital group with a different ownership form. Horwitz and Nichols (2007) also use FP
and NFP markets to study the spill-over effects of hospitals in one ownership sector on
the other regarding the provision of HH services. As described in the previous chapter,
the coefficient to the interaction term between NFP hospitals and fp_market is expected
to be negative, while the coefficient to the interaction term between FP hospitals and
nfp_market is expected to be positive.
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The set of organizational and market variables discussed above is followed by
another group of independent variables including the interaction terms of those variables
in the previous variable set and the year dummies. This set of variables is for exploring
the influence of these organizational and market factors on hospital change in the
provision of HH services after the implementation of the BBA. As discussed in Chapter 3,
the coefficients to these interaction terms are expected to be positive except for those
between HHA/elderly and the year dummies.
Control Variables
Certain factors besides those stated above are expected to impact a hospital‘s
decision to offer HH services. Hence, these factors are employed to mitigate the
interaction effect of hospital ownership type and the BBA on hospital provision of HH
care. The first two factors to be controlled for are hospital system affiliation and hospital
teaching status. Here, two dummy variables (System and Teaching) are created to
indicate whether a hospital is a member of a health/hospital system and of the Council of
Teaching Hospitals (COTH) of the Association of American Medical Colleges,
respectively. Specifically, system is coded as ―1‖ if a hospital has a system ID shown in
the AHA file and as ―0‖ otherwise. Also in the AHA file, there is a variable indicating
whether a hospital is a member of the COTH. It is coded as ―1‖ if the answer is yes, and
as ―0‖ otherwise.
Multi-hospital health systems, hospital networks or alliances, and vertically
integrated healthcare system have emerged since the 1990s. The larger, diversified
hospitals or health systems have sought to provide a more comprehensive continuum of
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services to address the needs of patients/clients in their communities (Paone and Mullen,
2005). If there are some types of arrangement in HH care provision among the local
hospitals in a system so that HH resources can be shared, one might observe lower
probabilities of offering HH care among individual system-affiliated hospitals. That is,
the coefficient to the variable system is expected to be negative. Also, teaching hospitals
are quite different from non-teaching hospitals in types of services and their health care
workforce. Hence, hospital teaching status is commonly controlled for in health services
research (Horwitz, 2005a; White and Begun, 1998/1999). Based on the fact that most of
the teaching hospitals are also research institutions focusing largely on tertiary acute care,
it is expected that theses hospitals are less likely to offer PAC such as HH services. Thus,
the coefficient to the variable teaching is also expected to be negative.
In addition, four environmental factors that could influence hospital provision of
HH services are identified and controlled for in this study. The first factor is related to
Certificate of Need (CON) laws or regulations in each state. States differ in CON
regulations which exist to affirm whether a proposed acquisition, expansion, or creation
of a healthcare facility is required to fulfill the needs of a community. Hence, in a state
with CON, a hospital has to get approval from the state health department before it can
construct a new major facility, acquire large/costly equipment, or expand certain services
such as with HH agency (Chiu, 1995). CON may also create a binding bed constraint
which can lead to different operating environments for HH agencies across states
(Grabowski, 2001). Therefore, a dummy variable to be controlled for is the presence of
HH CON in every state. The variable, HH CON, is coded as ―1‖ if a HH CON program
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is present in a state, and as ―0‖ otherwise. It should be harder for hospitals located in a
state with a HH CON program to establish HHAs compared to their counterparts in a
state without the program. The coefficient to this variable is expected to be negative.
The second environmental factor to be controlled for is a dummy variable (Rural)
indicating whether a hospital is in a rural area. As mentioned earlier, PAC or LTC
resources and needs may be different in rural areas versus urban areas (Chiu, 1995). As
described in Chapter 3, this factor (being in a rural area) should be positively related to
hospitals‘ decisions to provide HH care. This variable is coded as ―1‖ if the hospital is
located in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) where population is under 100,000 and
coded as ―0‖ otherwise.
The last two environmental factors to be controlled for measure the ability to pay
for healthcare services in the market. Here, two variables (Income and Unemployment)
are employed. The former is per capita income while the latter is unemployment rate,
both in the county where a hospital is located in a particular year. The data for the two
variables are directly drawn from the ARF file and are shown in $1,000 and percentage,
respectively. Per-capita income in different years is inflation-adjusted to year 2000 dollar
through the general Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by the CPI inflation calculator
in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics website (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008).
Hospitals located in a market with a greater ability to pay for healthcare services such as
HH services are more likely to continue to offer HH services than those located in a
market with limited ability to pay. Since per capita income should be associated
positively with local ability to pay for health care, the coefficient to this variable is
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expected to be positive. On the other hand, due to unemployment rate in the county is
associated negatively with local ability to pay for health care, the coefficient to this
variable is expected to be negative.
The measures and sources of the dependent, independent, and control variables
discussed above are summarized in Table 8.
Analytical Process
With respect to the analysis of the data, the following steps are employed. First,
descriptive statistics of and correlations between the study variables are presented. This
is followed by bivariate analyses of the hospital provision of HH services by ownership
types across years. These analyses provide the first glimpse of the relationships of
interest to this study. Third, several model specifications with different sets of control
variables are compared and a final model is selected for the primary analysis. As
mentioned in the data section, many observations in the study sample have either missing
values or outliers in key variables. Exclusion of these observations can cause sample
selection bias. Value imputation techniques have been applied in order to keep these
observations. Dummy variables indicating the observations with imputed values from the
sample means are created to address the issue of sample selection bias resulting from the
missing values in the independent variables. Model selection here is based on the
significance of the coefficients to these missing dummy variables. Also, one model
including the variable HH CON, and another one replacing HH CON with a whole set of
state dummy variables are tested and compared, based on the pseudo-R2 and a joint test
of the significance of the coefficients to the state dummies.
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Table 8. Study Variables, Measures, and Data Sources
Variable
Dependent Variable
HH provision

Measure

Source

―1‖ if the hospital had a nonzero HH revenue
in a particular year, or reported to AHA survey
with ownership/provision of a HH if the HH
revenue information is missing, and ―0‖
otherwise

HCRIS &
AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

―1‖ for a public hospital in a particular year
and ―0‖ otherwise

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

Religious

―1‖ for a religious nonprofit hospital in a
particular year and ―0‖ otherwise

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

Secular

―1‖ for a secular private nonprofit hospital in a
particular year and ―0‖ otherwise

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

For-profit

―1‖ for a for-profit hospital in a particular year
and ―0‖ otherwise

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

―1‖ if the observation is from the particular
year and ―0‖ otherwise

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

Medicare inpatient days percentage in the
hospital=[(#Medicare inpatient days)/( #total
inpatient days)]*100 in a hospital

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

Margin

Total profit margin of a hospital in a particular
year=[(total net income)/( total revenue)]*100

HCRIS
(1997 ~ 2003)

Nursing

Ratio of the number of nursing FTEs to the
total FTEs in a hospital and its subsidiary in a
particular year

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

Hospital size

The number of beds staffed in a hospital in a
particular year

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

CMI

Case-mix index of a hospital in a particular
year calculated by CMS

CMI file
(1997 ~ 2003)

Ratio of the number of HHAs to the number of
elderly people in the county=(# HHAs) /(#
elderly in 1,000) in the county

AHA
(1997~2003);
ARF (2006)

Ownership
Public

Years (base: 1997)
Year‘98~Year‘03
Organizational Factors
Medicare

Market Factors
HHA/elderly
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Table 8 (continued)
Variable
Elderly

Measure

Source

Elderly population percentage in the county in
a particular year (in %)

ARF
(2006)

Growth

The average growth rate of elderly population
in a county in a particular year=[(#elderly in
the current year-#elderly in the previous year)/
#elderly in the previous year]*100 (in %)

ARF
(2006)

FP market

The proportion of the number of total for-profit
hospital beds to the total hospital beds in a
county in a particular year (in %)

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

NFP market

The proportion of the number of total nonprofit
hospital beds to the total hospital beds in a
county in a particular year (in %)

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

―1‖ if the hospital has a health system ID and
―0‖ otherwise

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

Teaching

―1‖ if a member of council of teaching hospital
of the Association of American Medical
Colleges and ―0‖ otherwise

AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

HH CON

―1‖ if a hospital is in a state with a HH CON
program and ―0‖ otherwise

Rural

―1‖ if the hospital‘s MSA code is 0 or 1, ―0‖
otherwise

NCSL Website
http://www.nc
sl.org/program
s/health/cert-n
eed.htm
AHA
(1997 ~ 2003)

Income

Per capita income in the county in a particular
year (in $000)

ARF
(2001 & 2006)

Unemployment

Unemployment rate in the county in a
particular year (in %)

ARF
(2001 & 2006)

Control Variables
System

Once a final model specification is decided, logistic regression is conducted to
comprehensively test each of the hypotheses proposed previously while holding other
factors constant. This offers an opportunity to examine the relation between each variable
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of interest on hospital provision and the change of provision following the
implementation of the BBA. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis is employed to examine the
potential difference in the result between two different data arrangements for the
dependent variable, hospital provision of HH services.
Finally, in order to illustrate the relationships of major interest to this study,
simulated probabilities of HH provision by the four ownership types in years 1997
through 2003 based on the result of the fitted model is plotted, holding the organizational
and market factors constant. The flow of the analyses is shown in Figure 11. The
statistical package Stata version SE 11.0 is employed to carry out the analyses.

Descriptive Statistics and
Correlations

Logit
Model

Bivariate Analysis
(Cross-tables)

Sensitivity
Analysis

Model
Selection

Simulation of Probability of
HH provision by Ownership
Type and year

Figure 11. Analytical Process

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis in five sections,
basically following the process shown in Figure 11 described in the previous chapter.
First, descriptive statistics showing characteristics of the sample and of the hospitals in
each year are provided and discussed. This is followed by the presentation of results of
bivariate analyses which contrast the characteristics of HH-offering and non-offering
hospitals. Also, the percentages of hospitals with different ownership forms offering HH
services across the study period are plotted and discussed. The third section describes the
results of multivariate analyses. Before these results are presented, the decision process
underlying the final model specification is described. In this section, the estimation of a
full model including all the year dummy variables and the results will be presented. Each
hypothesis is discussed based on the results of the full model. In order to reveal the joint
effect of the post-BBA years, a reduced model replacing the dummy variables with a
post-BBA variable is then estimated. While the results most relevant to the hypotheses
are presented with the description of the results, the complete results of the multivariate
analyses are shown in Appendix. The fourth section presents a sensitivity analysis to
check the robustness of the model using different combinations of data sources for the
dependent variable. This chapter concludes with a summary of the major findings.
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Descriptive Statistics
Sample Statistics
The characteristics of the study sample are presented in Table 9 by showing the
key statistics including the mean, standard deviation, and range (minimum and maximum
values). These statistics are based on the total observations (N=32,642) included in the
final dataset for this analysis. Since some hospitals are not present in some years, each
hospital is not equally represented in the dataset. Hence, these statistics should not be
viewed as the statistics of the hospitals in the sample. However, these statistics provide
an opportunity for examining the overall soundness of the study data. Special attention is
directed to the range of the values of each variable since this information can be used to
identify possible outliers.
Looking first at the dummy variable indicators, slightly more than half of the
sample provides HH care. Almost 50 percent of the observations belong to secular
nonprofit hospitals, 25 percent public hospitals, 14 percent for-profit hospitals, and 11
percent religious hospitals. Around half of the observations belong to hospitals in health
systems or in rural areas. Twenty-nine percent of the sample observations are in a state
with a HH CON program, and only 6 percent of the observations are from teaching
hospitals.
With respect to the continuous variables, the proportion of hospital inpatient days
contributed by Medicare patients ranges from 0 percent to 100 percent with a mean of
48.8 percent for all the observations, which is reasonable. The mean of hospital total
profit margin is 1.14 percent which is a bit lower if compared to 2 percent, a figure
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables
Variable
Dependent variable
HH provision
Ownership
Public
Religious
Secular
For-profit
Organizational factors
Medicare (%)
Margin (%)
Nursing (%)
Hospital size (# of beds)
CMI
Market factors
HHA/elderly
(# HHAs per 1000 elderly persons)
Elderly (%)
Growth (%)
FP market (%)
NFP market (%)
Control variables
System
Teaching
HH CON
Rural
Income ($000 in year 2000 dollar)
Unemployment (%)
N=32,642

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

0.51

0.50

0

1

0.25
0.11
0.49
0.14

0.43
0.32
0.50
0.35

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

48.80
1.14
28.22
170.74
1.26

19.02
10.25
6.24
177.71
0.26

0.0
-484.9
1.91
2
0.4

100.0
99.7
99.0
2,518
3.7

0.32

0.37

0.0

5.1

13.90
0.73
12.39
87.61

3.94
2.38
23.14
23.14

3.0
-22.8
0.0
0.0

36.6
48.9
100.0
100.0

0.51
0.06
0.29
0.48
25.97
5.28

0.50
0.24
0.46
0.50
7.61
2.50

0
0
0
0
8.10
0.7

1
1
1
1
90.9
29.9

commonly used as the standard for the operating margin among U.S. hospitals (Zelman,
McCue, Millikan, and Glick, 2003: 125). Although the range of the total profit margin is
quite large, from -479.8 percent to 99.7 percent, it is not very surprising given the wide
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operational and market variations among the U.S. acute-care general community
hospitals. Likewise, the range of the proportion of the nursing FTEs in the total FTEs in
the hospital and its subsidiary institutions is very large (from 1.91% to 99.0%), relative to
its mean (28.22%) and standard deviation (6.24%). Also, a wide range (from 0.0 to 5.1)
of the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly persons in the county is observed. Further
examination of the observations related to these potential outliers found no particularly
unreasonable data. Also, all these potential outliers were calculated using original values
rather than imputed values. Thus, these values should be acceptable. Other continuous
variables such as the number of hospital beds, hospital CMI, elderly population
proportion and growth rate in the county, FP and NFP hospital market penetration ratios,
and county per-capita income and unemployment rate have reasonable ranges and means.
Hospital Statistics by Year, 1997-2003
In order to examine the data in a more sensible way, descriptive statistics for the
study variables are presented by year. These statistics provide more key characteristics
specific to hospitals included in the sample each year, revealing the change in
characteristics of interest of the sampled hospitals over the study period. A test statistic
(F-value) to assess whether the means of a particular variable are equal across the years
is also provided. As shown in Table 10, the proportion of hospitals offering HH care
decreases from 60 percent to 42 percent and this decrease is statistically significant. The
composition of hospitals by ownership type is by contrast generally stable between 1997
and 2003. The mean of Medicare proportions drops significantly in 1999, but else remain
consistent. The mean of hospital total profit margins declines significantly from 2.46
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables, By Year
Year

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

N

4,778
4,752
4,682
4,641
4,610
4,587
4,592
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Statistics Mean
Variable
(Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev)
(F value)
[min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max]
HH provision
0.60
0.58
0.55
0.50
0.47
0.45
0.42
(92.8***)
(0.49)
(0.49)
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.49)
[0,1]
[0,1]
[0,1]
[0,1]
[0,1]
[0,1]
[0,1]
Public
(1.15)

0.26
(0.44)

0.26
(0.44)

0.25
(0.44)

0.25
(0.43)

0.25
(0.43)

0.24
(0.43)

0.24
(0.43)

Religious
(0.13)

[0,1]
0.11
(0.32)
[0,1]

[0,1]
0.11
(0.32)
[0,1]

[0,1]
0.11
(0.32)
[0,1]

[0,1]
0.12
(0.32)
[0,1]

[0,1]
0.12
(0.32)
[0,1]

[0,1]
0.11
(0.32)
[0,1]

[0,1]
0.12
(0.32)
[0,1]

For-profit
(0.56)

0.48
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.15
(0.35)

0.49
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.14
(0.35)

0.49
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.14
(0.35)

0.49
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.14
(0.35)

0.50
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.14
(0.35)

0.50
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.14
(0.35)

0.49
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.15
(0.36)

Medicare (%)
(4.46***)

[0,1]
49.16
(19.02)

[0,1]
48.37
(18.78)

[0,1]
47.68
(19.15)

[0,1]
49.06
(19.13)

[0,1]
48.84
(19.01)

[0,1]
49.32
(18.67)

[0,1]
49.20
(19.36)

[0,99]
2.46

[0,100]
1.52

[0,100]
1.01

[0,100]
0.94

[0,96]
0.67

[0,96]
0.67

[0,100]
0.65

(9.96)
[-391,72]
27.70
(6.06)

(10.72)
[-471,100]
28.10
(6.49)

[4.1,99.0] [5.4, 91.3] [1.9,80.9] [6.9,63.5] [5.7,83.1] [6.5,90.9]
HHA/elderly
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.32
0.30
0.30
(26.42***)
(0.37)
(0.38)
(0.40)
(0.36)
(0.35)
(0.35)

[5.9,84.6]
0.30
(0.34)

Secular
(1.09)

Margin (%)
(19.72***)
Nursing (%)
(20.78***)

Hospital size
(0.12)

(11.64)
(9.18)
(10.16)
(10.96)
(8.64)
[-485,83] [-196,68] [-307,79] [-284,76] [-146,77]
28.71
28.63
28.46
28.24
27.69
(6.38)
(6.41)
(6.34)
(5.88)
(6.04)

[0.0,4.8]
171.57
(175.09)
[6,2518]

[0.0,4.7]
170.15
(174.26)
[6,2278]

[0.0,5.0]
170.17
(175.74)
[6,2346]

[0.0,5.0]
170.40
(177.62)
[6,2121]

[0.0,5.1]
172.15
(179.90)
[6,2112]

[0.0,3.6]
171.11
(179.85)
[2,2163]

[0.0,3.6]
169.61
(181.73)
[6,2146]
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Table 10 (continued)
Year

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

N

4,778
4,752
4,682
4,641
4,610
4,587
4,592
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Statistics Mean
Variable
(Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev)
(F value)
[min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max]
CMI
1.28
1.25
1.28
1.26
1.24
1.24
1.25
(14.11***)
(0.25)
(0.26)
(0.25)
(0.26)
(0.26)
(0.26)
(0.27)
[0.5,3.1] [0.5,3.7] [0.6,3.7] [0.4,3.7] [0.5,3.6] [0.5,3.6]
[0.5,3.2]
Elderly (%)
(2.47*)
Growth (%)
(150.41***)
FP market
(%) (1.45)
NFP market
(%) (1.45)
System
(5.10***)

13.97
(3.95)

14.01
(3.96)

13.96
(3.93)

13.75
(3.87)

13.85
(3.94)

13.86
(3.96)

[3.0,35.9] [3.4,36.6] [3.4,36.2] [3.0,34.2] [3.1,34.3] [3.0,34.7]
0.22
0.88
0.17
1.25
1.17
0.76
(2.43)
(2.14)
(2.04)
(2.86)
(2.73)
(1.48)
[-15,23] [-12,18] [-12,21] [-19,38] [-23,27]
[-8,49]
12.97
12.84
12.14
12.13
11.99
12.03
(23.36)
(23.24)
(22.89)
(22.92)
(22.99)
(23.04)
[0,100]
[0,100]
[0,100]
[0,100]
[0,100]
[0,100]
87.03
87.16
87.86
87.87
88.01
87.97
(23.36)
(23.24)
(22.89)
(22.92)
(22.99)
(23.04)
[0,100]
[0,100]
[0,100]
[0,100]
[0,100]
[0,100]

13.86
(3.94)
[3.4,34.6]
0.69
(2.45)
[-10,19]
12.58
(23.55)
[0,100]
87.42
(23.55)
[0,100]

0.48
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.06

0.50
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.06

0.51
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.06

0.51
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.06

0.52
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.06

0.52
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.06

0.53
(0.50)
[0,1]
0.06

(0.23)
[0,1]

(0.23)
[0,1]

(0.23)
[0,1]

(0.23)
[0,1]

(0.24)
[0,1]

(0.23)
[0,1]

(0.24)
[0,1]

HH CON
(0.02)

0.29
(0.45)
[0,1]

0.29
(0.46)
[0,1]

0.29
(0.45)
[0,1]

0.29
(0.46)
[0,1]

0.29
(0.46)
[0,1]

0.29
(0.46)
[0,1]

0.29
(0.46)
[0,1]

Rural
(0.36)

0.47
(0.50)
[0,1]

0.47
(0.50)
[0,1]

0.48
(0.50)
[0,1]

0.48
(0.50)
[0,1]

0.48
(0.50)
[0,1]

0.48
(0.50)
[0,1]

0.48
(0.50)
[0,1]

Income
($000)
(44.37***)

24.41

25.78

26.15

26.23

26.26

26.53

26.49

Teaching
(0.05)

(6.93)
(7.27)
(7.72)
(8.09)
(8.14)
(7.54)
(7.35)
[8.1,73.7] [8.7,76.3] [9.3,84.3] [9.7,90.9] [9.5,90.4] [10.0,81.0] [10.1,78.7]
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Table 10 (continued)
Year

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

N

4,778
4,752
4,682
4,641
4,610
4,587
4,592
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Statistics Mean
Variable
(Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev) (Std.dev)
(F value)
[min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max] [min,max]
Unemploy5.39
5.03
4.75
4.55
5.17
5.93
6.16
ment (%)
(2.66)
(2.59)
(2.45)
(2.35)
(2.30)
(2.29)
(2.38)
(272.09***)
[1,28]
[1,28]
[1,30]
[1,28]
[1,24]
[1,25]
[1,24]

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
percent to 0.65 percent, with a dramatic drop of nearly 1 percent in 1998. Wide variations
in total profit margin ranges are also observed. For example, the range is [-147%, 72%]
in 1998 and [-471%, 100%] in 2003. The nursing FTE proportion gradually and
significantly decreased between 1997 and 2001 and slightly increased afterward.
In addition, the statistics concerning hospital size and teaching status are quite
consistent across time. On the other hand, the statistics of hospital CMI and system
affiliation differ significantly among the years. Generally there is a declining trend in
overall hospital CMI from 1997 through 2003. During the same period, the percentage of
acute-care general community hospitals affiliated with a health system increased from 48
percent to 53 percent.
In terms of the market factors, FP and NFP market penetration ratios, state HH
CON requirement, and rural versus urban location generally remained consistent in the
study years. Yet the context regarding the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly persons,
elderly population proportion and growth rate, county per-capita income and
unemployment rate differed significantly across time. The number of HHAs per 1,000
elderly persons declined significantly across the study period. The standard deviations
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and ranges were consistent across time. The mean of the fraction of elderly in the
population is statistically significant different across the years, the variations are in fact
small, ranging from 13.75 percent to 14.01 percent. And, the mean of the elderly
population growth rate in these years differ significantly among hospitals as well as
across years. Examination of the related observations reveals no special problems. In
addition, the mean of the per-capita income of the counties where the sampled hospitals
were located increased gradually and significantly, from $24,410 in 1997 to $26,530 in
2002 and slightly fell to $26,490 in 2003. The statistics for the county unemployment
rate declined from 5.39 percent in 1997 to 4.55 percent in 2000 and then rose to 6.16
percent in 2003. No additional significant differences are observed for these factors.
Correlations among Variables
Table 11 shows the correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and
independent variables as well as correlation coefficients among independent variables.
The coefficients significantly different from zero at the 0.05 significance level are
highlighted with a bold font. As expected, the dependent variable, hospital provision of
HH care in a particular year, is significantly correlated with all the independent variables
except for hospital teaching status. Public and nonprofit hospitals are positively
correlated with HH provision while for-profit hospitals are negatively correlated with HH
provision. Medicare proportion, hospital total profit margin, HHA availability, hospital
size, CMI, elderly population proportion, NFP hospital market penetration, and rural
location are positively correlated with HH provision. On the other hand, HH provision is
negatively correlated with nursing FTE proportion, elderly population growth rate, FP

Table 11. The Correlation Coefficients between the Study Variables
Variables

1

1.hh provision

1.000

2.public

0.044 1.000

3.religious

0.047 -0.208 1.000

4.secular

0.031 -0.569 -0.354 1.000

5.for-profit

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

-0.141 -0.236 -0.147 -0.402 1.000

6.medicare

0.059 -0.134 0.021 0.026 0.110 1.000

7.margin

0.066 -0.012 0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.005 1.000

8.nursing

8

-0.014 -0.074 -0.032 -0.107 0.274 0.190 0.023 1.000

9.HHA/elderly 0.234 0.212 -0.047 -0.131 -0.034 -0.043 -0.015 -0.005 1.000
10.hospital size 0.066 -0.187 0.114 0.117 -0.039 -0.158 0.057 -0.001 -0.207 1.000
11.cmi

0.021 -0.300 0.160 0.095 0.091 0.009 0.091 0.104 -0.266 0.666 1.000

12.elderly

0.110 0.116 -0.059 0.021 -0.120 0.091 -0.025 -0.068 0.157 -0.202 -0.281 1.000

13.growth

-0.026 -0.034 -0.014 -0.008 0.067 -0.032 0.028 0.028 -0.094 -0.028 0.030 -0.215 1.000

14.fp market

-0.074 -0.192 -0.067 -0.264 0.677 0.085 0.011 0.222 -0.041 0.058 0.134 -0.129 0.095 1.000

15.nfp market

0.074 0.192 0.067 0.264 -0.677 -0.085 -0.011 -0.222 0.041 -0.058 -0.134 0.129 -0.095 -1.000 1.000

16.system

-0.083 -0.278 0.256 -0.111 0.270 0.024 0.007 0.158 -0.098 0.133 0.228 -0.118 0.030 0.240 -0.240 1.000

17.teaching

-0.010 -0.023 -0.013 0.079 -0.073 -0.126 0.007 -0.050 -0.082 0.533 0.411 -0.099 -0.070 -0.026 0.026 0.042 1.000

18.HH CON

-0.092 0.009 -0.038 0.014 0.004 -0.033 -0.033 0.017 -0.139 0.076 -0.033 -0.101 0.039 0.022 -0.022 -0.035 0.023 1.000

19.rural

0.123 0.305 -0.111 -0.087 -0.152 0.008 -0.019 -0.074 0.324 -0.468 -0.559 0.401 -0.064 -0.155 0.155 -0.201 -0.226 0.055 1.000

20.income

-0.095 -0.221 0.079 0.128 0.020 -0.049 0.013 -0.013 -0.214 0.396 0.422 -0.201 -0.009 0.008 -0.008 0.095 0.262 -0.041 -0.523 1.000

21.unemploy

-0.054 0.073 -0.026 -0.064 0.026 -0.009 -0.055 -0.020 -0.018 -0.092 -0.165 -0.056 -0.033 0.037 -0.037 -0.017 -0.033 0.154 0.163 -0.326 1.000

The coefficients in bold font are significantly different from 0.0 at the 0.05 significance level.
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hospital market penetration, system affiliation, presence of the state HH CON program,
and per-capita income as well as the unemployment rate in the county.
All the relationships are consistent with the expectation of this study except for
three variables including nursing FTE proportion, HHA availability (the number of
HHAs per 1000 elderly people), elderly population growth rate, and county per-capita
income. As described in the Variables and Measures section in Chapter 4, this study
hypothesizes that nursing density measured by the ratio of nursing FTEs to total FTEs in
the hospital and its subsidiary should be positively correlated with hospital provision of
HH care. Also, HHA availability in the market, which is an inverse measure of
transaction uncertainty, is expected to be associated negatively with HH provision. In
addition, the normative pressure on hospitals for offering HH care (as measured by
elderly population growth rate) and local ability to pay for health care (as measured by
per-capital income) are expected to be correlated positively with hospital provision of
HH care. Yet these two variables are correlated negatively with HH provision.
It can also be seen from Table 11 that the independent variables are correlated
with each other. Although some coefficients are quite large (greater than 0.5), they show
relationships in accordance with common knowledge. For example, FP hospital market
penetration is highly correlated with for-profit hospital. Also, larger hospitals are very
likely to be teaching hospitals and to have a higher CMI. Rural hospitals tend to have a
lower CMI compared to urban hospitals. Finally, examination of the coefficients in Table
11 demonstrates that no correlations are indeed high enough to raise the issue of
multicollinearity.
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Results of Bivariate Analyses
Comparison of Statistics between HH-Providing and Non-Providing Hospitals
Table 12 provides a comparison of the key statistics between hospitals offering
HH care (denoted by ―With HH‖) and those not offering HH care (denoted by ―W/O
HH‖) by year from 1997 to 2003. The significant differences in means of the
characteristics between the HH-providing hospital group and the HH-non-providing
group are tested. It can be seen from Table 12 that HH-providing hospitals and
non-providing hospitals differ significantly in most of the organizational and market
characteristics. First, the ownership mix differs between the two groups in most of the
years. The difference in ownership mix became even more evident in later years. In 1997,
only the share of religious hospitals is found to be significantly different between the
HH-providing and non-providing groups. However, the share of each ownership type is
significantly different between the two groups beginning in 2000. In 2003, for example,
54.1 percent of HH-providing hospitals are secular hospitals, followed by public
hospitals (26.7%), religious hospitals (12.8%), and for-profit hospitals (6.3%). For HH
non-providing hospitals, only 46 percent are secular nonprofits, followed in turn by
public hospitals (22.4%, less than its share in the providing group), for-profits (21%,
much more than its share in the providing group), and religious nonprofits (10.6%, less
than its share in the providing group).
More dramatic changes across time in the ownership mix between the two groups
are observed in particular for secular nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. In 1997, the share
of secular hospitals was almost equivalent between the HH-providing and non-providing

Table 12. Characteristics of HH Providing and Non-providing Hospitals, By Year
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Variable

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

N
Ownership
Public (%)
Religious (%)

2847 1931

2770 1982

2597 2085

2340 2301

2162 2448

2045 2542

1912 2680

26.2 26.1

26.1 24.8

27.6 22.8 *** 27.7 22.0 *** 27.2 22.6 *** 27.2 22.3 *** 26.7 22.4 ***

Secular (%)
For-profit (%)
Organizational
factors
Medicare (%)
Margin (%)
Nursing (%)
Hospital size
CMI

47.0 49.0
14.1 15.6

Market factors
HHA/elderly
Elderly (%)
Growth (%)
FP market (%)
NFP market(%)

12.7

9.3 *** 12.5 9.6 **

13.1 9.5 *** 13.4 9.9 *** 13.6 10.0 *** 12.5 10.4 *

2003

12.8 10.6 *

48.5 49.1
49.1 48.8
52.0 46.7 *** 52.6 46.9 *** 53.9 47.3 *** 54.1 46.0 ***
13.0 16.5 *** 10.2 18.8 *** 6.9 21.4 *** 6.6 20.4 *** 6.4 20.0 *** 6.3 21.0 ***

50.4 47.4 *** 49.6 46.6 *** 48.7 46.4 *** 49.8 48.4 *
49.8 48.0 ** 50.4 48.4 *** 50.9 48.0 ***
3.19 1.38 *** 2.22 0.55 *** 1.53 0.36 *** 1.56 0.32 *** 1.23 0.17 *** 1.09 0.34 *
1.21 0.25 **
28.9 28.4 *
28.7 28.6
28.4 28.5
28.0 28.5 ** 27.4 28.0 *** 27.5 27.9 *
27.7 28.4 ***
180 160 *** 179 157 *** 180 158 *** 184 157 *** 187 159 *** 185 160 *** 184 160 ***
1.29 1.26 *** 1.26 1.24 ** 1.28 1.28
1.27 1.26
1.25 1.24
1.25 1.24
1.25 1.26
0.42 0.26 *** 0.42 0.25 *** 0.43 0.26 *** 0.40 0.23 *** 0.39 0.22 *** 0.39 0.22 *** 0.39 0.23 ***
14.3
0.12
13.3
86.7

13.6 *** 14.3 13.5 *** 14.3 13.5 *** 14.2 13.3 *** 14.3
0.35 ** 0.88 0.89
0.13 0.23
1.26 1.24
1.17
12.5
12.6 13.2
10.8 13.8 *** 9.4 14.9 *** 9.2
87.5
87.4 86.8
89.2 86.2 *** 90.6 85.1 *** 90.8

13.4 *** 14.4 13.4 *** 14.4 13.5 ***
1.17
0.64 0.86 *** 0.68 0.69
14.5 *** 9.0 14.5 *** 9.2 15.0 ***
85.5 *** 91.0 85.5 *** 90.8 85.0 ***
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Table 12 (continued)
Variable
Control
variables
System (%)
Teaching (%)
HH CON (%)
Rural (%)
Income ($000)
Unemployment
(%)

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

With W/O
HH HH

47.6 48.7

49.0 51.6

47.2 54.8 *** 46.4 56.5 *** 45.7 57.4 *** 45.7 57.6 *** 46.2 57.8 ***

With W/O
HH HH

5.3 6.7 *
5.3 6.6
5.4 6.3
6.0 5.7
6.0 5.8
5.9 5.8
5.9 6.2
24.1 36.7 *** 24.0 36.7 *** 24.6 34.9 *** 25.0 33.9 *** 26.4 31.9 *** 26.5 31.7 *** 26.8 31.2 **
51.1 40.9 *** 51.8 41.0 *** 53.4 40.4 *** 54.5 41.0 *** 54.9 41.8 *** 55.6 42.3 *** 56.6 42.0 ***
23.9 25.2 *** 25.2 26.6 *** 25.5 26.9 *** 25.6 26.9 *** 25.6 26.9 *** 25.8 27.1 *** 25.7 27.1 ***
5.29 5.54 ** 4.97 5.12 *
4.67 4.84 *
4.46 4.65 ** 5.10 5.22
5.78 6.06 *** 6.07 6.23 *

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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groups. In the same year, the share of for-profit hospitals did not differ significantly
between the two groups. However, the secular ownership type took a much larger share
in the HH-providing group than in the non-providing group (54% vs. 46%) in 2003. In
the same year, the for-profit ownership type played a significantly smaller role in the
HH-providing group than in the non-providing group (6% vs. 21%). In fact, the for-profit
ownership type accounted for over 90 percent of the total difference in ownership mix
between HH-providing and non-providing groups from 1997 to 2003. In other words, the
role of for-profit hospitals in providing HH care became much less important after the
BBA, while secular hospitals took on a significantly larger share of the HH care market
post-BBA. The shares of public and religious nonprofit hospitals in the HH-providing
group increased initially but declined in later years during the study period. Overall, the
role of these two ownership types in the HH-providing group did not change
dramatically.
Hospitals offering HH care have significantly higher percentages of inpatient
days contributed by Medicare patients than have the hospitals not offering HH care. This
relation is consistent across the study period. Also, the hospital total profit margin and the
hospital size are greater for hospitals offering HH care than for those not offering HH
care. These findings are in accordance with the expectations that larger or more
profitable hospitals are more likely to offer their own HH services. Contrary to
expectations, the nursing FTE proportion is significantly higher for HH-providing
hospitals than for not providing hospitals only in 1997 (pre-BBA). In the post-BBA years,
this figure is either comparable or significantly higher for non-HH-providing hospitals
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than for providing hospitals. In addition, hospital CMI is a factor that distinguishes HH
providing and non-providing hospitals only for the first two years in the study period.
This may imply that CMI is no longer a critical consideration concerning HH provision
in the post-BBA era.
With respect to the market characteristics, significant differences are also
observed between the HH-providing and non-providing groups in most of the years
during the study period. HHA availability in the local market, as measured by the number
of HHAs per 1,000 elderly people in the county, is significantly higher for the
HH-providing group than for the non-providing group. This relation is contradicted to the
expectation. As expected, HH-providing hospitals were located in counties with higher
proportions of people age 65 or over than were non-providing hospitals. However, there
is no consistent pattern regarding elderly population growth rate between the
HH-providing and non-providing groups. In addition, HH-providing hospitals were
located in counties with lower FP hospital market penetration than were non-providing
hospitals. This relationship became particularly clear after the BBA.
Differences in the key characteristics between HH providing and non-providing
hospitals are also noted. System membership is a significant factor differentiating HH
providing and non-providing hospitals for most of the post-BBA period. In these years,
system-affiliated hospitals were significantly more represented in non-HH-providing
hospitals than in HH-providing hospitals. The proportion of teaching hospitals is
significantly different between the HH-providing and non-providing groups before the
BBA but similar post-BBA. Moreover, HH-providing hospitals were less likely than

124
non-providing hospitals to be located in states with a HH CON program. On the other
hand, HH-providing hospitals were more likely located in rural areas than were
non-providing hospitals. Finally, in the study period, HH-providing hospitals were more
likely than non-providing hospitals to be located in counties with lower per-capita
income as well as unemployment rates.
Comparison of the Percentage Offering HH Services among Ownership Types
Table 13 presents the percentage of hospitals offering HH care within each
ownership type across the study period. In 1997, before the BBA was implemented, more
than half of hospitals with each ownership form provided HH care. The percentage of
hospitals providing HH care is highest among religious nonprofit hospitals (67%),
followed by public hospitals (60%), secular nonprofits (59%), and for-profit hospitals
(57%). The percentage declines significantly over time for all ownership types after the
implementation of the BBA. Of most interest is whether hospitals in different ownership
structures differ in the reduction of HH provision post-BBA. Among the ownership types,
for-profit hospitals experienced the largest drop of the percentage of offering HH care
(39%) between 1997 and 2003, followed in turn by religious nonprofits (21%), public
hospitals (14%), and secular nonprofits (13%).
In order to get a visual interpretation of the change in HH provision by different
hospital ownership types, a graphical presentation of Table 13 is shown in Figure 12. A
number of trends in HH provision can be drawn from the figure. First, the percentage of
nonprofit hospitals offering HH care in general declined linearly from 1997 through 2003.
However, the overall reduction range is higher for religious nonprofits than for secular
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Table 13. Percentage of Hospitals Offering HH Services, By Ownership Type, 1997-2003
Year

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

F value

60%
67%

60%
64%

60%
63%

56%
58%

52%
54%

50%
49%

46%
46%

15.18***
13.64***

Secular
59%
58%
56%
For-profit
57%
52%
40%
Total
60%
58%
55%
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

53%
25%
50%

50%
22%
47%

48%
20%
45%

46%
18%
42%

23.75***
89.11***
92.80***

Ownership

Public
Religious

80%
Public
70%
Religious

60%
50%
Secular
40%
For-profit
30%

HH IPS fully
implemented

20%

HH IPS
phased in

10%

BBRA
HH PPS

0%
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Figure 12. Hospital Home Health Trends, By Hospital Ownership Type, 1997-2000

nonprofit and public hospitals. Second, public hospitals‘ percentage of providing HH
care started decreasing after 1999. The reduction in HH provision for public and religious
hospitals was similar between 1999 and 2001. The slope of public hospitals is similar to
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that of secular hospitals between 2001 and 2003. Third, the percentage of for-profit
hospitals offering HH care dropped dramatically between 1997 and 2000, compared to
other ownership types. However, between 2000 and 2003, the reduction by public
hospitals is comparable to those of other ownership types. Finally, it can be seen from
Figure 12 that for-profit hospitals overall behave very differently from public and private
not-for-profit hospitals, particularly in the years 1997 through 2000.
Results of Multivariate Analyses
The bivariate analysis discussed above provides an initial understanding of the major
relationship of interest. However, as mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, there might be other
underlying mechanisms influencing hospitals‘ decisions to offer HH care or not.
If these factors are correlated systematically with the ownership types, the results just
discussed are biased. Therefore, these factors need to be controlled in order to isolate the
effects of ownership types on hospital HH provision. Also, some of these factors have
theoretical and practical relevance, thus meriting examination. This section presents the
results of multivariate analyses taking all the relevant factors into account.
Model Selection
An appropriate model needs to be selected before the analysis is conducted. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, this study is potentially subject to a number of issues including
hospital closure or non-response, state policy effects, and sample selection biases due to
the imputation for missing values or outliers in the independent variables. First, for
testing the effect of hospital closure and nonresponse, a logit model as specified in the
―Econometric Approach and Model Specification‖ section in Chapter 4 with the variables
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listed in Table 8 plus a dummy variable (Closure) and the interaction terms of closure and
year dummy variables is estimated. The results of this model are shown in the first
column of Appendix 1. The coefficients of the variable closure and the interaction term
between closure and year 2002 are significantly different from 0 at the significance level
of 0.05, suggesting that the effect of closure is present. Both coefficients are negative,
suggesting that hospitals with closure or non-response were more likely than those
without such issues to not offer HH care before and to reduce HH care after the BBA
(particularly for 2002).
Second, in order to test the significance of the state effect, two models are
compared. More specifically, another logit model with the same specification as
described in the previous paragraph except for replacing the state HH CON with a set of
state dummy variables is estimated. The result of this model is shown in the second
column of Appendix 1. Empirical evidence indicating state effects can be found from the
result. Many coefficients of the state variables are significantly different from zero at the
conventional significance levels. Also, the joint test that all the coefficients of the state
variables equal to 0 yields a χ2 (chi-squared) statistic 287.38 with 50 degree of freedom.
The probability that a χ2 value is greater than 287.38 is lower than 0.0001. Thus, the null
hypothesis is rejected. In other words, there are significant state effects. Also, a number
of coefficients change dramatically from the first model to the second model. For
example, the coefficients of religious and secular ownership variables in model 1 are
0.430 and 0.085, respectively. The coefficients become 0.658 and 0.247 in model 2.
There is a 53 percent and a 191 percent increase for the two coefficients, respectively.
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This is a sign that these two models differ significantly. Based on the fact that the pseudo
R2 improves prominently from the basic model (0.125) to the model with a
comprehensive set of state dummy variables (0.157), this study includes the state dummy
variables rather than the state HH CON variable.
Finally, the potential issue related to sample selection resulting from the
imputation for missing values or/and outliers in a number of the independent variables is
tested. This test is done by including the four dummy variables margin_d, pop_d, and
cmi_d, and income_d indicating observations with imputation of the entire sample mean
for the variables margin, pop, cmi, and income, respectively. Since year effects are a
major interest here, each of the four missing dummy variables is also interacted with the
year dummy variables and added to the second model discussed in the previous
paragraph. Results of this sample selection test are shown in the last column of Appendix
1. Only the coefficients of cmi_d and margin_d are significant at the 0.05 significance
level, implying that only the imputation for the two variables, cmi and margin, could
cause sample selection biases. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term between
margin and year‘03 are statistically significant. Thus, the three terms, cmi_d, margin_d,
and margin x year‘03, are included in the final analysis model in order to control for the
effects resulting from the value imputation. In addition, the result of the third model
shows that the coefficients of the variable closure and its interaction term with year 2002
are also significant at the 0.05 level. Hence, these two terms are included in the final
analytical model, too.
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Results of the Full Model
A logit model with a full set of organizational and market factors (described in
Chapter 4) and year dummy variables representing years 1998 through 2003 was applied
to test the hypotheses. The complete results are presented in Appendix 2. The results for
year and ownership effects, organizational and market factors, and control variables are
presented separately.
In Table 14, the coefficients of the year dummy variables represent the change in
public hospitals‘ probability of offering HH care between 1997 and the corresponding
year, after controlling for other factors. Positive changes in the probability of offering
HH services are observed between 1997 and the six years following the implementation
of the BBA. This means that holding constant all other factors, public hospitals were in
fact more likely to provide HH care in the post-BBA years than in the pre-BBA year,
1997. However, the change in the probability of offering HH care among public hospitals
is statistically significant only for the period between 1997 and 1999. Public hospitals‘
odds of offering HH care in 1999 were 1.88 times the odds in 1997. A joint test of the
coefficients to the year terms results in a χ2 statistic equal to 10.86 with a degree freedom
of 6 (p value=0.0927), suggesting that the public hospitals‘ probability of offering HH
care does not change significantly from pre- to post-BBA periods.
In the baseline year before the BBA was implemented, hospitals with different
ownership forms differed significantly in the probability of providing HH care.
Compared to public hospitals, hospitals in other ownership types were significantly more
likely to offer HH care. The ratios of the probability of offering versus not offering HH
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Table 14. Estimations of Year and Ownership Effects by Logistic Regression with a Full
Set of Year Dummy Variables
Variable
Odds ratio
Year effects (Base: 1997)
Year‘98
1.156
Year‘99
1.880
Year‘00
1.846
Year‘01
1.878
Year‘02
1.180
Year‘03
1.170
Ownership effects
Religious hospital
1.884
0.891
Religious x year‘98
0.843
Religious x year‘99
0.793
Religious x year‘00
0.873
Religious x year‘01
0.775
Religious x year‘02
0.813
Religious x year‘03
Secular hospital
1.291
0.993
Secular x year‘98
0.895
Secular x year‘99
0.953
Secular x year‘00
1.031
Secular x year‘01
1.041
Secular x year‘02
1.120
Secular x year‘03
For-profit hospital
1.591
0.768
For-profit x year‘98
0.416
For-profit x year‘99
0.284
For-profit x year‘00
0.309
For-profit x year‘01
0.306
For-profit x year‘02
0.373
For-profit x year‘03
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Complete results are shown in Appendix 2.

Coefficient
0.145
0.631 *
0.613
0.630
0.165
0.157
0.633 ***
-0.115
-0.171
-0.231 *
-0.136
-0.255 *
-0.207
0.256 **
-0.007
-0.111
-0.048
0.031
0.040
0.113
0.464 *
-0.263
-0.876 ***
-1.257 ***
-1.173 ***
-1.185 ***
-0.987 ***

Standard error
0.241
0.274
0.324
0.334
0.351
0.358
0.132
0.078
0.098
0.109
0.118
0.127
0.133
0.090
0.050
0.062
0.073
0.079
0.083
0.088
0.184
0.135
0.174
0.209
0.217
0.223
0.222
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care among religious hospitals, for-profit hospitals, and secular hospitals were 1.88, 1.59,
1.29 times, respectively, the ratios among their public counterparts.
Consistent with expectations, the relative changes in the probability of offering
HH care from the pre- to the post-BBA periods between the for-profit and public hospital
groups are all significantly different from zero except for year 1998 (in fact it is
marginally significant in 1998, p value=0.05). For example, the ratio of the odds of
offering HH care among for-profit versus public hospitals in 1999 was 0.768 times the
ratio in 1997. In other words, the probability of offering versus not offering HH care was
lower for for-profit as compared to public hospitals in response to the enactment of the
BBA. Also, the probability of not offering versus offering HH care was much higher (3.5
times (1/0.284)) for for-profit as compared to public hospitals following the
implementation of the BBA between 1997 and 2000. This relation is significant
throughout the whole study period. Therefore, hypothesis 1a is supported. Nevertheless,
for-profit hospitals‘ reduction in the likelihood of offering versus not offering HH care
relative to that of public hospitals rose between 1997 and 2000 but declined between
2000 and 2003. The coefficients to the interaction terms between for-profit hospitals and
year 1998 and between for-profit hospitals and year 2000 are statistically significant (χ2
(1)= 22.66, p value<0.0001), while the coefficients to the interaction terms between the
for-profit hospital and year 2000 and between the for-profit hospital and year 2003 are
not statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level (χ2 (1)= 2.62, p value =0.1056).
Thus, compared to public hospitals, the change in the probability of offering versus not
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offering HH care among for-profit hospitals is significant between 1997 and 2000, but
not significant after 2000.
In addition, the relative changes in ratio of the probability of offering versus not
offering HH between the for-profit and private nonprofit hospital groups after the
implementation of the BBA are significantly different from zero. Table 15 provides the
results concerning year and ownership effects on hospital provision and change in
provision of HH care by applying a full model with private nonprofit hospitals (including
religious and secular nonprofits) serving as the base group. The results suggest that
for-profit hospitals were significantly less likely than their private nonprofit counterparts
to continue offering HH care post-BBA. For example, the ratio of the odds of offering
HH care among for-profit versus private nonprofit hospitals in 2003 was only 0.353
times the ratio in 1997. In other words, the probability of not offering versus offering HH
care was significantly higher (nearly 3 times) for for-profit as compared to private
nonprofit hospitals in response to the enactment of the BBA. Although the relative
change between 1997 and 1998 is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, a joint test
of all the relative changes from 1997 to the post-BBA years are all zero results in a χ2 (6)
equal to 36.12 (p value<0.0001). This provides empirical evidence that for-profit
hospitals were more likely than private nonprofit hospitals to reduce HH care post-BBA.
Therefore, hypothesis 1b is supported.
On the other hand, the relative changes in the probability of offering versus not offering
HH between the public and private nonprofit hospital groups after the implementation of
the BBA are only significantly different from zero for the period between 1997 and 1999.
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Table 15. Estimations of Year and Ownership Effects by Logistic Regression with a Full
Set of Year Dummy Variables (Private NFPs Serve as Base group)
Variable

Odds ratio Coefficient

Robust
Standard Error

Year Effect (Base: 1997)
1998
1.129
0.122
0.245
1999
1.642
0.496
0.278
2000
1.704
0.533
0.328
2001
1.872
0.627
0.339
2002
1.186
0.171
0.353
2003
1.268
0.237
0.361
Ownership Effect (Base: private nonprofits)
Public
0.733
-0.310***
0.089
1.026
0.026
0.048
Public x year‘98
1.131
0.123*
0.060
Public x year‘99
1.082
0.079
0.070
Public x year‘00
0.998
-0.002
0.076
Public x year‘01
1.011
0.011
0.081
Public x year‘02
0.944
-0.057
0.085
Public x year‘03
For-profit
1.141
0.131
0.181
0.790
-0.236
0.134
For-profit x year‘98
0.471
-0.754***
0.173
For-profit x year‘99
0.309
-1.176***
0.206
For-profit x year‘00
0.309
-1.173***
0.214
For-profit x year‘01
0.310
-1.171***
0.221
For-profit x year‘02
0.353
-1.041***
0.220
For-profit x year‘03
Other independent and control variables are not shown here
Model Statistics
Log pseudolikelihood = -18949.708
Wald χ2 (150)= 1582.37
Prob (> Wald χ2 (150)) <0.0001
Pseudo R2=0.1622
N=32,642
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

z

P>|z|

0.500
1.780
1.630
1.850
0.480
0.660

0.620
0.075
0.104
0.065
0.628
0.511

-3.490
0.540
2.050
1.120
-0.020
0.140
-0.670
0.730
-1.760
-4.360
-5.700
-5.470
-5.300
-4.740

0.000
0.589
0.040
0.262
0.983
0.890
0.502
0.467
0.079
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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A joint test of all the relative changes from 1997 to the post-BBA years are all zero
results in a χ2 (6) equal to 10.18 (p value =0.1174). This means that there is no
considerable difference in the change in the probability of offering versus not offering
HH care between public and private nonprofit hospitals post-BBA. Therefore, hypothesis
1c is not supported.
In addition, it can be noted from Table 14 that there may be differences between
religious and secular nonprofit hospitals in the change in the ratio of the probability of
providing versus not providing HH services after the BBA. Tests are conducted to
examine whether the differences in coefficients between the two nonprofit ownership
types are statistically significant following the estimation of the model reported in
Appendix 2. The results of the tests shown in Table 16 suggest that the coefficients are
not significantly different for years 1998 through 2001 but are significantly different for
years 2002 and 2003. Contrary to expectations, secular nonprofit hospitals were more
likely than religious nonprofit hospitals to continue providing HH care in 2002 and 2003
as compared to 1997. Also, different patterns of change in the probability of offering
versus not offering HH are noted between religious and secular nonprofit hospital groups.
Compared to public hospitals, religious hospitals were always more likely to reduce HH
provision in the years following the implementation of the BBA. For secular hospitals,
this only holds for two years, 1999 and 2000. In other post-BBA years, secular hospitals
were less likely than their public counterparts to reduce HH provision. These findings
provide initial evidence that hypothesis 1d is not supported. The difference in the change
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Table 16. Test Results of the Significance of the Differences between Religious and
Secular Nonprofit Hospitals in the Change in HH Provision Post-BBA
Year

Coefficients

Secular x Year Religious x Year
1998
-0.007
-0.115
1999
-0.111
-0.171
2000
-0.048
-0.231*
2001
0.031
-0.136
2002
0.040
-0.255*
2003
0.113
-0.207
Post-BBA
0.009
-0.183*
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

χ2 (1)

p value

2.00
0.41
2.23
2.30
6.34
6.84
4.98

0.1569
0.5240
0.0722
0.1290
0.0118
0.0089
0.0256

Difference
0.108
0.060
0.184
0.167
0.295*
0.321**
0.192*

in the odds of offering HH care between religious and secular nonprofit hospitals in
response to the BBA as a whole will be discussed in the next section.
Based on the results reported in Table 17, most of the organizational and market
factors assumed to be relevant to hospitals‘ decisions to offer HH care are significantly
associated with hospitals‘ likelihood of providing HH care. On average, a one percent
increase in the Medicare proportion results in 1.009 times significantly more likely to
offer versus not offer HH care. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported. Also, the result
suggests that a one percent increase in hospital total profit margin results in 1.015 times
the ratio of the probability of offering versus not offering HH care. This provides
empirical evidence that hypothesis 3a is supported. In addition, one more hospital bed
results in 1.002 times the ratio of the probability of offering to not offering HH care. This
finding can be used to support hypothesis 6a. Furthermore, one point increase in the
hospital case mix index on average results in 2.18 times the odds of offering HH care.
This provides empirical evidence that hypothesis 7a is supported. Finally, hospitals
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Table 17. Estimations of the Effects of Organizational and Market Factors by Logistic
Regression with a Full Set of Year Dummy Variables
Variable
Organizational factors
Medicare
Medicare x year‘98
Medicare x year‘99
Medicare x year‘00
Medicare x year‘01
Medicare x year‘02
Medicare x year‘03
Margin
Margin x year‘98
Margin x year‘99
Margin x year‘00
Margin x year‘01
Margin x year‘02
Margin x year‘03
Nursing
Nursing x year‘98
Nursing x year‘99
Nursing x year‘00
Nursing x year‘01
Nursing x year‘02
Nursing x year‘03
Hospital size
Hospital size x year‘98
Hospital size x year‘99
Hospital size x year‘00
Hospital size x year‘01
Hospital size x year‘02
Hospital size x year‘03
Hospital CMI
CMI x year‘98
CMI x year‘99
CMI x year‘00

Odds ratio
1.009
1.001
1.000
0.999
1.002
1.000
1.003
1.015
1.000
0.992
0.994
1.002
0.995
1.000
1.000
0.988
0.994
0.984
0.984
0.997
0.988
1.002
1.000
1.000
1.001
1.001
1.000
1.000
2.180
1.026
0.684
0.769

Coefficient
0.009 ***
0.001
0.000
-0.001
0.002
0.000
0.003
0.015 ***
0.000
-0.008
-0.006
0.002
-0.005
0.000
0.000
-0.012 *
-0.006
-0.016 *
-0.017 *
-0.003
-0.013
0.002 ***
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001 **
0.000
0.000
0.779 ***
0.026
-0.379 *
-0.263

Standard error
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.008
0.007
0.005
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.216
0.167
0.183
0.215
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Table 17 (continued)
Variable
CMI x year‘01
CMI x year‘02
CMI x year‘03
Market factors
HHA/elderly
HHA/elderly x year‘98
HHA/elderly x year‘99
HHA/elderly x year‘00
HHA/elderly x year‘01
HHA/elderly x year‘02
HHA/elderly x year‘03
Elderly proportion
Elderly x year‘98
Elderly x year‘99
Elderly x year‘00
Elderly x year‘01
Elderly x year‘02
Elderly x year‘03
Growth
Growth x year‘98
Growth x year‘ 99
Growth x year‘ 00
Growth x year‘ 01
Growth x year ‗02
Growth x year‘ 03
NFP hospital x FP market
NFP x FP market x year‘98
NFP x FP market x year‘99
NFP x FP market x year‘00
NFP x FP market x year‘01
NFP x FP market x year‘02
NFP x FP market x year‘03
FP hospital x NFP market

Odds ratio
0.613
0.733
0.641
4.764
1.030
0.855
1.121
1.275
1.055
0.987
1.023
1.006
1.002
0.996
0.984
0.991
0.998
1.016
1.015
1.030
1.007
1.008
0.970
1.037
1.001
1.000
0.998
0.998
0.997
0.991
0.989
0.996

Coefficient
-0.489 *
-0.311
-0.445
1.561 ***
0.029
-0.157
0.114
0.243
0.054
-0.013
0.023 *
0.006
0.002
-0.004
-0.016
-0.009
-0.002
0.016
0.015
0.029
0.007
0.008
-0.031
0.036
0.001
0.000
-0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.009 *
-0.011 **
-0.004

Standard error
0.208
0.218
0.233
0.190
0.087
0.125
0.141
0.157
0.178
0.198
0.010
0.006
0.008
0.009
0.010
0.010
0.011
0.015
0.020
0.020
0.018
0.019
0.024
0.019
0.003
0.002
0.003
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.003
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Table 17 (continued)
Variable
Odds ratio
1.003
FP x NFP market x year‘98
1.003
FP x NFP market x year‘99
0.999
FP x NFP market x year‘00
0.998
FP x NFP market x year‘01
0.996
FP x NFP market x year‘02
0.991
FP x NFP market x year‘03
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Complete results are shown in Appendix 2.

Coefficient
0.003
0.003
-0.001
-0.002
-0.004
-0.009 *

Standard error
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004

located in a county with one percent more elderly population causes the ratio of the
probability of offering to not offering HH services to rise by a factor of 1.023. Therefore,
hypothesis 8a is supported.
Several factors are founded to be either not associated with hospital provision of
HH care or in a way contrary to the expectation of this study. First, Table 17 suggests that
one more HHA per 1,000 elderly people in the county results in 4.76 times the ratio of
the probability of offering to not offering HH care in 1997, other relevant factors being
equal. This finding contradicts hypothesis 5a which states that HHA resource availability
is associated negatively with hospital provision of its own HH care. Therefore,
hypothesis 5a is not supported.
In addition, an increase in the nursing FTE proportion has no discernable effect
on the ratio of the probability of offering to not offering HH care (odds ratio=1.000). This
suggests that nursing FTE proportion is not associated with hospital provision of HH care.
Thus, hypothesis 4a is also not supported. Finally, elderly population growth rate in the
county is associated positively with hospitals‘ probabilities of offering HH care. A one

139
percent increase in elderly population growth rate results in about 1.016 times the ratio of
the probability of providing to not providing HH care. However, this coefficient is not
statistically significantly different from zero at a 0.05 significance level. Therefore,
hypothesis 9a is not empirically supported.
With respect to the interaction terms of the organizational/market factors and year
dummy variables, most of the coefficients are non-significant at the 0.05 significance
level. This implies that these factors in general are not associated with the change in
hospitals‘ ratio of the probability of providing versus not providing HH care between
1997 and the corresponding years post-BBA. Yet there are a few exceptions. Hospital
nursing FTE proportion is found to be associated negatively with hospitals‘ change in the
ratio of the probability of offering versus not offering HH care in 1998, 2000, and 2001,
compared to 1997. This implies that, contrary to expectations, hospitals with higher
proportions of total FTEs contributed by nursing staff were more likely to reduce HH
care in these years following the implementation of the BBA.
In addition, hospital size is noted to be associated negatively with the reduction in
hospitals‘ ratio of the probability of providing versus not providing HH care between
1997 and 2001. This means that larger hospitals were significantly less likely than
smaller hospitals to reduce HH care between 1997 and 2001. Moreover, hospital CMI is
associated positively with the reduction in hospitals‘ probability of offering versus not
offering HH services between 1997 and 1999 as well as 2001. For example, the result
shows that an one point increase in CMI results in 0.684 times the ratio of the probability
of offering versus not offering HH care in response to the enactment of the BBA between
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1997 and 1999. Furthermore, there is a negative impact of for-profit hospital market
penetration on public and private nonprofit hospitals‘ change in the probability of
offering versus not offering HH care in the 1997-2002 and 1997-2003 periods. This
implies that public and private nonprofit hospitals located in a county with higher FP
hospital penetration are significantly more likely than those located in lower FP hospital
penetration counties to reduce HH care between 1997 and 2002 or 2003.
Because there is in general a dearth of significant and consistent relationships
between each of the organizational and market factors and hospitals‘ changes in the ratio
of the probability of offering versus not offering HH care in the post-BBA years,
hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, 8b, 9b, 10a, and 10b are not supported. These
hypotheses will be reexamined later by using a reduced model investigating the joint
effect of the post-BBA years.
Finally, the relationships between the control variables and hospitals‘ likelihood
of offering HH care are presented in Table 18. All the coefficients are significant at
conventional levels. First, the result suggests the odds of providing HH care among
system-affiliated hospitals were 0.694 times the odds among their freestanding
counterparts in the study period. In other words, system-affiliated hospitals were less
likely than their freestanding counterparts to provide HH care in the study period.
During the same period, non-teaching hospitals‘ ratio of the probability of
offering to not offering HH care was nearly 2 (1/0.526) times that of teaching hospitals.
Also, the ratio of the probability of offering to not offering HH services among rural
hospitals were 1.59 times the ratio among urban hospitals. Furthermore, a $1,000
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Table 18. Results Showing the Relationship between Hospital Provision of HH Care and
Control Variables in the Logit Model with a Full Set of Year Dummy Variables
Variable
Odds ratio
Control variables
System
0.694
Teaching
0.526
Rural
1.598
Income
0.987
Unemployment
0.966
Closure
0.577
0.504
Closure x year‘02
CMI_d
0.195
Margin_d
0.490
1.517
Margin_d x year‘03
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Complete results are shown in Appendix 2.

Coefficient

Standard error

-0.365 ***
-0.642 ***
0.469 ***
-0.013 *
-0.035 **
-0.550 ***
-0.686 *
-1.634 ***
-0.713 **
0.417 *

0.060
0.150
0.085
0.006
0.013
0.108
0.327
0.364
0.227
0.179

increase in county per-capita income on average resulted in 1.01 (1/0.987) times the ratio
of not offering to offering HH care. Finally, a 1 percent increase in county unemployment
rate caused the ratio of the probability of not offering to offering HH care to rise by a
factor of 1.04 in the period of 1997 through 2003. These suggest that all the control
variables are negatively associated with hospitals‘ likelihood of offering HH care, except
that rural hospitals are more likely than urban hospitals to offer HH care.
Results of the Reduced Model
Since the majority of the coefficients of the interaction terms between the
organizational and market factors and year dummy variables are non-significant at the
conventional level of 0.05, a reduced model is applied to examine the joint effect of the
post-BBA years on the change in the likelihood of providing HH care as compared to the
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pre-BBA year. In this model, a dummy variable (post_BBA) indicating the post-BBA
period years 1998 through 2003 is used to replace all the year dummies in the full model.
A shortened version of the results without showing the state effects is reported in Table
19 while the completed results are presented in Appendix 3.
The results of the reduced model are very similar to those of the full model. This
model further confirms that the post-BBA effect on hospitals‘ changes in the probability
of offering HH care is present for the for-profit hospital group compared to public
hospitals. Thus, hypothesis 1a is supported. A test of significance of the difference in the
coefficient for the interaction terms of ownership and post_BBA between for-profit and
private nonprofit (including religious and secular nonprofits) results in a χ2 (2) equal to
39.92 (p value<0.0001), suggesting that hypothesis 1b is also supported. However, a test
of significance of the joint effect of secular and religious ownership on the change in
probability of offering HH care post-BBA results in a χ2 (2) equal to 5.19 (p
value=0.0745). This means that there is no significant overall difference in the change in
probability of offering HH care between public and private nonprofit hospitals after the
implementation of the BBA. Thus, hypothesis 1c is not supported. Also, a test of the
significance of the difference in the coefficient between religious and secular nonprofit
hospitals after the BBA results in a χ2 (1) equal to 4.98 (p value= 0.0256). Although the
difference is statistically significant, the direction of the relationship is opposite to the
expectation. It suggests that religious hospitals were more likely than secular nonprofit
hospitals to reduce HH provision after the BBA. Therefore, hypothesis 1d is rejected.
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Table 19. Results of the Reduced Logit Model with a Post-BBA Dummy Variable
Variable
Post-BBA (vs. Pre-BBA)
Ownership effects (vs. Public)
Religious
Religious x Post-BBA
Secular
Secular x Post-BBA
For-profit
For-profit x Post-BBA
Organizational factors
Medicare
Medicare x Post-BBA
Margin
Margin x Post-BBA
Nursing
Nursing x Post-BBA
Hospital size
Hospital size x Post-BBA
CMI
CMI x Post-BBA
Market factors
HHA/elderly
HHA/elderly x Post-BBA
Elderly
Elderly x Post-BBA
Growth
Growth x Post-BBA
NFP x FP market
NFP x FP market x Post-BBA
FP x NFP market
FP x NFP market x Post-BBA
Control variables
System
Teaching
Rural

Odds ratio
1.357

Coefficient
0.305

Standard error
0.253

1.865
0.833
1.278
1.009
1.625
0.385

0.623 ***
-0.183 *
0.245 **
0.009
0.485 **
-0.956 ***

0.132
0.090
0.090
0.059
0.183
0.159

1.009
1.000
1.015
0.996
1.000
0.990
1.002
1.000
2.114
0.799

0.009 **
0.000
0.015 ***
-0.004
0.000
-0.010
0.002 ***
0.000
0.749 ***
-0.224

0.002
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.214
0.165

4.956
1.073
1.024
0.996
1.015
1.010
1.001
0.996
0.995
1.000

1.601 ***
0.070
0.024 *
-0.004
0.015
0.010
0.001
-0.004
-0.005
0.000

0.191
0.113
0.010
0.007
0.015
0.015
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003

0.694
0.533
1.576

-0.366 ***
-0.629 ***
0.455 ***

0.059
0.148
0.083
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Table 19 (continued)
Variable
Odds ratio
Income
0.983
Unemployment
0.944
Closure
0.678
0.937
Closure x Post-BBA
CMI_d
0.252
0.701
CMI _d x Post-BBA
Margin_d
0.422
1.271
Margin_d x Post-BBA
Constant
State variables are not shown here
Model Statistics
Log pseudolikelihood
-19201.629
2
Wald χ (88)
1365.6
2
P(>Wald χ (88))
<0.0001
2
Pseudo R
0.151
N
32642
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Complete results are shown in Appendix 3.

Coefficient
Standard error
-0.017 **
0.006
-0.057 ***
0.012
-0.388 ***
0.113
-0.066
0.110
-1.380 ***
0.409
-0.355
0.356
-0.863 ***
0.262
0.240
0.214
-1.140 **
0.419

The results of the reduced model concerning the effects of the organizational and market
factors on HH provision before the BBA are close to those of the full model as the
coefficients and significance of the related terms are very similar. Thus, the findings also
support hypotheses 2a, 3a, 6a, 7a, and 8a, but fail to support hypotheses 4a, 5a, and 9a.
Of particular interest are the effects of these factors on the change in the
probability of offering HH care after the BBA. It is clearly noted that all the coefficients
to the interaction terms of these factors and post_BBA are not significant at the 0.05
significance level. These findings provide further evidence that hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b,
6b, 7b, 8b, 9b, 10a, and 10b are not supported.
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Sensitivity Analysis
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the data regarding the dependent variable, hospital
provision of HH care in a particular year, came from two data sources including the
HCRIS and AHA. The results discussed above are based on the data combining
information from the two files using the HCRIS as the master source and AHA as the
supplementary source. Although this arrangement of the data should result in the best
data quality given the information available, it is necessary to conduct a sensitivity
analysis to check potential inconsistencies in results due to this particular type of data
arrangement. Because the two data files have their own strengths and weaknesses, this
sensitivity analysis employs a different arrangement of the data sources to create a new
dependent variable. That is, the AHA data are used as the master source and the HCRIS
as the supplementary source. More specifically, this new dependent variable
(hhprov_new) is coded as ―1‖ if a hospital reported to the AHA survey that HH services
are owned or provided by the hospital or its subsidiary and as ―0‖ if HH services are
provided through other arrangements. However, if a hospital did not report related
information to the AHA survey but had non-zero HH revenues included in the HCRIS
file in a particular year, the new HH provision variable is also coded as ―1‖ and as ―0‖
otherwise. Then a reduced logit model similar to that described in the previous section
except using the new dependent variable is estimated.
A comparison of the result of this new model (AHA model) with that of the model
(HCRIS model) presented in the previous section is reported in Appendix 4. The
comparison suggests that the two models yield similar results. All significant coefficients
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between the two models have the same signs. The differences in the significant
coefficients across the models range from -24 percent to 37 percent. The differences in
the coefficients of major interest between the two models are between -21 percent and 37
percent. In general, the two models do not differ in the major findings of this study
except for the effect of nursing FTE proportion after the BBA. While this effect is
insignificant for the HCRIS model, it becomes statistically significant for the AHA model.
In fact, the effect of nursing FTE proportion on hospital provision of HH care after the
BBA is marginally significant for the HCRIS model (p value=0.51). Both models
demonstrate a negative effect, suggesting that the proportion of hospital total FTEs
contributed by nursing staff is associated positively with the likelihood of reducing HH
provision after the BBA. However, the results of the hypotheses tests are the same no
matter which data arrangement for the dependent variable discussed above is applied.
Summary of Findings
The major findings of the analyses organized by the structure of the study
hypotheses are summarized in Table 20. Seven out of twenty-two proposed hypotheses
are empirically supported. Hospital Medicare inpatient day proportion, hospital total
profit margin, hospital case mix index, number of hospital beds, and elderly population
proportion in the county are positive and significant determinants of hospital provision of
HH care. Hospital‘s nursing FTE proportion and annual elderly population growth rate in
the county are insignificant determinants of hospital provision of HH services. Finally,
contrary to the expectation, the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly people in the county
is a positive and significant contributor to hospital provision of HH services.
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Table 20. Effects of Factors on Hospitals‘ Provision of HH Care Before and Reduction in
Provision of HH Care After the Implementation of the BBA
Hypotheses

Variables

Expected Sign
P (offer)

P(continue)
post-BBA

Economics- Ownership
H1a
FP vs. Public
(-)
H1b
FP vs. NFP
(-)
H1c
NFP vs. Public
(-)
H1d
Secular vs. Religious
(-)
Resource Dependence
H2a~H2b
Medicare
(+)
(+)
H3a~H3b
Margin
(+)
(+)
H4a~H4b
Nursing
(+)
(+)
Transaction Cost
H5a~H5b
HHA/elderly
(-)
(-)
H6~H6b
Hospital size
(+)
(+)
H7a~H7b
CMI
(+)
(+)
Institutional Theory
H8a~H8b
Elderly
(+)
(+)
H9a~H9b
Growth
(+)
(+)
H10a
(-)
NFPs x FP market
H10b
(+)
FPs x NFP market
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
NS: not statistically significant at the 5% significance level
MS: marginally significant at the 5% significant level

Effect Founded
P (offer)

P(continue)
post-BBA

(-)***
(-)***
(-)NS
(+)*
(+)**
(+)***
(+)NS

(+)NS
(-)NS
(-)MS

(+)***
(+)***
(+)***

(+)NS
(+)NS
(-)NS

(+)**
(+)NS

(-)NS
(+)NS
(-)NS
(+)NS

After the implementation of the BBA, as hypothesized, for-profit hospitals were
significantly more likely than public and private nonprofit hospitals to reduce HH care.
However, other relationships proposed in this study are not supported. There is no
discernable difference in the change in the probability of offering HH care between
public and private nonprofit hospitals after the BBA. Surprisingly, religious hospitals
were indeed more likely than secular hospitals to discontinue HH services post-BBA.
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Nine out of the ten organizational and market factors that were supposed to play
certain roles in hospitals‘ decisions to continue or discontinue HH care after the BBA
have no significant effects, based on the empirical result of the analyses performed. Yet
the hospital nursing FTE proportion has a negative and marginally significant effect on
hospitals‘ continuation of HH care provision after the BBA. These findings will be
further discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Following the implementation of the BBA, there was a decline in the number of
hospital-based HHAs and in the probability hospitals would provide HH services. As
stated in Chapter 1, the purpose of this study is to shed light on the objective function of
hospitals by examining how they change their provision of HH services in response to a
change in financial incentives, and to explore the factors that influence hospital provision
of HH services. Using a multi-theoretical framework and a difference-in-difference
estimation approach, the current study reveals the objective functions of hospitals with
different ownership forms and explores the key factors affecting hospitals provision and
change in provision of HH services in the face of the BBA. This chapter summarizes the
results presented in the previous chapter, interprets the findings, describes implications,
discusses study limitations, and suggests areas for future research.
Summary and Interpretation of the Descriptive and Bivariate Analyses
This study examines hospitals‘ probabilities of reducing or discontinuing HH
provision from one pre-BBA period to six post-BBA periods. Significant decreases in the
percentage as well as the number of hospitals offering HH care over the study period
were noted. Between 1997 and 2003, the percentage of acute-care general community
hospitals offering HH care dropped from 60 percent to 42 percent; the number of
hospital-based HHAs kept declining from 2,847 to 1,912 (a 33% decline.
149
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Various degrees of reduction in HH provision among different hospital ownership
types were also clearly observed. Among the hospitals of different ownership types,
for-profit hospitals were the most likely to reduce provision of HH services (39%),
followed by religious nonprofit hospitals (21%), public hospitals (14%), and secular
nonprofit hospitals (13%). Between 1997 and 2000, the percentage offering HH services
fell 32 percent among for-profit hospitals, 9 percent among religious hospitals, 6 percent
among secular hospitals, and 4 percent among public hospitals (see Table 13). These
findings are similar to those from Horwitz (2005a) who reported a 37.5 percent, 7.7
percent, and 1.5 percent decline among for-profit, nonprofit, and public hospitals,
respectively.
As shown in the last two columns of Table 21, the number of hospitals offering
HH care declined by 303 for secular nonprofit hospitals, 281 for for-profit hospitals, 234
for public hospitals, and 117 for religious hospitals. However, the number of hospitals
offering HH care declined by around 70 percent among for-profits, 32 percent among
religious nonprofits, 31 percent among public hospitals, and 23 percent among secular
nonprofits.

Table 21. The Number of Hospitals Offering HH Care, By Ownership Type and Year
Year
Ownership
Public
Religious
Secular
For-profit
Total

Change
in #
745 723
718
648
589
556
511
-234
362 345
339
314
293
256
245
-117
1,338 1,343 1,276 1,217 1,137 1,102 1,035 -303
402 359
264
161
143
131
121
-281
2,847 2,770 2,597 2,340 2,162 2,045 1,912 -935
1997 1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Change
in %
-31.4%
-32.3%
-22.6%
-69.9%
-32.8%
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From these results, at least four conclusions can be drawn. First, compared to
public and private nonprofit hospitals, for-profit hospitals behaved differently,
dramatically decreasing provision of HH care after the implementation of the BBA.
Second, the share of nonprofit hospital-based HHAs in total hospital-based HHAs
increased from 86 percent in 1997 to 94 percent in 2003. This may have implications for
the quality of hospital-based HH care if HHA ownership is associated with care quality
(Rosenau and Linder, 2003). Third, although for-profit hospitals dropped HHAs more
dramatically than did other ownership types, the impact of the reduction on HH access
may not be proportionally strong because for-profit hospitals only account for 10 percent
to 15 percent of total hospitals. In fact, the reduction in for-profit hospital-based HHAs
accounts for only 30 percent of overall decrease in total hospital-based HHAs during the
study period. Finally, as mentioned in the previous chapter, for-profit hospitals‘
probability of offering HH care dropped dramatically between 1997 and 2000, compared
to other ownership types. However, between 2000 and 2003, the change in the overall
probability with which for-profit hospitals offered HH care became more comparable to
those of other ownership types (see Figure 12). This may be an indication that the HH
IPS and/or BBRA of 1999 to a certain extent lessened the financial concern of for-profit
hospital managers about HH provision. However, the HH IPS or/and BBRA do not seem
to have had a clear influence on public and private nonprofit hospitals‘ concerns in
continuing to provide HH care or not. F tests to assess whether hospitals‘ probabilities of
offering HH care changed across years from 1997 through 1999 result in F values equal
to 0.06 (p value=0.94), 0.86 (p value=0.42), 2.03 (p value=0.10) for public, religious, and
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secular nonprofit hospitals, respectively. This indicates that there were no significant
changes in the probability of offering HH care right after the implementation of the BBA
among each type of nonprofit hospitals.
Certain trends with regard to the organizational and market factors of interest are
revealed by the descriptive and bivariate analyses. First, the overall hospital total profit
margin fell significantly across the post-BBA period, particularly in the first year
following the implementation of the BBA. The average hospital total profit margin
decreased from 2.46 percent in 1997 to 1.52 percent in 1998. This provides evidence that
the BBA may have a direct impact on hospitals‘ financial performance. Yet the decreases
in total profit margin became less dramatic after 2001. From 2001 to 2003, the overall
hospital profit margin declined slightly from 0.67 percent to 0.65 percent. The
implementation of the HH IPS and/or BBRA of 1999 should play an effective role in
slowing down the deterioration of hospital financial conditions.
Second, the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly people in the county declined
over the study period. This may be a result of the implementation of the BBA which
made HH services unprofitable. Third, during the study period, both hospital nursing
density (as measured by the proportion of total FTEs accounted by nursing FTEs) and
hospital average CMI in general decreased. This is reasonable because as the overall
complexity of patient conditions decreased, fewer nursing capacities are needed to take
care of the patients in the hospital. Finally, across the study period, the proportion of
system-affiliated hospitals kept rising, probably due to market pressures on hospitals to
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share resources, reduce costs, building up bargaining power, and increase legitimacy
(D‘Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; Luke and Walston, 2003).
For the market factors, the counties where acute-care general community
hospitals were located on average did not become more aged or less aged across time
during the study period, while the growth rate of the elderly population in counties
differed considerably from one year to another. Finally, two contrasting social trends are
observed in the analysis. Between 1997 and 2003, the counties where the sampled
hospitals were located, on average, became wealthier, as reflected by the increase in
per-capita income. However, the same counties experienced an overall decrease in
unemployment rate in the first half period followed by a dramatic increase in the second
half period. This is a sign that these counties were faced with increasing socioeconomic
inequity, particularly in the period of 2000 to 2003.
Summary and Interpretation of the Hypotheses Tests
The primary goal of this study is to shed light on how the objective functions of
hospitals with different ownership forms differ by comparing their responses to changes
in payment policies following enactment of the BBA. Thus, the first research question
asked: Did the relative changes in hospital provision of HH care differ among public,
religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals after the implementation of
the BBA? Four hypotheses (hypotheses 1a-1d) were proposed to examine the effects of
the ownership types on the change in hospitals‘ probability of offering HH care after the
reduction in financial incentive brought about by the implementation of the BBA.
The second major interest of this study is to examine the effects of certain organizational
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and market factors on hospital provision and change in provision of HH services after the
BBA. These factors including hospitals‘ reliance on PAC, hospital financial and
workforce capabilities, transaction uncertainty, frequency, and complexity, normative and
mimetic pressures, and the interaction of ownership and market penetration. To explore
these issues eighteen hypotheses were developed. Multivariate analyses were conducted
to test these hypotheses. The results of the hypothesis testing are shown in Table 22. The
following section will provide further discussion and interpretation of these results. The
effects of ownership will be discussed first, followed by the roles of the organizational
and market factors.
Hypotheses 1a-1d: Ownership Effects
In alignment with hypotheses 1a and 1b, for-profit hospitals were significantly
more likely than public and private nonprofit hospitals, respectively, to reduce HH
services after the implementation of the BBA, holding other things equal. Since the BBA
prominently reduced the Medicare reimbursement payments for HH services and
Medicare payment accounts for the largest portion of total HHA revenues, the
implementation of the BBA created a strong financial incentive to reduce HH provision
among hospitals. However, if hospitals of different ownership types have different
objectives, they should respond differently to the BBA, as reflected by differences in the
change in the likelihood of providing HH. This empirical finding suggests that for-profit
hospitals were the most responsive ownership type in the face of a major reduction in
financial incentive. In other words, compared with both public and private nonprofit
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Table 22. Summary of Hypotheses Tests
Hypotheses

Ownership/Factors

Supported
Offer HH
pre-BBA

Economics- Ownership
H1a
FP vs. Public
H1b
FP vs. NFP
H1c
NFP vs. Public
H1d
Secular vs. Religious
Resource Dependence
H2a~H2b
Level of hospital dependence
on post-acute care% Medicare inpatient days
H3a~H3b
Hospital financial capabilityHospital profit margin
H4a~H4b
Professional capabilityNursing density
Transaction Cost
H5a~H5b
UncertaintyLimited HHAs
H6~H6b
Frequency-Hospital size
H7a~H7b
Complexity-Hospital CMI
Institutional Theory
H8a~H8b
Normative pressureElderly population %
H9~H9b
Normative pressureElderly population growth rate
H10a
Mimetic pressureNFPs x FP market penetration
H10b
Mimetic pressureFPs x NFP market penetration

Change HH
provision post-BBA

Yes
Yes
No
Opposite
Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No
(Opposite)

Opposite

No

Yes
Yes

No
No

Yes

No

No

No
No
No

hospitals, for-profit hospitals are indeed more profit-oriented. They behave like other
profit-maximizing firms, as expected by economic theory.
This finding is consistent with the findings from Wheeler et al. (1999) on
subacute care (SAC), Horwitz (2005a) on HH, and Lucente (2006) on NH. Similar to the
current study, the studies by Horwitz (2005a) and Lucente (2006) compared hospital
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provision of HH and NH services, respectively, before and after the implementation of
the BBA, and found that for-profit hospitals were the most likely to reduce HH provision
post-BBA. Wheeler et al. (1999) reported that for-profit hospitals are more responsive to
financial conditions in their decisions to invest SAC than are nonprofit hospitals. As
expected by finance theory, profit-maximizing hospitals with lower financial returns
would be more likely than those with higher returns to search for diversified cash flow.
Wheeler and colleagues found that for-profit hospitals that experienced relatively low
financial returns began to offer more SAC services than more profitable for-profits. This
study observes similar results by including interaction terms of ownership types and total
profit margin using private nonprofit hospitals as the base group. The coefficient to the
interaction term between for-profit type and total profit margin is -0.0092 with a standard
error of 0.0049 and a p value of 0.06, which is marginally significant at the 0.05 level.
This means that compared to nonprofit hospitals, less profitable for-profit hospitals are
more likely than more profitable for-profits to provide HH care, holding other things
constant.
However, based on the aforementioned discussion, it is still unclear whether
nonprofit hospitals are also profit-oriented in nature and whether there are differences in
operational objectives among public, religious, and secular nonprofit hospitals. This
study found no significant difference in the reduction in the ratio of the probabilities of
offering versus not offering HH care between public and private nonprofit hospitals
post-BBA. Yet there are significant differences between religious and secular nonprofit
hospitals in the likelihood of dropping HH services after the BBA. As shown in Table 16
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in the previous chapter, religious nonprofits were significantly more likely than secular
nonprofits to reduce HH care since 2002. The difference in the likelihood of reduction of
HH provision between religious and secular nonprofit hospitals gradually increased over
the study period. The overall post-BBA difference is also statistically significant between
the two nonprofit ownership types.
In order to further examine these relationships, the probability of offering HH
care is simulated for hospitals with different ownership types across the study period and
plotted in Figure 13. These simulated probabilities were calculated based on the fitted
full model reported in Appendix 2, holding constant the factors except years (used here to
represent the presence of the BBA) and ownership types. The purpose of this figure is to
illustrate the relationship between ownership types and the probability of providing HH
care while holding constant all other factors for each year. More specifically, the
following steps were applied to compute the simulated probabilities:
The fitted model is simplified as:
probhh=1/(1+e-(β0+B1Years+B2Ownerships+B3Ownerships x Years+ B4Others))—(1);
Where probhh is the predicted probability of offering HH care based on the fitted
model. From (1), the following expression is obtained:
e(β0 + B1Years + B2Ownerships + B3Ownerships x Years + B4Others) = probhh/ (1- probhh) —(2);
From (2), the following expression is obtained:
β0 + B1Years + B2Ownerships + B3Ownerships x Years + B4Others =
ln(probhh/(1-probhh))—(3)
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Figure 13. A Simulation of the Probability of Offering HH Care, By Ownership Type and
Year, Holding Other Factors Constant

From (3), the following expression is obtained:
B4Others=ln[probhh/(1-probhh)-( β0+B1Years+B2 Ownerships+B3Ownerships x Years)]
Then the mean of B4Others, mean_B4Others, is calculated. Finally, the simulated
probability equals to 1/(1+e-(β0+B1Years+B2Ownerships+B3Ownerships x Years+ mean_B4Others)).
It can be seen from Figure 13 that, after holding equal other factors, the
probability of offering HH care in the first year after the implementation of the BBA rose
slightly for hospitals of all ownership types except for for-profit hospitals. Overall, the
for-profit group had a downward trend in the probability of offering HH services after the
implementation of the BBA. Surprisingly, in the second period (1998- 1999), the
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likelihood of providing HH care increased dramatically for public and private nonprofit
ownership types. The probabilities of offering HH services among hospitals of these
three nonprofit ownership types remained stable between 1999 and 2001. Between 2001
and 2002, all the ownership types had a considerable drop in the probability of offering
HH care. However, the probability among for-profit hospitals flattened out after 2002.
After holding all other considered conditions equal, for-profit hospitals and
religious hospitals had an overall (1997 through 2003) reduction in the probability of
offering HH services, while the probability of offering HH care increased for public and
secular nonprofit hospitals between 1997 and 2003. The probability decreased most
significantly for for-profit hospitals (a 20% reduction), followed by religious nonprofit
(1%). The probabilities of offering HH care among public and secular nonprofit hospitals
increased slightly by 4 percent and 7 percent, respectively. It is also clear that the trends
regarding the probability of offering HH care are similar among the three types of
nonprofit hospitals. For-profit hospitals have a pattern of HH provision very different
from the nonprofit sectors in the post-BBA periods. These findings are basically
consistent with the results of the bivariate analyses described earlier. In addition, the
simulated graph further demonstrates that the three nonprofit ownership types did not
change significantly in the probability of offering HH care in the face of the reduced
reimbursement payments that followed the implementation of the BBA, if other
conditions were all the same. This provides empirical evidence that U.S. acute-care
general nonprofit community hospitals in general may not be very sensitive to the change

160
in the reimbursement environment. It can thus be concluded that public and private
hospitals do have objectives other than profit-maximization.
These results suggest that nonprofit hospitals could be two-good producers whose
objective is to maximize total market outputs (Weisbrod, 1988). As long as the total
profit margin can be maintained or is not lower than zero, they will continue to offer
unprofitable services to meet the health care needs of the community. While Weisbrod‘s
original model focuses on private nonprofits, scholars have extended this perspective to
view all nonprofit (including public and private nonprofits) hospitals as the producers
providing the under-supplied but necessary services such as charity care in the market
(Frank and Salkever, 1991).
Based on the two-good model, the increase in the probability of offering HH care
among nonprofit hospitals between 1997 and 2001 can be explained as efforts nonprofit
hospitals made to make up for the loss of for-profit hospital-based HHAs and expected
loss of the total hospital-based HHA capacities. By doing this, the overall HH care need
could be met.
However, between 2001 and 2002, the probability of offering HH care among
nonprofit hospitals dropped significantly. This may be a result of the combination of the
implementation of the HH PPS on October 1, 2000 as well as that nonprofit hospitals‘
profit margins had reduced considerably due largely to the implementation of the BBA
since 1997. Yet it can also be argued that public and private nonprofit hospitals are
inefficient profit maximizers, although public hospitals have seldom been modeled in this
way.
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It should be noted that the discussion here focuses largely on the relative change
or simulated change, not the real change in the probability of offering HH care among
different hospital ownership forms. In fact, hospitals of all ownership types declined in
HH provision during the study period. Therefore, the finding should still be consistent
with that of Bazzoli and colleagues (2006) who reported a reduction in uncompensated
care provision in safety-net hospitals that were largely comprised of public and religious
hospitals after a decline in Medicaid payments resulting from the BBA.
With respect to the significant difference in the change in probabilities of offering
HH care between religious and secular nonprofit hospitals after the BBA, a number of
explanations are provided. First, more than 80 percent of religious nonprofit hospitals
were members of health systems, while only 40-50 percent of secular nonprofit hospitals
were system-affiliated hospitals in the study period. Religious health systems should be
able to take an advantage of their systemized structures in the arrangement of acute and
PAC continuum. If religious health systems are more likely to adopt certain types of
regional planning strategies or are more effective in arranging PAC services for their
member hospitals as compared to their secular counterparts, individual religious hospitals
may be more flexible in discontinuing HH services. This is likely because in the face of
the payment reduction resulting from the BBA, religious health systems may take a more
active role in arranging or centralizing PAC services in the region. The benefits of doing
this include economies of scale or scope, resource sharing, and meeting the community
need as well as the bottom line at the same time.
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The second explanation may be that religious hospitals carried a larger
responsibility for providing uncompensated care, compared to their secular counterparts.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the BBA also reduced the adjustment received by hospitals
that treat a disproportionate share of low-income patients. Thus, religious hospitals might
have perceived a stronger impact from the BBA than secular nonprofits. As a result,
religious hospitals were more likely than secular hospitals to reduce HH care after the
implementation of the BBA.
The third possible explanation for the difference in the change in HH provision
between the religious and secular ownership types would be that secular nonprofit
hospitals are governed directly by their communities, while religious hospitals are
directed in large part by church authorities or large healthcare systems in the case of
Catholic hospitals. While the community representatives are more concerned with the
heath care need of their communities, church representatives may have the objective of
serving the needs of their church such as for evangelical purposes, increasing church
reputation or/and competitive power (Bercea, Ekelund, and Tollison, 2005), and
delivering a social ministry in addition to meeting community needs. If the provision of
HH care is not closely related to the objectives valued highly by church authorities,
religious hospitals may be more likely to discontinue it in an environment unfavorable to
HH operation. On the other hand, secular nonprofit hospitals are not as responsive as
their religious hospitals to policy changes as long as there is a demand for PAC in the
community.
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Hypotheses 2a-9a: Effects of Organizational and Market Factors on Hospital Provision
of HH Care
In addition to revealing the ownership effects on hospital provision of HH
services after the implementation of the BBA, this study is intended to explore related
organizational and market factors that influence HH provision. Hypotheses 2a~9a are
employed for this particular purpose. This section presents the discussion of the major
findings to these hypotheses.
First, in accordance with hypothesis 2a, the proportion of hospital inpatient days
contributed by Medicare patients was found to be positively associated with the
probability of offering HH care. Here, the proportion of Medicare patients in a hospital is
used to measure the hospital‘s reliance on PAC. Hospitals with higher Medicare
proportions should be faced with greater pressure of seeking suitable PAC facilities for
their discharged elderly patients. This result suggests that hospitals with a higher level of
dependence on PAC facilities are more likely to offer HH care. This finding is consistent
with the findings from Xu (2000) on HH care, and Chiu (1995) and Lucente (2006) on
NH services, although they used the Medicare proportion to measure transaction
frequency. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that hospitals‘ reliance on PAC is
associated with a greater likelihood for hospitals to offer HH care.
In alignment with hypothesis 3a, this study finds that hospital financial capability,
as measured by total profit margin, is positively associated with hospital provision of HH
care. This finding is partially consistent with the findings reported by Wheeler et al.
(1999). In their study, the size of hospital SAC was found to be negatively associated
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with hospital financial risk as measured by the variance of cash flow. That is, hospitals
with greater fluctuations in financial returns are less likely than financially stable
hospitals to provide SAC. However, the relationship between the level of financial
returns (measured by cash flow) and hospital probability of offering SAC is reported by
Wheeler et al. to be insignificant, although positive. By applying total profit margin as a
measure of financial performance, the current study demonstrates that financial resources
are important for hospitals in offering HH services.
Inconsistent with hypothesis 4a, workforce capability (as measured by the ratio of
nursing FTEs to total FTEs in a hospital and its subsidiary) is not significantly associated
with hospital provision of HH care. This suggests that hospital nursing capability does
not matter regarding HH care provision. Using a somewhat different nursing density ratio,
the number of RN and LPN per bed, Wheeler et al. (1999) and Lucente (2006) found a
significant effect of nursing density on hospital provision of both SAC and NH services.
However, nursing density was found to be positively associated with SAC provision in
the Wheeler et al. study, while it was negatively associated with NH care provision in
Lucent‘s study. There are at least two reasons that may explain why this study found no
significant relationship between nursing density and hospital provision of HH care. On
the one hand, hospitals with higher nursing density are more capable of providing HH
services. On the other hand, these hospitals are more able to provide better inpatient
acute care to their patients, reducing the need to transfer their patients to HH settings.
Contrary to hypothesis 5a, this study finds that HHA service availability
(measured by the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly people in the county) is positively
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associated with hospitals‘ probability of providing HH care. HHA availability in the local
market should reduce the level of transaction uncertainty between acute care and HH
services. Hospitals faced with lower levels of transaction uncertainty (with more HHAs
in the county) concerning discharging patients to necessary HH settings should feel less
need to provide their own HH services. However, the finding suggests that hospitals with
lower levels of transaction uncertainty in discharging patients to HHAs are more likely
than those with higher levels of transaction uncertainty to provide their own HH services.
This confusing result may be a result of the use of an imprecise measure. That is, the
number of HHAs in the county may not be able to correctly measure the actual HH
capacity in the market. It is very likely that each HHA differs materially in size or service
volume. Therefore, it is suggested that a more appropriate measure should be employed,
if available. For example, Chiu (1995) used area hospital occupancy rate as a measure of
transaction uncertainty and found positive association between the measure and hospital
provision of NH care. Also in studying the linkage between hospitals and NHs, Lucente
(2006) applied the ratio of NH beds to the elderly population in the county to measure
transaction uncertainty and found a positive association.
However, the effect of transaction uncertainty on hospital provision of PAC may
depend on the type of care studied. For example, Wheeler et al. (1999) found a negative
association between hospital size of SAC and two-year lagged hospital occupancy, a
measure used by Xu (2000) and Lucente (2006) to represent transaction uncertainty. In
studying hospital integration with HH services, Xu (2000) employed a number of
variables to measure transaction uncertainty. These variables include the ratio of the
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number of RNs and LPNs employed by HHAs to the elderly population, hospital
occupancy rate, the ratio of the number of NHs to the elderly population, and imbalanced
demand over supply of HH services (using a dichotomous variable to indicate the level of
the number of Medicare-certified HHAs relative to the elderly population). None of the
coefficients to these variables were shown to be statistically significant. These findings
may suggest that transaction uncertainty is not a major concern in hospitals‘ decisions to
offer HH care, at least not in the expected way.
Consistent with hypothesis 6a, hospital size, which is used to measure transaction
frequency, is empirically found to be associated positively with hospital provision of HH
care. Hospital size has been consistently demonstrated by a number of studies to be
associated positively with hospital offering of PAC services such as HH (Xu, 2000), SAC
(Wheeler et al., 1999), NH (Lucente, 2006), and end-of-life care (White et al., 2002).
Several theoretical perspectives would predict that larger hospitals are more likely to
offer HH services. First, this relationship may be predicted by economies of scale or
scope from the viewpoint of economics. Second, resource dependence theory argues that
larger hospitals have more resources to provide more necessary services. Also, larger
hospitals usually have more patients and diverse health care needs, driving hospitals to
integrate various services in order to secure their patient sources, the most critical
resource for hospitals. Finally, from the perspective of transaction cost economics, larger
hospitals may need to be involved with more activities discharging patients to necessary
PAC services, thus increasing transaction frequency and transaction costs. In order to
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reduce related transaction costs, these hospitals may set up their own PAC facilities and
provide PAC services for their discharged patients.
Furthermore, this study observes a positive and significant effect of hospital CMI
on hospital provision of HH care. Most of the people who need HH care are partially
dependent patients whose conditions may be more complex than those who do not need
HH care. The CMIs of these chronic conditions should be higher. This result suggests
that transaction complexity is a key concern in transferring patients to HHAs. That is,
hospitals with more medically complex patients are more likely to offer HH services,
driven by the difficulty and relating costs in transferring these medically complex
patients to external HHAs. Thus hypothesis 7a is supported.
Consistent with hypothesis 8a, normative pressure (as measured by the proportion
of elderly population in the county) is a driving force for hospital adoption of HH care.
Previous studies such as Wheeler et al. (1999) and Xu (2000) were unable to find a
discernable effect of elderly population proportion on hospital offering of SAC and HH,
respectively. This study empirically reveals that higher social pressures resulting from
higher elderly density in the local area is associated with hospitals to provide their own
HH care. It is also possible that hospitals in counties with a higher elderly density view it
as a market opportunity for PAC diversification.
However, the second measure of the level of social/normative pressure, elderly
population growth rate in the county, is noted to be not significantly associated with
hospital offering of HH services. Possible explanations include (1) the change in elderly
population may not be directly perceived by the residents in a community; (2) elderly
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population change varies year by year. Hence, people in the community will evaluate the
need of LTC/PAC in the community based on the elderly proportion instead of the
change in the elderly population.
Hypotheses 2b-10b: Effects of Organizational and Market Factors on Hospital Provision
of HH Care after the Implementation of the BBA
One of the major interests of this study is to examine the factors that affect
hospitals‘ decisions to drop HH care after enactment of the BBA. From the results
presented in Chapter 5, it is clear that only one of the factors examined has significant
effect on changing hospitals‘ probabilities of offering HH services. More specifically,
only ownership type (i.e., for-profit versus public and private nonprofit hospitals, and
religious nonprofit versus secular nonprofit hospitals) can statistically explain the relative
decrease in the probability of offering HH care post-BBA. All other organizational and
market factors considered overall did not influence hospitals‘ changes in provision of HH
services, except for nursing FTE proportion whose effect is marginally significant.
The non-significant effects of the organizational and market factors on the
changes in hospital provision of HH care suggest that the change in financial incentive is
the most critical and consistent consideration in hospitals‘ responses to the
implementation of the BBA. Compared to the ownership effects resulting from hospitals‘
objectives, other factors are minimized when it comes to planning for the strategic
change in HH care in the face of the BBA. However, this does not mean that these
organizational and market factors are no longer important in hospital managers‘
considerations concerning HH provision. These factors are still in the hospital‘s equation
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of HH provision but simply do not affect the change in hospitals‘ likelihood of providing
HH services in the post-BBA period.
Also, the findings related to the role of the organizational and market factors in
the change in HH provision could also be a result of the analytical approach used here. It
is likely that hospital managers made service provision decisions in one particular year
based on the performance and situation of the previous year. However, this study
assumes no time lag between performance evaluations and decisions. Nevertheless, most
of the factors considered such as ownership, CMI, nursing staff proportion, proportion of
Medicare patients, hospital size, and market characteristics are basically quite stable for
individual hospitals. The application of a time-lagged approach may not make a big
difference to the result.
In addition, although this study observes expected spillover effects of nonprofit
hospitals on for-profit hospitals, and vice versa (hypotheses 10a and 10b), the effects are
not statistically significant. This suggests that the mimetic pressure resulting from cross
ownership influence may be present, but it is relatively weak. Horwitz and Nichols (2007)
reported that nonprofit hospitals were more likely to offer HH services in the high than
the low for-profit penetration markets when the services were profitable (in the pre-BBA
period). Yet when the services became less profitable, nonprofit hospitals reduced their
likelihood of offering HH services more dramatically in high than low for-profit
penetration markets. The results for for-profit hospitals are similar. The directions of the
relationships found in the current study are consistent with those from Horwitz and
Nichols, but the relationships are not significant. The difference in these findings may be
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due to the different definitions employed by the current study and that conducted by
Horwitz and Nichole.
The Relationships between the Control Variables and Hospital Provision of HH Care
As expected, all the control variables are significantly associated with hospitals‘
likelihood of providing HH care. Teaching hospitals and system-affiliated hospitals were
less likely to offer HH care than non-teaching and freestanding hospitals, respectively. As
mentioned earlier, health systems may have particular regional resource sharing
mechanisms (Luke, Walston, and Plummer, 2004), thus reducing system member
hospitals‘ likelihood of establishing their own HHAs. In addition, teaching hospitals may
focus largely on providing acute care tertiary services, conducting educational programs
and research projects rather than offering PAC services. This study also found that rural
hospitals were more likely than their urban counterparts to provide HH care, due
probably to the relative lack of family members to take care of the dependent elderly at
home in rural areas.
Finally, two variables measuring local ability to pay for health care were
controlled for in the analysis. Results show that hospitals located in counties with higher
unemployment rates were less likely than those located in counties with lower
unemployment rates to offer HH services. This result makes sense since counties with
higher unemployment rates should be less able to pay for HH care, given some of HH
services are privately paid. There might be more uninsured people in these counties, thus
reducing the motivation of hospitals to set up HHAs. It is also observed that hospitals
were more likely to discontinue HH services in higher than in lower per-capita income
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counties. If county per-capita income also measures local ability to pay for health care,
the result should be opposite. Obviously these findings contradict with each other.
However, it is very likely that counties with higher per-capita incomes have more
working residents, and they are less likely to need HH services.
Implications of the Findings
The findings of this study have several important implications. The discussions of
the implications in this section are divided into four parts, including policy implications,
implications for hospital managers, theoretical implications, and implications for
methodology.
Policy Implications
A number of policy implications can be drawn from the empirical findings of this
study. First, the findings reported here provide evidence in support of tax exempt status
for private nonprofit hospitals. This study reveals that private nonprofit hospitals‘
objectives are similar to those of their public counterparts but are very different from
those of for-profit hospitals. Public and private nonprofit hospitals together play a critical
role in meeting the total health care need of the market. In this light, they exist because of
market failure or the expectation of market deficiency such as the expected reduction in
HH provision after the BBA. Therefore, the tax benefits enjoyed by nonprofit hospitals
should be justifiable given their provision of the necessary but under-supplied services
(because these services are less profitable or unprofitable) in the health care market.
Second, these findings do not support the argument that ―We (the U.S.) are the
only advanced country in the world that has chosen to leave health care to the tender
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mercies of a panoply of for-profit businesses, whose purpose is to maximize income and
not to provide health‖ quoted earlier in this dissertation. Thus, in thinking of health care
reform or policy changes, it may be more appropriate to view hospitals as groups with
different objectives instead of one industry with an overarching for-profit purpose. As
Horwitz (2005a: 796) states, ―ownership could be considered in designing
reimbursement policies‖.
Third, this study provides evidence that the BBRA of 1999 were particularly
effective in stopping or slowing down the declining pace of HH care provision among
for-profit hospitals. The decline in the probability of offering HH care among for-profit
hospitals flattened out right after the implementation of the BBRA at the end of 1999 in
both the actual or simulated probability figures (see Figures 12 and 13, respectively).
However, the BBRA does not seem to have an influence on provision of HH services
among public and private nonprofit hospitals. Surprisingly, the HH PPS which is
considered to be less stringent in HH service reimbursement than the HH IPS did not
significantly change the reduction pace in the probability of offering HH care among
hospitals of all ownership types in the actual probability figure, but did significantly
reduced the probability among all ownership types in the simulated probability figure.
This may be a result of hospitals‘ view of the HH PPS as another major policy scheme
for controlling Medicare HH expenditures and reducing HH reimbursement.
Finally, between 1997 and 2003, the share of nonprofit hospital-based HHAs
increased, due to the dramatic decline in the number of for-profit hospital-based HHAs
after the implementation of the BBA. If nonprofit HHAs are more likely than their
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for-profit counterparts to provide services with better quality (Rosenau and Linder, 2003),
the BBA might have brought some benefits to the quality of overall HH services. The
quality benefits could offset some of the negative impacts resulting from the reduction in
access to hospital-based HH services. This may explain in part why researchers were not
able to find discernable reductions in quality of PAC services received by Medicare
patients after the BBA (e.g., McCall, Korb, Petersons, and Moore, 2003; Kilgore et al.,
2009).
Management Implications
This study provides at least three insights for hospital managers. First, private
nonprofit hospital managers can use the empirical evidence found in this study to support
their tax exempt status. In addition, most of the organizational and market factors
examined here are significantly associated with hospital provision of HH services. In
considering providing HH services or diversifying into PAC services, hospitals can
conduct a comprehensive assessment of their situations based on these factors.
Furthermore, a key contribution of this study is to reveal that, in response to a
major payment policy change, hospitals‘ adaptive strategies concerning service provision
may be based largely on their operative objectives rather than other organizational or
market performance or conditions following the implementation of the policy. Whether
this phenomenon is specific to hospital provision of HH care in response to the BBA or is
also applicable to hospital provision of other service types after the implementation of
other policies warrants further research.
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Theoretical Implications
A number of theoretical implications can be drawn here. First, the findings of this
study mostly support the economic model viewing nonprofit hospitals as two-good
producers whose objective function is to maximize market output for meeting the health
care needs of the community. Yet the possibility that nonprofit hospitals are inefficient
profit-maximizers still cannot be totally ruled out based on the analytical results.
Second, this study empirically demonstrates the different behavior between
religious and secular nonprofit hospital groups. Nevertheless, the proposed conceptual
model in Chapter 3 is not able to explain the difference observed. Given the fact that very
limited existing theoretical or conceptual models can be applied to differentiate these two
nonprofit hospital sectors, this study calls for further development of conceptual
frameworks in exploring the distinct behaviors between religious and secular nonprofit
hospitals.
Third, the findings of this study strengthen the argument of and the proposal for
using multi-theoretical frameworks in empirical research. It can be seen from the results
of the hypothesis tests that only part of the constructs proposed by each organization
theory are empirically supported. This finding suggests that there is no perfect or ideal
theory that alone can explain or predict all the relations regarding hospitals‘ responses to
environmental changes. Each theoretical perspective has its own strengths and
weaknesses. In this regard, different theories are in fact complementary in providing a
wider and more comprehensive view of organization behaviors. However, the difference
in theoretical predicting ability may be due to the extent to which the measures are
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appropriately selected. Thus, alternative measures may be needed for further tests of the
theories.
Methodology Implications
Policy evaluation is an important task for researchers and analysts. This study
demonstrates a straightforward analytical approach for conducting longitudinal research
to examine several aspects of hospital behavior across time following the implementation
of a particular policy. In addition, compared to previous related studies, the current study
should be able to obtain a more valid estimation of the relationships of interest by taking
into account more organizational and market factors drawn from relevant theories.
Possible validity issues or biases related to data and analysis are also considered and
addressed with reasonable efforts. Therefore, this study provides a useful example for
future related research.
Limitations of the Study
There are several noteworthy limitations to this study that should be addressed.
First, there might be history threats present in this study. Although this study controls for
potential state policy effects, the approach employed here only control for the differences
present throughout the study period. That is, possible changes in reimbursement
payments in individual states within the study period may fail to be controlled for
(Spector, Cohen, and Pesis-Katz, 2004). In addition, no effort was taken to isolate the
effects of concurrent events that might influence hospital provision of HH services at the
national level. However, the implementation of the BBA has been widely recognized as
the national landmark policy affecting the operation of acute-care, PAC, and LTC
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organizations in the late 90s. In addition, the findings here are aligned with the expected
path of hospitals‘ responses following the implementations of the HH IPS, BBRA, and/or
HH PPS. No other underlying effects resulting from national policies or events could be
observed in the analysis.
Second, there might be issues resulting from omitted variables. For example, the
financial performance of hospital-based HHAs should be a critical factor in the equation
of hospital closure of HHAs. Yet this factor is not included in the analytical model due to
technical difficulty. Nevertheless, pre- versus post-BBA indicators (i.e., the year
dummies) were employed to represent the overall profitability of HH agencies in this
study. This is based on the assumption that HH services were profitable before and
unprofitable after the BBA (Horwitz, 2005b). In this case, if the financial performance of
individual hospital-based HHAs is controlled for, it may not be able to see the post-BBA
effect which is the primary interest of this study. This is because the actual financial
impact of the BBA reflected by the financial performance of HHAs is set to be equal.
That is, this may cause an issue of an overspecified model in this analysis (Wooldridge,
2006: 94-95). Therefore, this study examines a perceived impact (post-BBA effect) rather
than a direct impact (i.e., the effect of the actual reduction or change in hospital-based
HHA financial performance post-BBA) of the BBA. Also, a hospital total profit margin
measure is included in the analysis to reflect the overall financial performance of
individual sampled hospitals. Future research may be conducted to evaluate the direct
impact of the BBA on hospital operations.
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Another set of omitted variables include other PAC/LTC services individual
hospitals provide as well as other types of arrangement for provision of these services.
These factors should also be in the equations of hospitals‘ provision of HH services.
However, there are issues of reverse causality between these factors and hospital HH
provision. Those hospitals that already owned a HHA should have lower likelihood of
having other PAC services and other service arrangements. For the issue of service
arrangement, system membership has been included in the analysis, which is supposed to
partially control for the effect of service arrangement. For the issue of other type of PAC
services, the effect of NH provision may need to be considered since HH and NH care
are the two major types of PAC services hospitals provide. Future studies can apply a
bivariate probit model to simultaneously study hospital provision of HH and NH services,
while considering the correlation of these two service types.
In addition, the effectiveness or ability of health systems in arranging services
continuum among their member hospitals in a local market should also be considered. As
mentioned earlier, this factor may explain why religious hospitals were more likely to
reduce HH provision after the enactment of the BBA, compared to their secular
counterparts. However, there is still a lack of a widely-recognized measure for this factor.
Third, as mentioned in Chapter 4, there might be anticipatory effects of hospitals
in response to the BBA. However, these effects have been observed to be minor. As
demonstrated in Figures 12, the change in the percentage of offering HH services is not
significant for each ownership type in the beginning of the study period, i.e., 1997 to
1998. A dramatic drop in the percentage among for-profit hospitals was not observed
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until 1998, one year after the implementation of the BBA. According to Horwitz (2005a),
hospitals‘ probability of offering HH services were generally stable among all types of
hospitals between 1995 and 1997. The decline in the probability among for-profit
hospitals accelerated after 1997. These findings provide evidence that the anticipatory
effects of hospitals in response to the BBA before 1997 can be ignored.
Fourth, one potential limitation may result from that the pre-BBA data are based
on only one year of data while the post-BBA data are based on six-year data. Biases
could be present if the pre-BBA data are systematically under- or over-estimated.
However, there is no clear evidence that the pre-BBA data are problematic, based on the
examination of the variable statistics reported in Table 10.
Finally, this study is only applicable to the U.S. non-federal, short-term,
acute-care general community hospitals located in the 50 states and the District of
Columbia. Since the hospitals without a Medicare provider ID were excluded from the
analysis, the findings of this study should be only generalizable to those
Medicare-certified general community hospitals.
Suggestions for Future Studies
This study raises several questions for future research. While this study in fact
examines a post-BBA effect, future research might study the direct impact of the BBA on
hospital provision of HH services. This can be done by employing the reduction in HH
Medicare revenues after the BBA as the key explanatory variable.
Future studies might also study the impact of the BBA on hospital provision of
other types of PAC services such as NH care. Results of studying hospital provision of
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NH services after the implementation of the BBA are seldom reported. Given that NH
and HH services differ in service population, service scope, and revenue source, hospitals
should have different strategic considerations in changing NH provision post-BBA. New
knowledge about the linkage between hospitals and PAC services can be gained by
comparing the results from studies on hospital provision of NH services with the findings
regarding hospital offering HH care reported by previous and the current studies.
While this study applies whether a hospital provides its own HH care to indicate
HH provision, future research might use HH service volume to measure HH provision. In
response to the BBA, some hospitals may still provide HH services, but the level of
provision may be decreased. A whether-or-not measure is not able to detect the change in
the size of HH service over time. Thus, HH service volume should be a more sensitive
measure for studying the relationship of interest.
Finally, more studies are needed for revealing the different behaviors between
religious and secular hospitals. So far economic and organizational theories usually
consider these two nonprofit types to be the same health care organizations in terms of
operational objectives and resulting behaviors. However, this study and previous studies
(e.g., Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003; Hansmann, Kessler, and McClellan, 2003; White,
Cochran, and Patel, 2002) have empirically demonstrated that religious and secular
nonprofit hospitals differ significantly in operational behaviors or responses to the
change in operating environment. More sophisticated theoretical or conceptual models on
nonprofit hospitals are needed for guiding related research. On the other hand, more
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empirical studies comparing the behavior of these two hospital ownership types are
helpful in verifying the theoretical or conceptual models.
Conclusions
By using a natural experiment approach and longitudinal national hospital data,
this study sheds light on the objective functions of hospitals with different ownership
forms by comparing their relative reductions in HH provision after the implementation of
the BBA. The empirical findings reveal that for-profit hospitals behave differently as
compared to public and private nonprofit hospitals, due to their different operational
objectives. While the response of for-profit hospitals is consistent with the
profit-maximizer model, both public and private nonprofit ownership types behave
consistently in accordance with the model of two-good producers whose objective is to
maximize market outputs for meeting the health care needs of the community, given the
break-even requirement. This finding provides support for the tax exemption the United
States government has granted private nonprofit hospitals.
Although the response patterns of the nonprofit ownership types are in general
similar, this study found that, contrary to expectation, religious hospitals were more
likely than secular nonprofit hospitals to have reduced HH provision after the BBA.
Further studies are needed to explore the difference in operational behaviors between
these two ownership types.
Built on previous related studies and applying a more comprehensive set of
independent and control variables and improved data sources, this study is able to
examine the effects of certain organizational and market factors on hospital offering of
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HH care pre-BBA and the change in the provision of HH care in the six years following
the implementation of the BBA. Hospital proportion of Medicare patients, hospital size,
total profit margin, case mix index, elderly density in the market are found to be positive
determinants of a hospital‘s likelihood of offering HH care. However, these
organizational and market factors, in general, play a non-significant role in influencing
hospitals‘ changes in HH care provision after the implementation of the BBA. These
findings raise a number of relevant questions for future research.
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APPENDIX

Appendix 1. Comparison of the Three Models with Different Sets of Control Variables
Model
Variable
Year effects (Base: 1997)
Year‘98
Year‘99
Year‘00
Year‘01
Year‘02
Year‘03
Ownership effects
Religious hospital
Religious x year‘98
Religious x year‘99
Religious x year‘00
Religious x year‘01
Religious x year‘02
Religious x year‘03
Secular hospital
Secular x year‘98
Secular x year‘99
Secular x year‘00
Secular x year‘01
Secular x year‘02
Secular x year‘03
For-profit hospital
For-profit x year‘98
For-profit x year‘99
For-profit x year‘00

Simple logit
model
(1)
0.293
0.751 **
0.833 **
0.929 **
0.444
0.473
0.430 ***
-0.078
-0.133
-0.182
-0.083
-0.204
-0.157
0.085
0.008
-0.096
-0.022
0.058
0.061
0.135
0.359 *
-0.231
-0.798 ***
-1.161 ***

(1) plus State
(2) plus
Dummy
Missing Dummy
variables
Variables
0.165
0.704 *
0.673 *
0.737 *
0.263
0.270
0.658 ***
-0.105
-0.162
-0.225 *
-0.136
-0.255 *
-0.209
0.247 **
0.002
-0.100
-0.037
0.040
0.052
0.130
0.449 *
-0.273 *
-0.855 ***
-1.257 ***

0.161
0.646 *
0.639 *
0.650
0.174
0.174
0.634 ***
-0.116
-0.171
-0.228 *
-0.131
-0.254 *
-0.208
0.255 **
-0.004
-0.109
-0.045
0.035
0.039
0.114
0.459 *
-0.265 *
-0.880 ***
-1.264 ***
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Model
Variable
For-profit x year‘01
For-profit x year‘02
For-profit x year‘03
Organizational factors
Medicare
Medicare x year‘98
Medicare x year‘99
Medicare x year‘00
Medicare x year‘01
Medicare x year‘02
Medicare x year‘03
Margin
Margin x year‘98
Margin x year‘99
Margin x year‘00
Margin x year‘01
Margin x year‘02
Margin x year‘03
Nursing
Nursing x year‘98
Nursing x year‘99
Nursing x year‘00
Nursing x year‘01
Nursing x year‘02
Nursing x year‘03
Hospital size
Hospital size x year‘98
Hospital size x year‘99
Hospital size x year‘00
Hospital size x year‘01
Hospital size x year‘02
Hospital size x year‘03
Hospital CMI

Simple logit
model
(1)
-1.071 ***
-1.083 ***
-0.898 ***
0.010 ***
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.001
0.003
0.013 ***
0.000
-0.006
-0.005
0.003
-0.004
0.001
0.008
-0.011 *
-0.004
-0.012
-0.014 *
-0.002
-0.010
0.002 ***
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001 **
0.001
0.001
1.001 ***

(3) plus State
(4) plus
Dummy
Missing Dummy
variables
Variables
-1.160 ***
-1.176 ***
-1.168 ***
-1.185 ***
-0.974 ***
-1.012 ***
0.009 ***
0.002
0.001
-0.001
0.003
0.000
0.003
0.015 ***
-0.001
-0.008
-0.006
0.001
-0.006
0.000
0.002
-0.012 *
-0.007
-0.016 *
-0.017 *
-0.004
-0.014
0.002 ***
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001 **
0.001
0.001
0.800 ***

0.009 ***
0.001
0.000
-0.001
0.002
0.000
0.003
0.015 ***
0.000
-0.009
-0.006
0.001
-0.006
0.000
0.000
-0.013 *
-0.007
-0.016 *
-0.017 *
-0.003
-0.013
0.002 ***
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001 **
0.000
0.000
0.778 ***
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Model
Variable
CMI x year‘98
CMI x year‘99
CMI x year‘00
CMI x year‘01
CMI x year‘02
CMI x year‘03
Market factors
HHA/elderly
HHA/elderly x year‘98
HHA/elderly x year‘99
HHA/elderly x year‘00
HHA/elderly x year‘01
HHA/elderly x year‘02
HHA/elderly x year‘03
Elderly proportion
Elderly x year‘98
Elderly x year‘99
Elderly x year‘00
Elderly x year‘01
Elderly x year‘02
Elderly x year‘03
Growth
Growth x year‘98
Growth x year‘ 99
Growth x year‘ 00
Growth x year‘ 01
Growth x year ‗02
Growth x year‘ 03
NFP hospital x FP market
NFP x FP market x year‘98
NFP x FP market x year‘99
NFP x FP market x year‘00
NFP x FP market x year‘01

Simple logit
model
(1)
-0.110
-0.469 **
-0.423 *
-0.663 **
-0.506 *
-0.699 **
1.720 ***
-0.003
-0.215
0.080
0.226
0.074
0.002
0.033 ***
0.005
-0.001
-0.012
-0.024 *
-0.015
-0.005
0.022
0.018
0.028
-0.009
-0.008
-0.029
0.039 *
0.004
0.000
-0.002
-0.002
-0.003

(5) plus State
(6) plus
Dummy
Missing Dummy
variables
Variables
-0.010
0.029
-0.415 *
-0.380 *
-0.309
-0.265
-0.536 **
-0.483 *
-0.367
-0.308
-0.506 *
-0.436
1.540 ***
0.027
-0.166
0.116
0.259
0.074
0.016
0.023 *
0.006
0.000
-0.007
-0.019
-0.012
-0.003
0.017
0.018
0.030
0.006
0.009
-0.032
0.037
0.000
0.000
-0.002
-0.001
-0.003

1.558 ***
0.037
-0.153
0.115
0.248
0.048
-0.014
0.022 *
0.005
0.001
-0.005
-0.017
-0.010
-0.003
0.017
0.014
0.030
0.007
0.009
-0.031
0.036
0.001
0.000
-0.002
-0.001
-0.003
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Model
Variable
NFP x FP market x year‘02
NFP x FP market x year‘03
FP hospital x NFP market
FP x NFP market x year‘98
FP x NFP market x year‘99
FP x NFP market x year‘00
FP x NFP market x year‘01
FP x NFP market x year‘02
FP x NFP market x year‘03
Control variables
System
Teaching
HH CON
Rural
Income
Unemployment rate
Closure
Closure x year‘98
Closure x year‘99
Closure x year‘00
Closure x year‘01
Closure x year‘02
State dummies
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont#
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania

Simple logit
model
(1)
-0.008 *
-0.010 **
-0.004
0.003
0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.005
-0.010 **
-0.269 ***
-0.760 ***
-0.337 ***
0.393 ***
-0.022 ***
-0.025 *
-0.505 ***
-0.089
-0.141
-0.304
-0.392
-0.876 **

(7) plus State
(8) plus
Dummy
Missing Dummy
variables
Variables
-0.008 *
-0.009 *
-0.010 **
-0.011 **
-0.005
-0.004
0.003
0.003
0.004
0.004
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.004
-0.009 *
-0.009 *
-0.382 ***
-0.637 ***

-0.365 ***
-0.642 ***

0.488 ***
-0.013 *
-0.035 **
-0.542 ***
-0.076
-0.096
-0.234
-0.331
-0.799 *

0.477 ***
-0.013 *
-0.035 **
-0.449 ***
-0.072
-0.086
-0.253
-0.326
-0.804 *

-1.543 ***
-1.742 ***
-4.889 ***
-0.922 **
-1.067
-1.535 ***
-1.493 ***
-1.024 **
-0.562 *

-1.374 ***
-1.585 ***
-4.721 ***
-0.747 *
-0.778
-1.371 **
-1.314 ***
-0.839 **
-0.393
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Model
Variable
Delaware
Maryland
D.C.
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico

Simple logit
model
(1)

(9) plus State
(10) plus
Dummy
Missing Dummy
variables
Variables
0.072
0.253
-0.979 **
-0.816 *
-1.368
-1.196
-0.141
0.157
-0.684 **
-0.496
-0.995 **
-0.815 *
-1.497 ***
-1.324 ***
-0.275
-0.098
-0.524 *
-0.335
0.245
0.421
-0.466
-0.288
-0.696 **
-0.525
-1.641 ***
-1.478 ***
-0.686 *
-0.513
-0.610 *
-0.410
-0.002
0.161
-1.392 ***
-1.221 ***
-0.579 *
-0.417
-0.365
-0.201
0.033
0.234
-0.940 **
-0.773 *
-0.422
-0.095
-0.515
-0.347
-0.817 **
-0.527
0.812 *
1.001 **
-0.681 **
-0.432
-0.016
0.168
-0.622 **
-0.432
-0.570
-0.394
-0.131
0.043
-0.033
0.143
-0.674 *
-0.469
-0.756
-0.593
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Model
Variable
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Washington
Oregon
California
Alaska
Hawaii
CMI_d
CMI_d x year‘98
CMI_d x year‘99
CMI_d x year‘00
CMI_d x year‘01
CMI_d x year‘02
CMI_d x year‘03
Pop_d
Pop_d x year‘98
Pop_d x year‘99
Pop_d x year‘00
Pop_d x year‘01
Pop_d x year‘02
Pop_d x year‘03
Margin_d
Margin_d x year‘98
Margin_d x year‘99
Margin_d x year‘00
Margin_d x year‘01
Margin_d x year‘02
Margin_d x year‘03
Income_d
Income_d x year‘98
Income_d x year‘99
Income_d x year‘00

Simple logit
model
(1)

(11) plus State
(12) plus
Dummy
Missing Dummy
variables
Variables
-0.620
-0.427
-0.079
0.064
-0.758 *
-0.595
-0.911 **
-0.734 *
0.824 *
1.005 **
-0.341
-0.124
-0.527
-0.321
-1.110 *
-0.913
-1.377 ***
-0.242
-0.223
-0.098
-0.402
-0.346
-0.638
-1.638
0.136
0.403
-0.072
0.553
0.365
0.132
-0.844 **
-0.037
0.111
0.180
0.100
0.480
0.605 *
1.499
0.073
-0.400
-0.052
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Model
Variable
Income_d x year‘01
Income_d x year‘02
Income_d x year‘03
Constant
Model Statistics
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald χ2
P(>Wald χ2)
Pseudo R2
N
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Simple logit
model
(1)

-2.330 ***
-19787.842
1399.52
(df=109)
<0.001
0.125
32642

(13) plus State
(14) plus
Dummy
Missing Dummy
variables
Variables
-0.465
-0.537
-0.206
-1.429 ***
-1.504 ***
-19056.515
1603.70
(df=158)
<0.001
0.157
32642

-18920.998
1775.75
(df=186)
<0.001
0.163
32642
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Appendix 2. Completed Results of the Full Model
Variable
Year effects (Base: 1997)
Year‘98
Year‘99
Year‘00
Year‘01
Year‘02
Year‘03
Ownership effects
Religious hospital
Religious x year‘98
Religious x year‘99
Religious x year‘00
Religious x year‘01
Religious x year‘02
Religious x year‘03
Secular hospital
Secular x year‘98
Secular x year‘99
Secular x year‘00
Secular x year‘01
Secular x year‘02
Secular x year‘03
For-profit hospital
For-profit x year‘98
For-profit x year‘99
For-profit x year‘00
For-profit x year‘01
For-profit x year‘02
For-profit x year‘03
Organizational factors
Medicare
Medicare x year‘98
Medicare x year‘99

Odds ratio
1.156
1.880
1.846
1.878
1.180
1.170

Coefficient
0.145
0.631 *
0.613
0.630
0.165
0.157

Standard error
0.241
0.274
0.324
0.334
0.351
0.358

1.884
0.891
0.843
0.793
0.873
0.775
0.813
1.291
0.993
0.895
0.953
1.031
1.041
1.120
1.591
0.768
0.416
0.284
0.309
0.306
0.373

0.633 ***
-0.115
-0.171
-0.231 *
-0.136
-0.255 *
-0.207
0.256 **
-0.007
-0.111
-0.048
0.031
0.040
0.113
0.464 *
-0.263
-0.876 ***
-1.257 ***
-1.173 ***
-1.185 ***
-0.987 ***

0.132
0.078
0.098
0.109
0.118
0.127
0.133
0.090
0.050
0.062
0.073
0.079
0.083
0.088
0.184
0.135
0.174
0.209
0.217
0.223
0.222

1.009
1.001
1.000

0.009 ***
0.001
0.000

0.002
0.002
0.002
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Variable
Medicare x year‘00
Medicare x year‘01
Medicare x year‘02
Medicare x year‘03
Margin
Margin x year‘98
Margin x year‘99
Margin x year‘00
Margin x year‘01
Margin x year‘02
Margin x year‘03
Nursing
Nursing x year‘98
Nursing x year‘99
Nursing x year‘00
Nursing x year‘01
Nursing x year‘02
Nursing x year‘03
Hospital size
Hospital size x year‘98
Hospital size x year‘99
Hospital size x year‘00
Hospital size x year‘01
Hospital size x year‘02
Hospital size x year‘03
Hospital CMI
CMI x year‘98
CMI x year‘99
CMI x year‘00
CMI x year‘01
CMI x year‘02
CMI x year‘03
Market factors
HHA/elderly

Odds ratio
0.999
1.002
1.000
1.003
1.015
1.000
0.992
0.994
1.002
0.995
1.000
1.000
0.988
0.994
0.984
0.984
0.997
0.988
1.002
1.000
1.000
1.001
1.001
1.000
1.000
2.180
1.026
0.684
0.769
0.613
0.733
0.641
4.764

Coefficient
Standard error
-0.001
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.000
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.015 ***
0.003
0.000
0.004
-0.008
0.004
-0.006
0.005
0.002
0.006
-0.005
0.008
0.000
0.007
0.000
0.005
-0.012 *
0.005
-0.006
0.006
-0.016 *
0.007
-0.017 *
0.007
-0.003
0.007
-0.013
0.007
0.002 ***
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.001 **
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.779 ***
0.216
0.026
0.167
-0.379 *
0.183
-0.263
0.215
-0.489 *
0.208
-0.311
0.218
-0.445
0.233
1.561 ***

0.190
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Variable
HHA/elderly x year‘98
HHA/elderly x year‘99
HHA/elderly x year‘00
HHA/elderly x year‘01
HHA/elderly x year‘02
HHA/elderly x year‘03
Elderly proportion
Elderly x year‘98
Elderly x year‘99
Elderly x year‘00
Elderly x year‘01
Elderly x year‘02
Elderly x year‘03
Growth
Growth x year‘98
Growth x year‘ 99
Growth x year‘ 00
Growth x year‘ 01
Growth x year ‗02
Growth x year‘ 03
NFP hospital x FP market
NFP x FP market x year‘98
NFP x FP market x year‘99
NFP x FP market x year‘00
NFP x FP market x year‘01
NFP x FP market x year‘02
NFP x FP market x year‘03
FP hospital x NFP market
FP x NFP market x year‘98
FP x NFP market x year‘99
FP x NFP market x year‘00
FP x NFP market x year‘01
FP x NFP market x year‘02
FP x NFP market x year‘03

Odds ratio
1.030
0.855
1.121
1.275
1.055
0.987
1.023
1.006
1.002
0.996
0.984
0.991
0.998
1.016
1.015
1.030
1.007
1.008
0.970
1.037
1.001
1.000
0.998
0.998
0.997
0.991
0.989
0.996
1.003
1.003
0.999
0.998
0.996
0.991

Coefficient
0.029
-0.157
0.114
0.243
0.054
-0.013
0.023 *
0.006
0.002
-0.004
-0.016
-0.009
-0.002
0.016
0.015
0.029
0.007
0.008
-0.031
0.036
0.001
0.000
-0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.009 *
-0.011 **
-0.004
0.003
0.003
-0.001
-0.002
-0.004
-0.009 *

Standard error
0.087
0.125
0.141
0.157
0.178
0.198
0.010
0.006
0.008
0.009
0.010
0.010
0.011
0.015
0.020
0.020
0.018
0.019
0.024
0.019
0.003
0.002
0.003
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
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Appendix 2 (continued)
Variable
Control variables
System
Teaching
Rural
Income
Unemployment
Closure
Closure x year‘02
CMI_d
Margin_d
Margin_d x year‘03
State dummies
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont#
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Maryland
D.C.
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin

Odds ratio

Coefficient

Standard error

0.694
0.526
1.598
0.987
0.966
0.577
0.504
0.195
0.490
1.517

-0.365 ***
-0.642 ***
0.469 ***
-0.013 *
-0.035 **
-0.550 ***
-0.686 *
-1.634 ***
-0.713 **
0.417 *

0.060
0.150
0.085
0.006
0.013
0.108
0.327
0.364
0.227
0.179

0.215
0.174
0.008
0.401
0.387
0.215
0.227
0.365
0.569
1.091
0.375
0.256
0.991
0.516
0.375
0.226
0.749
0.606
1.292
0.635
0.501
0.193

-1.537 ***
-1.747 ***
-4.883 ***
-0.914 **
-0.950
-1.538 ***
-1.483 ***
-1.007 **
-0.564 *
0.087
-0.982 **
-1.363
-0.009
-0.661 *
-0.981 **
-1.486 ***
-0.289
-0.502 *
0.256
-0.454
-0.691 **
-1.645 ***

0.378
0.442
1.040
0.313
0.625
0.444
0.251
0.311
0.249
0.879
0.338
0.702
0.339
0.264
0.325
0.270
0.245
0.248
0.267
0.243
0.256
0.277
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Appendix 2 (continued)
Variable
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Washington
Oregon
California
Alaska
Hawaii
Constant
Model Statistics:
Log pseudolikelihood=
Wald χ2 (df=157)=
Prob (>Wald χ2 (157))=
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Odds ratio
0.508
0.563
0.994
0.250
0.556
0.690
1.070
0.389
0.767
0.596
0.498
2.295
0.551
1.004
0.551
0.571
0.885
0.977
0.531
0.470
0.555
0.909
0.469
0.407
2.314
0.751
0.626
0.341

-18933.834
1602.52
<0.0001

Coefficient
Standard error
-0.678 *
0.269
-0.575 *
0.266
-0.006
0.273
-1.385 ***
0.302
-0.587 *
0.263
-0.371
0.277
0.068
0.261
-0.943 **
0.329
-0.265
0.343
-0.517
0.284
-0.697 *
0.277
0.831 *
0.347
-0.596 *
0.259
0.004
0.281
-0.596 **
0.225
-0.561
0.325
-0.122
0.363
-0.024
0.484
-0.633 *
0.317
-0.755
0.415
-0.589
0.318
-0.095
0.314
-0.758 *
0.383
-0.899 **
0.295
0.839 *
0.368
-0.287
0.228
-0.468
0.589
-1.076
0.557
-1.332 **
0.423
N=
Pseudo R2 =

32642
0.163
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Appendix 3. Completed Results of the Reduce Model with the Post-BBA Dummy
Variable
Variable
Post-BBA (vs. Pre-BBA)
Ownership effects (vs. Public)
Religious
Religious x Post-BBA
Secular
Secular x Post-BBA
For-profit
For-profit x Post-BBA
Organizational factors
Medicare
Medicare x Post-BBA
Margin
Margin x Post-BBA
Nursing
Nursing x Post-BBA
Hospital size
Hospital size x Post-BBA
CMI
CMI x Post-BBA
Market factors
HHA/elderly
HHA/elderly x Post-BBA
Elderly
Elderly x Post-BBA
Growth
Growth x Post-BBA
NFP x FP market
NFP x FP market x Post-BBA
FP x NFP market
FP x NFP market x Post-BBA
Control variables
System
Teaching

Odds ratio
1.357

Coefficient
0.305

Standard error
0.253

1.865
0.833
1.278
1.009
1.625
0.385

0.623 ***
-0.183 *
0.245 **
0.009
0.485 **
-0.956 ***

0.132
0.090
0.090
0.059
0.183
0.159

1.009
1.000
1.015
0.996
1.000
0.990
1.002
1.000
2.114
0.799

0.009 **
0.000
0.015 ***
-0.004
0.000
-0.010
0.002 ***
0.000
0.749 ***
-0.224

0.002
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.214
0.165

4.956
1.073
1.024
0.996
1.015
1.010
1.001
0.996
0.995
1.000

1.601 ***
0.070
0.024 *
-0.004
0.015
0.010
0.001
-0.004
-0.005
0.000

0.191
0.113
0.010
0.007
0.015
0.015
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003

0.694
0.533

-0.366 ***
-0.629 ***

0.059
0.148
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Appendix 3 (continued)
Variable
Rural
Income
Unemployment
Closure
Closure x Post-BBA
CMI_d
CMI _d x Post-BBA
Margin_d
Margin_d x Post-BBA
State dummies
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont#
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Maryland
D.C.
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
Kentucky
Tennessee

Odds ratio
1.576
0.983
0.944
0.678
0.937
0.252
0.701
0.422
1.271
0.223
0.177
0.008
0.423
0.406
0.228
0.246
0.397
0.587
1.127
0.403
0.295
1.033
0.538
0.398
0.236
0.755
0.625
1.281
0.669
0.522
0.198
0.523
0.580

Coefficient
Standard error
0.455 ***
0.083
-0.017 **
0.006
-0.057 ***
0.012
-0.388 ***
0.113
-0.066
0.110
-1.380 ***
0.409
-0.355
0.356
-0.863 ***
0.262
0.240
0.214
-1.501 ***
-1.732 ***
-4.854 ***
-0.861 **
-0.901
-1.480 ***
-1.402 ***
-0.924 **
-0.532 *
0.120
-0.908 **
-1.222
0.032
-0.620 *
-0.921 **
-1.442 ***
-0.281
-0.470
0.248
-0.401
-0.651 *
-1.617 ***
-0.649 *
-0.545 *

0.376
0.439
1.039
0.309
0.622
0.439
0.248
0.307
0.246
0.883
0.333
0.687
0.333
0.260
0.320
0.267
0.240
0.245
0.263
0.239
0.253
0.273
0.266
0.261
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Appendix 3 (continued)
Variable
Odds ratio
Alabama
0.999
Mississippi
0.267
Minnesota
0.551
Iowa
0.667
Missouri
1.073
North Dakota
0.384
South Dakota
0.723
Nebraska
0.568
Kansas
0.478
Arkansas
2.146
Louisiana
0.555
Oklahoma
0.976
Texas
0.548
Montana
0.566
Idaho
0.917
Wyoming
0.919
Colorado
0.536
New Mexico
0.469
Arizona
0.579
Utah
0.902
Nevada
0.494
Washington
0.443
Oregon
2.464
California
0.810
Alaska
0.677
Hawaii
0.362
Constant
Model Statistics
Log pseudolikelihood
-19201.629
2
Wald χ (88)
1365.6
2
P(>Wald χ (88))
<0.0001
2
Pseudo R
0.151
N
32642
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Coefficient
Standard error
-0.001
0.266
-1.321 ***
0.298
-0.595 *
0.260
-0.405
0.274
0.070
0.257
-0.958 **
0.326
-0.324
0.339
-0.565 *
0.281
-0.738 **
0.275
0.764 *
0.337
-0.590 *
0.254
-0.024
0.277
-0.602 **
0.222
-0.570
0.325
-0.087
0.360
-0.084
0.473
-0.624 *
0.314
-0.756
0.410
-0.547
0.313
-0.103
0.306
-0.705
0.373
-0.814 **
0.291
0.902 *
0.363
-0.210
0.225
-0.391
0.586
-1.017
0.550
-1.140 **
0.419
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Appendix 4. Results of Sensitivity Analysis: Comparison of the Coefficients between the
Two Models with Dependent Variables Derived from the HCRIS and AHA
Files, Respectively

HCRIS Model
0.305

Coefficients
AHA Model
0.361

0.623 ***
-0.183 *
0.245 **
0.009
0.485 **
-0.956 ***

0.615 ***
-0.154
0.201 *
0.081
0.491 **
-1.093 ***

-1%
-16%
-18%

0.009 **
0.000
0.015 ***
-0.004
0.000
-0.010
0.002 ***
0.000
0.749 ***
-0.224

0.009 ***
0.000
0.014 ***
-0.001
0.004
-0.014 **
0.002 ***
0.000
0.721 ***
-0.247

-3%

1.601 ***
0.070
0.024 *
-0.004
0.015
0.010
0.001
-0.004
-0.005
0.000

1.520 ***
0.039
0.023 *
-0.001
0.015
0.006
0.002
-0.004
-0.005
0.000

Model
Variable
Post-BBA (vs. Pre-BBA)
Ownership effects (vs. Public)
Religious
Religious x Post-BBA
Secular
Secular x Post-BBA
For-profit
For-profit x Post-BBA
Organizational factors
Medicare
Medicare x Post-BBA
Margin
Margin x Post-BBA
Nursing
Nursing x Post-BBA
Hospital size
Hospital size x Post-BBA
CMI
CMI x Post-BBA
Market factors
HHA/elderly
HHA/elderly x Post-BBA
Elderly
Elderly x Post-BBA
Growth
Growth x Post-BBA
NFP x FP market
NFP x FP market x Post-BBA
FP x NFP market
FP x NFP market x Post-BBA
Control variables

∆%

1%
14%

-6%

37%
-14%
-4%

-5%
-7%
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Appendix 4 (continued)
HCRIS Model
-0.366 ***
-0.629 ***
0.455 ***
-0.017 **
-0.057 ***
-0.388 ***
-0.066
-1.380 ***
-0.355
-0.863 ***
0.240

Coefficients
AHA Model
-0.385 ***
-0.497 ***
0.438 ***
-0.015 **
-0.049 ***
-0.405 ***
-0.144
-1.283 **
-0.374
-0.737 **
0.292

-1.501 ***
-1.732 ***
-4.854 ***
-0.861 **
-0.901
-1.480 ***
-1.402 ***
-0.924 **
-0.532 *
0.120
-0.908 **
-1.222
0.032
-0.620 *
-0.921 **
-1.442 ***
-0.281
-0.470
0.248
-0.401
-0.651 *

-1.437 ***
-1.765 ***
-4.729 ***
-0.925 **
-0.859
-1.364 **
-1.320 ***
-0.881 **
-0.479
-0.151
-0.874 **
-1.174
0.030
-0.566 *
-0.923 **
-1.456 ***
-0.367
-0.458
0.243
-0.424
-0.592 *

Model
Variable
System
Teaching
Rural
Income
Unemployment
Closure
Closure x Post-BBA
CMI_d
CMI_d x Post-BBA
Margin_d
Margin_d x Post-BBA
State dummies
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont#
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Maryland
D.C.
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan

∆%
5%
-21%
-4%
-10%
-15%
5%
-7%
-15%

-4%
2%
-3%
7%
-8%
-6%
-5%
-10%
-4%

-9%
0%
1%

-9%
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Appendix 4 (continued)
Model
Variable
Wisconsin
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Washington
Oregon
California
Alaska
Hawaii
Constant
Model Statistics
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald χ2 (df=88)

HCRIS Model
-1.617 ***
-0.649 *
-0.545 *
-0.001
-1.321 ***
-0.595 *
-0.405
0.070
-0.958 **
-0.324
-0.565 *
-0.738 **
0.764 *
-0.590 *
-0.024
-0.602 **
-0.570
-0.087
-0.084
-0.624 *
-0.756
-0.547
-0.103
-0.705
-0.814 **
0.902 *
-0.210
-0.391
-1.017
-1.140 **
-19201.629
1365.6

Coefficients
AHA Model
-1.622 ***
-0.607 *
-0.547 *
-0.067
-1.202 ***
-0.476
-0.355
-0.333
-1.052 **
-0.216
-0.453
-0.750 **
0.783 *
-0.598 *
-0.088
-0.704 **
-0.686 *
-0.107
-0.321
-0.670 *
-0.818 *
-0.550
-0.200
-0.647
-0.814 **
0.685 *
-0.239
-0.307
-0.892
-1.259 **
-19309.34
1338

∆%
0%
-7%
0%
-9%
-20%

10%
-20%
2%
3%
1%
17%
20%

7%
8%

0%
-24%

11%

211
P(>Wald χ2 (88))
Pseudo R2
N
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

<0.0001
0.151
32642

<0.0001
0.1451
32642
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